‘Don’t Become Surrogates for State Lethargy’: Supreme Court Sets Aside HC Order Condoning 3,966-Day Delay

The Supreme Court on September 12, 2025, ruled that administrative negligence and laxity cannot justify condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, setting aside a Karnataka High Court order that had condoned an extraordinary delay of 3,966 days by the Karnataka Housing Board in filing a second appeal in a partition suit.

A bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan held that condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is an exception and not the rule, stressing that government authorities stand on the same footing as private litigants. “Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bona fide, sufficient and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely because the applicant is the State,” the bench observed.

Court cautioned high courts against condoning delays on “frivolous or superficial grounds” and reminded that limitation laws are meant to ensure finality in litigation. It warned that constitutional courts should not act as surrogates for State lethargy.

"Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude,'' the court said.

Court emphasised that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such a callous attitude of State authorities or their instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. "They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy,'' it said.

Court said, for the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay has to be explained by establishing the existence of “sufficient cause” for the entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of filing. If the period of limitation is 90 days, and the appeal is filed belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation has to be given for the entire 100 days, the court said.   

The bench said the constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. It stressed that litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. 

"We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law,'' the bench said.   

The court pointed out that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain finality. 

"More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia,'' the bench said.

Court opined that such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again.

"As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice,'' the bench said.   

Holding that no litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law, the court allowed an appeal filed by Shivamma (since deceased, represented through legal heirs). Court set aside the Karnataka High Court’s March 21, 2017 order that condoned the 3,966-day delay. Apart from upholding the costs of Rs. 25,000 imposed by the High Court, the Supreme Court directed the Housing Board to pay an additional Rs. 25,000 to the Karnataka State Legal Services Authority within four weeks.

The bench further directed the Principal Judge (Junior Division), Kalaburagi, to conclude execution proceedings in favour of the appellant within two months, and asked its registry to circulate copies of the judgment to all high courts.

The High Court had then condoned the delay of 3966 days in preferring the second appeal against the judgment and order passed by the First Appellate Court in regular appeal arising from the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in original suit of 1989.

Court pointed out that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter; acceptability of the explanation is the criterion. The criterion for condoning the delay is sufficiency of reason and not the length of the delay, it said.  

The bench also underscored that even a strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether “sufficient cause” has been demonstrated, it said.   

As per the facts of the matter, the appellant's father owned and possessed 9 acres 13 guntas of land. Upon his demise, a suit for partition was filed owing to some disputes among the legal heirs, including appellant and one Gurulingappa C Patil.

Patil purportedly “donated” 4 acres out of the land, the subject matter of the suit, to the Government of Karnataka. In 1979, the housing board took over the possession of the land for the purpose of establishing a housing colony.

In 1989, a compromise decree was passed in the partition suit by which the appellant herein became the absolute owner of the parcel of land, including the 4 acres of land in question. 

Since the possession of the land in question was not reverted to the appellant herein, one another suit in1989 was instituted, this time against the respondent housing corporation, for the relief of declaration of title and possession of the land in question.

In 1997, the trial court dismissed the suit. On the first appeal, the First Appellate Court in 2006 allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in favour of the appellant, granting the declaration as sought in the suit. It declined the relief of possession as substantial construction had already been undertaken over the land. However, it directed the payment of compensation.

In 2011, the appellant herein initiated execution proceedings. 

In 2017, the housing board realised the seriousness of the situation and filed a second appeal before the High Court along with an application for condonation of delay of 3966 days against the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court in 2006. 

The High Court, by its impugned judgment and order in 2017, allowed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by the respondent no. 1, and thereby condoned the delay, leading the appellant to approach the apex court.

The bench finally directed the court of Principal Judge (Junior Division), Kalaburagi, to proceed with the execution of the decree in favour of the appellant and conclude the proceedings within a period of two months.

Court also directed its registry to circulate one copy each of this judgment to all the High Courts.

Case Title: Shivamma (Dead) By LRs Vs Karnataka Housing Board & Ors

Judgment Date: September 12, 2025

Bench: Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan