When the Court Disarmed the State: How the Salwa Judum Judgment Prolonged Naxalism

On July 5, 2011, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court led by Justice B. Sudershan Reddy disbanded the Salwa Judum movement, a tribal led youth initiative and then recruited by the state, to counter Maoist insurgents in Bastar. In Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh, the Court not only outlawed the recruitments of the youth in  the Special Public Officers (SPO) scheme, but also ordered the recall of all firearms, the withdrawal of State funding, and the prosecution of Salwa Judum.

To civil-liberties advocates, this was a watershed victory, a constitutional court applause moment, another star on their chest, paraded to showcase against state sponsored militia. But to security planners and enforcement agencies, it came as a crippling blow. It effectively dismantled the most potent grassroots counter-insurgency mechanism the State had at the height of the Maoist war.

A Counter-Insurgency shortcut

Salwa Judum, for all its flaws, had provided the police with something they lacked, which is local intelligence networks, terrain knowledge, and manpower.

SPOs were drawn from the very villages Maoists operated in, and their role was to guide, supplement and strengthen regular police and paramilitary units. Critics argue that the Salwa Judum was misused by the State and anyone who didn't join the ops, were automatically branded "naxals". However, the security planners saw on ground, what the judges had overlooked in the name of judicial philosophy. On the ground, SPOs  weren’t just manpower—they were local guides. One detailed report observed that SPOs “provide logistical services for CRPF troops with their superior local‑level knowledge of the terrain, Maoist strategy, and camp locations,” filling gaps where the state’s security apparatus was stretched thin.”

The Court, however, stated that the disbanding was required as it was an unconstitutional abdication of the State’s duty. Justice Reddy wrote that arming civilians was “a clear transgression of constitutional limits” and condemned the State’s faith in “a might is right approach” . It was perhaps the most scathing rebuke of “muscular governance” ever delivered from the bench.

The paradox is very difficult to miss, with judicial oversight on an issue which only the Executive and soldier understood. By removing this layer of local support, the judgment robbed the State of its most effective asset against Maoists. 

Home Minister's Woes

Home Minister Amit Shah has put it bluntly: “Had the Supreme Court not banned Salwa Judum, Naxalism would have ended by 2020.”

It’s not just political rhetoric. A 2018 law review paper notes that in 2008, Salwa Judum had 23 active camps in Dantewada and Bijapur, and gathered intelligence from villagers to gather information useful to police operations. This indicates the movement had achieved a degree of operational reach, at least in those districts, not necessarily weakening Maoists, but supporting counter-insurgency efforts. The 2011 judgment could have needlessly reversed that momentum. 

In effect, the Court gave the insurgency a second wind. Bastar remained a conflict zone for another decade, with hundreds of lives lost that might otherwise have been spared.

Judicial Activism Meets National Security

The judicial philosophy underlying the judgment was clear was that fundamental rights cannot be sacrificed at the altar of counter-insurgency. But in privileging theory over ground reality, the Court unbashedly created a security vacuum. Even today, we see a convergence of lawyers, activists, and even judges that often sidelines the mandate of elected bodies, pushing courtroom-crafted solutions in place of policies shaped by public consensus.

This is the essence of Shah’s critique. The Court may have intended to strengthen constitutionalism sitting atop ivory towers, with a singular lens of judicial philosophy, touted as constitutionalism, but in practice it weakened the State’s hand. Salwa Judum was far from perfect. But to dismantle it wholesale, rather than reform or regulate, was to throw away what could have decisively broken the back of the Maoist movement.

Today, when Justice Reddy emerges as the Vice-Presidential candidate of the Opposition bloc, his 2011 judgment is more than just history. It is a political flashpoint but the truth lies in the consequences. The Salwa Judum judgment was about how courts see their role in balancing security with liberty. It is also about the tipping balance, through which the Court altered the trajectory of the Naxal conflict itself.

And if Shah is right, the price of that “activism” was not merely constitutional, it was measured in years of insurgency, lives lost, and an unfinished war.