Mumbai Court Clears O' Romeo Release, Limits Use Of Personality Rights To Block Films
The Mumbai City Civil Court dismissed a plea to stall the release of O Romeo, holding that personality and privacy rights claims after death are limited and cannot override freedom of expression in certified films
Rights After Death Are Limited, Rules Mumbai Court In O Romeo Dispute
The Bombay City Civil Court at Mumbai has refused to grant an ad-interim injunction restraining the release of the film O Romeo, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that the movie infringed the personality or privacy rights of her deceased father.
Declining to interfere with the scheduled theatrical release, the Court emphasised that once a film has been duly certified by the statutory authority, pre-release injunctions must be exercised with extreme caution, particularly where the alleged injury is compensable in damages and the film asserts itself to be a work of fiction.
Judge Smt. H. C. Shende, while dismissing a Notice of Motion filed in a civil suit, observed that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a clear and unmistakable identification of her deceased father with the character portrayed in the film.
The Court dismissed the application seeking restraint on the release, exhibition, broadcasting, and streaming of O Romeo, as well as the prayer for court-mandated pre-screening of the film, holding that no case for equitable relief was made out.
The suit was instituted by Ms. Sanober Shaikh, who claimed protection of the personality rights, privacy, and publicity rights of her deceased father, Hussain Shaikh, also known as “Hussain Ustara.”
The plaintiff asserted that her father was a journalist and social worker who assisted law enforcement and intelligence agencies and was allegedly killed because he posed a threat to organised crime syndicates.
According to the plaintiff, the impugned film, though presented as fictional, was substantially inspired by her father’s life and work, as reflected in public statements, interviews, social media material, and alleged references to a former police officer describing the deceased as an asset of the police.
It was contended that the teaser, trailer, and promotional material of O Romeo revealed incidents, character traits, abusive language, and a lifestyle closely resembling that of the deceased, allegedly inspired by the book Mafia Queens of Mumbai, without obtaining consent from the plaintiff or other legal heirs. On this basis, the plaintiff argued that the film violated personality rights and the right to privacy, which, according to her, survived even after death.
The plaintiff also sought a direction for pre-screening of the film by a Court Commissioner before its release.
The defendants, including producer Sajid Nadiadwala and associated entities, opposed the motion, contending that the suit suffered from gross delay and laches and was deliberately filed at the eleventh hour to pressurise the filmmakers.
They asserted that O Romeo was a complete work of fiction, did not use the name of the deceased, did not claim to be a biographical account, and carried clear disclaimers in both Hindi and English stating that characters and events were fictional.
It was further argued that personality rights and privacy rights are personal in nature and do not survive death, and that in any event, the alleged injury, if any, was compensable in monetary terms.
The defendants also drew the Court’s attention to correspondence exchanged between the parties, submitting that the plaintiff had herself demanded monetary compensation and sought permission fees, initially seeking Rs. 1 crore and later Rs. 5 crores.
According to the defendants, this demonstrated that the grievance was essentially commercial and not a genuine assertion of inalienable personal rights. They further highlighted that the film had already received certification from the competent statutory authority, which had not been challenged by the plaintiff, nor had the certifying authority been impleaded as a party to the suit.
After hearing both sides, the Court noted that it was an undisputed position that the film had been duly certified prior to its release.
The Court observed that judicial interference with certified films must be approached with extreme circumspection, and that the plaintiff had failed to challenge the certification before the appropriate forum.
On the central issue of personality and privacy rights after death, the Court held that the law in this area remained evolving and that the judgments relied upon by the plaintiff were distinguishable on facts. Relying on precedents, the Court observed that claims of reputation or privacy after death are extremely limited, especially when balanced against the freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution.
The Court further held that at the prima facie stage, it was not satisfied that the plaintiff had established a clear identification between the deceased and the character depicted in the film.
The presence of disclaimers and the absence of the deceased’s name or an explicit biographical claim weighed against the grant of injunction. Importantly, the Court found that the plaintiff’s own conduct, particularly the admitted monetary demands reflected in correspondence, undermined the equitable nature of the relief sought.
Addressing the plea for pre-screening of the film by a Court Commissioner, the Court categorically held that such a direction would amount to judicial censorship, which is impermissible in law, especially when a separate statutory mechanism exists for film certification and grievance redressal.
The Court reiterated that once an alleged injury is compensable in damages, the grant of injunction becomes legally impermissible.
Applying the settled three-fold test of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, the Court concluded that the plaintiff failed on all counts.
It held that no strong prima facie case was made out, the balance of convenience lay squarely in favour of the defendants who had invested substantial resources in production and marketing, and that any alleged injury to the plaintiff could be compensated monetarily.
Accordingly, the Notice of Motion was dismissed, with the Court clarifying that its observations were prima facie in nature and would not influence the final adjudication of the suit.
Case Title: Sanober Irfan Shaikh v. Sajjid Nadiadwala & Ors.
Bench: Smt. H. C. Shende, Judge, Bombay City Civil Court
Date of Order: 07.02.2026