Supreme Court restores appeal after delay condonation plea.

The Supreme Court recently observed that courts should not adopt a pedantic approach while deciding applications seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, particularly when refusing to condone the delay could defeat a party's substantive rights.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act allows courts to condone delays in filing appeals or applications after the prescribed limitation period if the applicant can show sufficient cause for not filing them on time.

A Bench of Justices M M Sundresh and Prasanna B Varale observed that the duration of delay, by itself, cannot be a ground to reject an application for condonation, especially when the appellate court has reversed a trial court decree without hearing the affected party.

Court was dealing with an appeal filed by Janardhan Dass, challenging the Himachal Pradesh High Court's decision to reject his application seeking condonation of delay in filing a regular second appeal.

The appellant had initially filed a civil suit seeking cancellation of a sale deed dated May 26, 2010, executed between him and the respondent in respect of the suit properties. He had also sought cancellation of subsequent mutation entries and a permanent injunction restraining the respondent from entering the properties.

The trial court partly decreed the suit by cancelling the sale deed, subject to the appellant repaying Rs 6.4 lakh to the respondent out of the total sale consideration of Rs 16.5 lakh. It also granted the relief of injunction.

However, the first appellate court allowed the respondent's appeal and dismissed the suit.

Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant sought condonation of delay in filing a regular second appeal before the high court. The high court dismissed his application by an order dated April 10, 2025.

Before the Supreme Court, counsel for the appellant submitted that although the first appellate court had passed a reasoned judgment, it had done so ex parte, without hearing the appellant. Counsel further submitted that the delay in filing the second appeal was also attributable to the intervening Covid-19 pandemic, but these circumstances had not been considered by the high court.

Opposing the appeal, counsel for the respondent argued that the delay fell beyond the period covered by the Covid-19 limitation extensions. It was also submitted that the first appellate court's judgment could not be termed ex parte.

The Bench noted that the trial court had partly decreed the suit in favour of the appellant, but the first appellate court subsequently set aside that decree without hearing him. The high court, in turn, refused to condone the delay in filing the second appeal.

On examining the first appellate court's judgment, Court found that the decree passed in favour of the appellant had indeed been set aside ex parte.

"Considering the facts, we are inclined to hold that the appellant is certainly entitled to the relief of condonation of delay, as merely the duration of delay per se, cannot be a ground to reject the substantive right of the appellant, especially, when it involves reversing the decision of the Trial Court," the Bench observed.

It further emphasised that courts should not adopt a pedantic approach while adjudicating applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Accordingly, Court set aside the high court's order rejecting the application for condonation of delay. It clarified, however, that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the underlying dispute.

The Bench also granted liberty to the appellant to file an appropriate application for impleading the proposed party, as the respondent was stated to have transferred the property in favour of that party during the pendency of the proceedings.

Court thus allowed the appeal.

Case Title: Janardhan Dass Vs Kirnesh Jung

Bench: Justices M M Sundresh and Prasanna B Varale

Date of Judgment: September 29, 2026

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