Delhi HC Dismisses Vimal Elaichi Maker’s Plea Against Show Cause Notices To SRK, Ajay Devgn; Says 'Approach Maharashtra'

Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma, in a judgment reserved on September 7 and pronounced on September 14, dismissed the petition, holding that "the petitioner has failed to establish that any substantial or material part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court."

The petitioner had sought quashing of a show cause notice dated August 11, 2026 issued by the Assistant Commissioner (Food), FDA, Greater Mumbai Division, as well as a direction restraining the respondents from taking coercive action against it or its brand ambassadors for alleged non-compliance with the notice.

The petition stated that P.B. Agro LLP "recently learnt, through media reports, that FSSAI- through FDA, Mumbai; had issued the impugned notice to the petitioners' brand ambassadors in relation to the advertising campaign concerning the petitioner's product," and complained that "neither has any notice been issued to the petitioner nor has it been afforded any opportunity of hearing."

Senior Advocates Dayan Krishnan and Mohit Mathur, appearing for the petitioner, argued that the writ was maintainable under both Article 226(1) and 226(2) of the Constitution, since the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and FSSAI; the apex authority under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006; were situated in Delhi, and that "a substantial part of the cause of action had arisen in Delhi," as the petitioner carried on business only from Delhi, managed and operated the advertising campaign from Delhi, and made payments to the brand ambassadors from Delhi.

It was further argued that the directions in the impugned notice, requiring brand ambassadors to take down advertisements and not assist in disseminating them; "effectively amounted to a direction to remove and a ban on the petitioner's advertisements," such that the notice was "in substance, as good as a notice issued to the petitioner in Delhi."

Reliance was placed on Bakshish Ahmad v. Union of India and Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India. The petitioner also pointed to pending proceedings before the Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA), situated in New Delhi, on the same surrogate advertising issue.

The Central Government Standing Counsel for the Union and CCPA, along with counsel for FSSAI, opposed the petition on maintainability, contending that "neither Article 226(1) nor Article 226(2) of the Constitution was attracted," that the Ministry had "no role in the issuance of the impugned notice," and that "the mere fact that the petitioner was based in Delhi could not confer territorial jurisdiction upon this Court," particularly since the notice had been issued by FDA, Mumbai under the Government of Maharashtra; which was "not even before this Court to defend the same."

Court's Findings

The Court framed the central question as "whether this Court can exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of the impugned show cause notice issued by the FDA, Mumbai, merely because the petitioner is based in Delhi and some of the authorities impleaded in the writ petition as respondents... are located in Delhi."

Recording the undisputed facts, the Court noted that the notice was issued by the Assistant Commissioner (Food), FDA, Greater Mumbai Division, bore the heading "Government of Maharashtra, Food and Drug Administration," was addressed to three brand ambassadors who are residents of Mumbai, and that "none of the said brand ambassadors has challenged the impugned notice before this Court."

On the role of FSSAI, the Court held: "There is no direction, command, communication, order or other material placed before the Court to show that respondent no. 2/FSSAI, as the apex statutory body under the FSS Act, had directed FDA, Mumbai to issue the impugned notice... The mere fact that FSSAI is the apex body under the enactment, or that it is situated in Delhi, cannot alter the source or character of the show cause notice impugned in the present petition."

The Court further observed that the alleged injury pleaded by the petitioner was speculative: "The alleged injury is therefore, at present, founded substantially on the petitioner's apprehension regarding the possible consequences of the impugned notice issued to the brand ambassadors. Such apprehension cannot, by itself, be treated as a completed or substantial cause of action arising in Delhi... particularly when the petitioner has not been called upon to do anything and no order has been passed against it."

Rejecting the argument based on the petitioner's Delhi operations, the Court held: "The mere fact that the petitioner is incorporated, carries on business or maintains an office in Delhi cannot mean that every regulatory action taken against its product by an authority in another State becomes amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court. If such a principle were accepted, a company carrying on business throughout the country could challenge every order or notice issued by a State authority before the High Court within whose jurisdiction its registered office or principal place of business is situated."

Significantly, the Court noted that the petitioner's own averments confirmed the dispute belonged in Maharashtra, noting the petition itself asserted that "pan masala is prohibited in the State of Maharashtra," that VIMAL Elaichi "is not itself a prohibited commodity," that FDA Mumbai had allegedly admitted in media interviews the petitioner's pan masala was "not manufactured in Maharashtra since 2001," and that "no manufacturing unit or transport network dealing in VIMAL-branded pan masala has been found in Maharashtra by the GST authorities."

The Court held these were "not just incidental pleadings, but constitute a substantial part of the petitioner's challenge," showing that "the central controversy concerns the legality and correctness of an action taken by the FDA Mumbai, in relation to alleged activities in Maharashtra."

Reliance on Precedent

The Court extensively relied on Supreme Court rulings on territorial jurisdiction, quoting Alchemist Ltd. v. State Bank of Sikkim for the proposition that "even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the court, the court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a 'part of cause of action', nothing less than that." It also cited Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises, State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties, Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, and State of Goa v. Summit Online Trade Solutions (P) Ltd. on the doctrine of forum conveniens.

The Court also quoted its own Coordinate Bench's observations in Indure Private Limited v. Government of NCT of Delhi: "A petitioner who approaches this Court to assail a decision of an authority situated in Delhi, when the underlying cause for the said decision lies elsewhere, effectively attempts to make this High Court a mini-pan-India superior court exercising jurisdiction over all events which take place throughout this Country."

Distinguishing the petitioner's principal authority, the Court held that Bakshish Ahmad v. Union of India was "distinguishable on facts," since it concerned a BSF member's dismissal where the Union of India and Director General, BSF- headquartered in Delhi; were necessary parties by statute, a context the Court found inapplicable here.

Even assuming a remote cause of action existed in Delhi, the Court held it would still decline jurisdiction: "This Court is of the view that the present case is not an appropriate case for exercise of jurisdiction having regard to the doctrine of forum conveniens... the courts in Maharashtra are the natural and convenient forum for adjudication of the dispute."

The Court concluded: "The present petition is, accordingly, held to be non-maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction. In addition, the Court also finds that courts in Maharashtra are the more appropriate and convenient forum for the petitioner to raise its grievances concerning the impugned notice, as per doctrine of forum conveniens." The petition was dismissed on this ground "without expressing any opinion on the merits of the petitioner's challenge."