Allahabad High Court examines judicial accountability and administration.

“Who judges the judge, where judges act in an administrative capacity and are alleged to have exercised discretion in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner?” questioned Justice Vinod Diwakar of the Allahabad High Court while examining concerns over judicial accountability, institutional functioning and delays in the subordinate judiciary.

Court was hearing four petitions raising concerns ranging from prolonged pendency before trial courts to non-compliance by subordinate courts with directions issued by the high court.

In a common judgment, the court examined wider questions concerning judicial accountability and the functioning of the judicial institution.

Who judges judges when they act in an administrative capacity?

Justice Diwakar observed that while judicial decisions are subject to appeal and review, administrative decisions taken by judges often escape structured scrutiny.

He said administrative powers such as roster allocation, case listing, functioning of committees and adherence to the High Court Rules can have significant consequences for fairness, equality and institutional integrity. Yet, such decisions often remain insulated from formal review in the name of judicial independence.

Court said that in such situations, accountability for administrative conduct largely rests on self-regulation, peer scrutiny and the ethical expectations attached to judicial office.

It noted that in the absence of formal review structures, the burden of “judging a judge” shifts informally to the institution itself through Full Court deliberations, internal checks and, increasingly, public scrutiny.

However, court said such “diffuse accountability” may not be sufficient.

It called for clearly articulated administrative standards, reason-giving obligations and limited but meaningful review mechanisms based on rule-bound procedures.

Such mechanisms, Justice Diwakar said, should ensure that judicial discretion, even when exercised on the administrative side, remains consistent with constitutional values of equality and fairness.

Concerns over Chief Justice-centric administration

Court also called for a “recalibration” of the Chief Justice-centric model of high court administration in favour of a more deliberative and institutionally balanced approach.

Justice Diwakar noted that the Supreme Court had envisaged a Chief Justice-centric administration combining strong leadership with a “collaborative, participative & consultative approach” and a spirit of fraternity.

However, he observed that in the Allahabad High Court there is currently “little leeway of conscious and participative dialogue” among judges on matters such as allocation of judicial business.

Court said the Chief Justice is constitutionally regarded as primus inter pares, or first among equals, but observed that the practical functioning of high courts had become markedly Chief Justice-centric.

Justice Diwakar noted that the Chief Justice “exercises exclusive administrative prerogatives,” with influence over judicial assignments and management of court resources, rendering the office structurally dominant and creating a functional hierarchy “incompatible with the formal ideal of judicial equality and constitutional morality.

Court pointed to the marginal role of puisne judges in administrative matters, saying this ran counter to approaches that emphasise participatory decision-making and institutional accountability.

It stressed that administrative autonomy remains an important component of judicial independence, but cautioned that excessive centralisation can blur the distinction between independence and insulation.

Justice Diwakar highlighted that there is little scope for conscious and participative dialogue among High Court judges on allocation of business.

Justice Diwakar also noted that allocation of work is not linked to performance, while there are no defined, codified and notified parameters governing elevation and promotion. He further observed that administrative decisions are not subjected to independent audit for fixing accountability in cases of proven favouritism, partisanship or other extraneous considerations.

Court emphasised that where the judiciary controls appointments and significantly influences its own institutional norms, it cannot entirely disclaim responsibility for institutional shortcomings.

Justice Diwakar said accountability therefore needs to be understood not merely as a shared responsibility but as “structured responsibility”, requiring the judiciary to strengthen internal transparency and adopt clearer criteria and processes.

He, however, clarified that his concern was not to question the subjective satisfaction of the Chief Justice or cast aspersions on the office.

Rather, the issue was the manner in which the high court discharged its administrative functions and the need to ensure that these functions operated within the framework of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, through procedures that were rule-bound, transparent and objective.

Court stressed that the behaviour of judges responsible for the high court's administrative affairs shapes the institution's judicial behaviour, with those administrative choices eventually establishing behavioural patterns within the judicial institution.

Court requested the Chief Justice to explore the necessity of convening Full Court meetings and opening a dialogue to ensure compliance with the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952. It also directed the Registrar (Compliance) to place a copy of the judgment before the Chief Justice, through the Registrar General, for his perusal and such further steps as he may deem appropriate.

The four petitions, apart from raising concerns over procedural delays and non-compliance with high court directions by subordinate courts, included a challenge to onerous bail conditions, two criminal cases pending for years without charges being framed despite repeated listings, and a 2013 cheque-bounce case that had been listed more than 100 times without an effective order.

Court directed expeditious disposal of the delayed cases and issued directions to ensure the appearance of the accused and address procedural lapses contributing to the delay.

Case Title: Pappu Met @ Pappu v. State of U.P. and Another (with connected matters)

Judgment Date: September 28, 2026

Bench: Justice Vinod Diwakar

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