“Best Interest of Child Is Paramount, Not That of Perpetrator”: Madras HC Upholds Joint Trial In POCSO Case

The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court has held that a joint trial in a POCSO case does not vitiate conviction unless the accused proves actual prejudice or miscarriage of justice

By :  Sakshi
Update: 2026-02-12 08:57 GMT

The Madras High Court held that procedural objections to a joint trial cannot invalidate a POCSO conviction in the absence of demonstrated prejudice.

The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court has ruled that a joint trial of multiple accused in a child sexual abuse case does not become illegal or vitiated merely because the offences were committed on different occasions, unless the accused is able to clearly demonstrate that such a procedure caused real prejudice to the defence or resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

Stressing that courts dealing with offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 must adopt a child-centric approach, the Court held that technical objections relating to joinder of charges or common questioning under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot override substantive justice when the rights and welfare of a minor victim are at stake.

The judgment was delivered by a Division Bench comprising Justice G.K. Ilanthiraiyan and Justice R. Poornima, which dismissed a criminal appeal filed by Accused No.2 challenging his conviction by the Principal Special Court for POCSO Act cases at Theni.

The Bench upheld the trial court’s judgment convicting the appellant for aggravated penetrative sexual assault under Sections 5(m) read with 6 of the POCSO Act and for rape under Section 376-AB of the Indian Penal Code, and confirmed the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him.

Following were the issues framed by the court:

(i) whether joint trial conducted by the trial Court caused any prejudice to the appellant.

(ii) Whether it is correct for both the accused to be questioned under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., with the same questionnaire and whether it causes any prejudice.

(iii) Whether joint trial can be conducted for both the accused when they did not commit the offences in the course of same transaction.

The case arose from a complaint registered in May, 2023 after information was received by the Child Helpline authorities that a minor girl had been subjected to repeated sexual abuse.

According to the prosecution, the victim, who was about 11 years old and studying in the sixth standard at the relevant time, lived with her mother in financially vulnerable circumstances. Taking advantage of her poverty and lack of familial support, multiple accused from the same village allegedly subjected her to aggravated penetrative sexual assault on several occasions.

During an inquiry conducted by a Child Helpline supervisor, it was found that the child had not menstruated for several months and was pregnant, following which she was produced before the Child Welfare Committee and medically examined.

An FIR was registered for offences under the POCSO Act and the IPC, and after completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against two accused, as a third accused named during the inquiry had died.

During trial, the prosecution examined 17 witnesses, including the victim, her mother, Child Helpline officials, Child Welfare Committee members, doctors, and school authorities who proved the age of the child. Medical evidence and documentary records were placed on record to corroborate the prosecution version.

The Special Court conducted a joint trial of both surviving accused and, upon appreciation of the evidence, convicted them and sentenced them to life imprisonment with fines.

In appeal, Accused No.2 contended that the trial stood vitiated because the offences attributed to the two accused were committed on different dates, at different places, and did not constitute the “same transaction” as contemplated under Section 223 CrPC. It was argued that the trial court conducted a joint trial without any request from the accused, framed charges jointly, and put identical questions to both accused while recording their statements under Section 313 CrPC, thereby causing serious prejudice to the appellant’s defence.

The appellant also pointed to alleged delays in lodging the complaint and forwarding materials to the court, and relied on various Supreme Court judgments to argue that such procedural lapses warranted setting aside the conviction.

Opposing the appeal, the State submitted that both accused committed similar offences against the same minor victim within a proximate time frame, and that a joint trial avoided repeated trauma to the child.

It was argued that no objection was raised by the appellant at the outset of the trial, that he had adopted the entire cross-examination conducted by the co-accused, and that no specific or tangible prejudice had been demonstrated.

The prosecution further submitted that minor procedural irregularities, even if assumed, could not eclipse the overwhelming evidence establishing the guilt of the accused.

After examining the statutory framework and precedent, the High Court reiterated that while Section 218 CrPC lays down the general rule of separate trials for distinct offences, Sections 219 to 223 CrPC carve out exceptions permitting joint trials in appropriate cases, subject to judicial discretion.

The Bench underscored that the crucial test is not whether a separate trial was theoretically possible, but whether the joint trial actually prejudiced the accused or resulted in a failure of justice.

The Court observed that the concept of “same transaction” is not to be interpreted in a pedantic manner and may be inferred from proximity of time, continuity of action, similarity of conduct, and unity of purpose.

"Whether a transaction can be regarded as the same would necessarily depend upon the particular facts of each case. Though the Legislature has left the said expression undefined, the same can be inferred by applying to cases where there is proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts. Thus, where there is a commonality of purpose or design, where there is a continuity of action, then all those persons involved can be accused of the same or different offences 'committed in the course of the same transaction'. Further when the Courts deal with an issue of child abuse, it must apply the laws in protecting the best interest of child, since interest of the child is paramount and not the interest of perpetrator of the crime. The approach must be child-centric", the court observed.

Applying these principles, the Bench held that although the accused were not acting in concert, the offences disclosed a continuing pattern of sexual exploitation of the same child, and therefore could not be treated as wholly unconnected acts.

The Court noted that the appellant neither objected to the joint trial at the initial stage nor demonstrated how the common questioning under Section 313 CrPC impaired his defence. It was also observed that the appellant had adopted the cross-examination conducted by the co-accused, which undermined his plea of prejudice at the appellate stage.

Emphasising the need for a victim-centric approach in cases of child sexual abuse, the Court held that the interests of the child must prevail over hyper-technical objections raised by the accused after conclusion of trial.

Finding no illegality, perversity, or miscarriage of justice, the Bench dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court.

Case Title: Bhagavathiraj v. State

Bench: Justice G.K. Ilanthiraiyan and Justice R. Poornima

Date of Judgment: 10.02.2026

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