Human Rights Court Can Act Without Commission Recommendation: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has held that a recommendation by the National or State Human Rights Commission is not a mandatory condition for initiating criminal proceedings before a Human Rights Court for alleged violations of human rights.

A Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta said the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 contemplates two distinct institutional mechanisms for the protection and enforcement of human rights: the National and State Human Rights Commissions, which have powers of inquiry, investigation and recommendation, and Human Rights Courts, which are established for the speedy trial of offences arising out of violations of human rights.

“On the one hand are the National and State Human Rights Commissions, which have been entrusted with powers of inquiry, investigation and recommendation under Sections 12 to 18 of the 1993 Act. On the other hand, Section 30 thereof expressly contemplates Human Rights Courts for the speedy trial of offences arising out of violations of human rights,” the Bench said.

Human Rights Court and Human Rights Commission recommendation

Court clarified that the Commission and the Human Rights Court perform different functions, and a complaint need not first go through the Commission before criminal proceedings can be initiated before a Human Rights Court.

“The Commission primarily performs an inquisitorial and recommendatory role, whereas the Human Rights Court exercises judicial power in relation to offences arising out of violations of human rights,” the Bench said.

It held that the mere power given to the Commission to inquire into complaints and, where appropriate, recommend prosecution cannot be construed as making such an inquiry or recommendation an indispensable condition for initiating criminal proceedings.

“Nothing in Sections 12 to 18 of the 1993 Act expressly provides that every prosecution concerning an offence arising out of a violation of human rights must originate from a recommendation of the Commission,” the Bench ruled.

Court further said Section 30 does not make the jurisdiction of a Human Rights Court dependent on the completion of any prior proceedings before the Commission.

“In our considered opinion, to read such a limitation into the statute would amount to supplying a condition which Parliament itself has not enacted,” it said.

Why did the Supreme Court uphold Rule 6 of Karnataka Human Rights Courts Rules?

Court was considering an appeal filed by Sayad Asifullah against a July 17, 2025 order of the Karnataka High Court, which had struck down Rule 6 of the Karnataka State Human Rights Courts Rules, 2006. Rule 6 of the Rules of 2006 allows a victim to go straight to the Human Rights Court without approaching the National of State Human Rights Commission.

The high court had held Rule 6 to be unconstitutional, inconsistent with the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 and beyond the rule-making power conferred on the State Government under Section 41 of the Act.

The Supreme Court disagreed with this reasoning and set aside the high court's order.

The case arose from criminal proceedings initiated against police officers at Jalanagar Police Station, Vijayapura, over alleged violations of the appellant's human rights during his custody in another case.

The high court had quashed the proceedings and held that a January 20, 2024 order passed by the principal district and sessions judge and special judge, human rights court, directing an investigation could not survive.

The Supreme Court, however, held that Rule 6 does not create any new offence, prescribe any new punishment or enlarge the meaning of human rights under the 1993 Act.

Instead, it merely provides the procedure through which the jurisdiction of a Human Rights Court under Section 30 may be invoked and exercised, Court said.

The offences that may ultimately be tried by the Human Rights Court continue to be offences punishable under the applicable penal law. Rule 6 only regulates the manner in which a complaint alleging such an offence may be received, investigated and proceeded with in accordance with law.

What is the extent of the State Government's rule-making power?

The Supreme Court also rejected the high court's view that the State Government's rule-making power under Section 41 is confined to the matters specifically listed in Section 41(2).

The Bench pointed out that Section 41(1) expressly empowers the State Government to make rules “to carry out the provisions of this Act”. Section 41(2), it noted, begins with the words “in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power”.

Court said it is well settled that rules made under delegated legislative power cannot travel beyond the parent enactment or alter its substantive scheme. However, where a statute confers a general rule-making power to carry its provisions into effect, the delegate can prescribe the procedural machinery necessary to give those provisions meaningful operation, provided the procedure is not inconsistent with the statute.

The Bench also relied on Paramvir Singh Saini Vs Baljit Singh (2003), noting that the decision clarified that recourse to a Human Rights Court is not dependent upon a prior inquiry or recommendation by the Human Rights Commission.

“This reinforces the construction which follows from the statutory scheme itself, namely, that the remedies before the Commission and the Human Rights Court are distinct and complementary and that the former is not a mandatory gateway to the latter,” Court said.

Does simultaneous recourse to the Commission and Human Rights Court amount to double jeopardy?

No, the Supreme Court said.

It rejected the high court's apprehension that allowing simultaneous recourse to the Human Rights Commission and Human Rights Court could result in double jeopardy.

“An inquiry or recommendation by the Commission does not amount to a prior prosecution or punishment so as to attract the constitutional protection against double jeopardy,” the Bench said.

Court therefore found that the high court had read into the 1993 Act a limitation that was not present in its text and had failed to give independent operation to Section 30.

It also held that the high court incorrectly treated Rule 6 as creating a parallel substantive regime, when the Rule merely provides procedural machinery for a Human Rights Court already contemplated by Parliament.

The Supreme Court consequently held that Rule 6 of the Karnataka State Human Rights Courts Rules, 2006 is not inconsistent with the 1993 Act and does not travel beyond the rule-making power conferred on the State Government under Section 41.

“Rule 6 of the 2006 Rules is therefore intra vires the 1993 Act and is valid,” the Bench declared.

Court revived the proceedings against the police officers before the Human Rights Court at Vijayapura.

Allowing the appeal, Court clarified that it had expressed no opinion on the merits of the allegations forming the subject matter of the proceedings. All contentions and defences available to the parties have been left open to be considered by the competent court on their own merits.

Case Title: Sayad Asifullah Vs State of Karnataka & Ors

Bench: Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta

Date of Judgment: August 31, 2026