Supreme Court’s Presidential Reference: Can Governors and the President Be Forced to Act Within Timelines?
A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court is hearing a Presidential Reference under Article 143(1) on whether courts can prescribe fixed timelines for Governors and the President to act on state bills, a question that cuts to the heart of separation of powers in India’s constitutional scheme.
On April 8, 2025, a two-judge Bench in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor held that indefinite delay by Governors in dealing with bills, effectively amounted to a "pocket veto". The court laid down structured timelines: one month for Governors under Article 200 and three months for the President under Article 201.
This unprecedented judicial direction led to a Presidential Reference seeking clarity on 14 questions, including whether courts can judicially craft timelines where the Constitution is silent, whether “deemed assent” is permissible, and the permissible scope of judicial review.
In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed timeline and the manner of exercise of powers by the Governor and the President, can timelines be imposed and the manner of exercise be prescribed through judicial orders for the exercise of discretion, President Murmu had stated.
The five-judge Bench led by CJI B.R. Gavai has underlined that it is not sitting in appeal against the April judgment, but only rendering an advisory opinion, after the President's reference. The April verdict stressed that constitutional actors must act “with all possible speed” and prescribed outer limits for assent to prevent indefinite executive inaction. The judgment drew parallels with past rulings where the Court introduced timelines to prevent abuse, such as in disqualification proceedings by Speakers. It is this attempt to judicially enforce deadlines that now stands questioned.
The Larger Question: Should the Judiciary enforce deadlines?
The debate is whether courts can enforce rigid timelines for executive decisions when the Constitution itself does not.
An important reference point here is the Constitution Bench judgment in which the Top Court had overturned the Asian Resurfacing precedent of 2018, in it ordered that which stay orders would stand automatically vacated after six months, holding that such judge-made deadlines amounted to legislation under Article 142.
In the said case, it was held that constitutional courts should not lay down a time-bound manner to decide cases, since grassroots issues are known to the courts concerned and such orders should be passed only in exceptional circumstances.
Judicial processes themselves are not bound by constitutional deadlines: the Supreme Court has over 87,000 pending cases, with judgments sometimes reserved for months. Unlike Parliament’s express statutory timelines, the judiciary largely regulates itself through practice directions and when a judicial decision like Asian Resurfacing is passed, it is overturned, citing judicial established timelines unconstitutional.
This has led to arguments that if the judiciary resists hard timelines for its own processes and pendency continues to grow, with reports suggesting that it would take 466 years to clear all criminal cases at the current rate of disposal, caution should apply before extending them to the executive.
It is important to reflect on the Solicitor General's arguments before the Supreme Court for this purpose, where is he batting for institutional balance.
Representing the Union, SG Mehta recalled that a six-week timeline for presidential assent was originally proposed but removed on Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s suggestion, replaced with the phrase “as soon as possible.” Mehta described this as a conscious omission by the Constituent Assembly.
He warned: “The alleged failure, inaction or error of one organ does not and cannot authorise another organ to assume powers that the Constitution has not vested in it… If any organ is permitted to arrogate to itself the functions of another… the consequence would be a constitutional disorder not envisaged by its framers.”
On remedies, he argued: “The perceived lapses, if any, are to be addressed through constitutionally sanctioned mechanisms, such as electoral accountability, legislative oversight, executive responsibility… Article 142 does not empower the court to create a concept of deemed assent.”
However, he emphasised that whether or not to seek the Supreme Court’s opinion is solely the President’s prerogativeunder Article 143.
Parliament's own Timelines Vs Actual Implementation
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) is one of the rare statutes where Parliament itself mandated a strict time-bound process. A corporate insolvency resolution must conclude in 180 days, extendable up to 330 days.
Yet, implementation has lagged sharply:
As of March 2025, nearly 2,000 cases remained pending before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and these are specifically, the ongoing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) cases. According to the Government of India's response to the pendency question before NCLT in Lok Sabha on August 11, 2025, NCLT backlog stood at 14,961 cases as of March 31, 2025.
This shows that even when Parliament prescribes strict deadlines, compliance in practice can fall short.
The Balancing Act Ahead
The Supreme Court’s forthcoming opinion will clarify whether timelines can be judicially imposed where the Constitution is silent, or whether such directions upset the delicate balance between elected governments, the executive, and the judiciary.
The comparison with the IBC highlights a crucial point: while time-bound governance is desirable, even statutory deadlines often falter in implementation. Whether the judiciary should fill constitutional silences with rigid deadlines, or leave such reforms to Parliament and political processes, is the key question the Court must now address.