Karthigai Deepam Row: State Tells Madras High Court No Proof Deepathoon Ever Used to Light Lamp

The Madras high court on Thursday heard extensive arguments in the batch of appeals challenging a December 1 single judge order that permitted the lighting of Karthigai Deepam atop a stone pillar, described as “Deepathoon”, on Thiruparankundram hill, with the State strongly contending that there was no material on record to establish either the existence of such a structure as a lamp pillar or any historical practice of lighting a lamp there.

The appeals were being heard by a division bench of Justices G. Jayachandran and K.K. Ramakrishnan.

Leading the submissions for the State, Advocate General P.S. Raman argued that neither before the single judge nor before the division bench had any evidence been produced to show that the structure in question was ever used for lighting a deepam or was historically known as a “Deepathoon”. He pointed out that in an enquiry conducted pursuant to a trial court order, the district judge in 1920 had categorically recorded that the only structure atop the hill was the dargah.

Raman further relied on the stand of the temple’s Executive Officer, who had recorded that since no deepam had ever been lit on the said structure, permission to light a lamp there could not be granted. Questioning the reasoning adopted in the impugned order, the Advocate General submitted that the single judge was faced with a prayer asserting a “usual practice”, but not a usual place or manner, and nevertheless went beyond the pleadings by permitting not what existed, but what, according to the court, “ought to be”.

The Advocate General took exception to the single judge’s finding that the temple had failed in its duty by denying permission. “Did the temple authority truly fail merely by refusing permission to light a lamp at a place where it has never been lit?” Raman asked, arguing that denial of permission in such circumstances could not be equated with abdication of statutory duty.

A central plank of the State’s case was the availability of an alternate statutory remedy. Raman submitted that once the representation seeking permission was rejected, the petitioners’ only remedy lay under Section 63(e) of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. Despite this, he argued, the single judge issued a writ of mandamus. Stressing the scope of Section 63(e), Raman urged the court to carefully note the punctuation used by the legislature, stating that the provision empowered the Joint Commissioner to decide not merely personal rights, but also questions relating to “established usage”.

After the lunch break, the Advocate General reiterated that Section 63(e) was the sole remedy available to the petitioners and posed the question whether, under the guise of asserting a customary religious right, the petitioner was in effect seeking enforcement of a property right. Enforcing a new custom in the name of protecting a property right, he contended, could not be done through the writ jurisdiction under Article 226, particularly when the single judge himself had observed that he was dealing not with what existed, but with what ought to be.

Raman also addressed references in the impugned judgment to prohibitory orders under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, submitting that the validity of such orders was not under consideration in the present appeals and lay before a different forum. On maintainability, he conceded that since the authorities involved were statutory bodies, the writ petitions were maintainable, but emphasised that the real issue was whether the discretion exercised by the court under Article 226 was justified on the facts.

On the plea of res judicata, the Advocate General argued that since the Deepathoon as such had never been mentioned in earlier proceedings, that aspect was not barred. However, he submitted that the question whether a devotee could seek enforcement of Devasthanam rights was hit by res judicata, and the operative directions issued by the single judge stood restricted on that count.

Questioning the finding that the hilltop was the “appropriate” place to light the deepam, the AG said that for over a century devotees had considered Uchi Pillaiyar as the proper location. “How can we suddenly say in December 2025 that another place is more appropriate?” he asked, adding that decisions on such matters were best left to temple and district authorities.

Opposing the State’s submissions, senior advocate S. Sriram, appearing for a Hindu devotee, contended that lighting the lamp at the hilltop was an established religious practice and that the controversy was about retrieving a usage that had been conceded under earlier circumstances. He argued that there was nothing left to be remanded to HR&CE authorities since their stand was already on record and fully supported the Executive Officer’s decision.

Other counsel for devotees disputed the State’s claim that Deepathoon was never mentioned earlier, pointing to temple literature and photographs of similar lamp pillars. Submissions were also made questioning the extent to which a secular State could involve itself in religious matters.

Senior advocate Palanivel Rajan argued that Deepathoon was not a new concept and that the relief granted by the single judge was within the scope of the prayer seeking “any other order” the court deemed fit. Arguments concluded with the bench directing parties to file written submissions by tomorrow and reserving orders.

Case Title: The Executive Officer, Arulmigu Subramanian Swamy Temple, Thirupparankundram, Madurai vs. Rama Ravikumar and Others with connected matters

Hearing Date: December 18, 2025

Bench: Justices G Jayachandran and K K Ramakrishnan