'Lawmakers’ Expeditious Trials Cannot Bypass Procedural Safeguards': SC Quashes Separate Trial of Cong MLA in Nuh Riots

The Supreme Court on September 12, 2025, emphasised that while expeditious disposal of cases involving MPs and MLAs is desirable, administrative prioritisation cannot override procedural safeguards under the Criminal Procedure Code or the constitutional mandate of equality.

"The right to equal access to justice is an essential facet of the rule of law, and no person – whether a sitting MLA or an ordinary citizen – can be subjected to procedural disadvantage or preferential treatment without express legal justification,'' a bench of Justices J B Pardiwala and R Mahadevan said.

Court allowed an appeal filed by Mammam Khan, a Congress MLA from Haryana, quashing the trial court orders of August 28, 2024, and September 2, 2024, and the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s December 12, 2024 affirmation, which had directed police to file separate charge sheets and segregate his trial.

The bench held that segregating the trial without legally recognised grounds violated Khan’s right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.

"The right to equal access to justice is an essential facet of the rule of law, and no person – whether a sitting MLA or an ordinary citizen – can be subjected to procedural disadvantage or preferential treatment without express legal justification,'' the bench said.  

The proceedings related to offences of rioting, dacoity, mischief by fire, and criminal intimidation during large-scale communal violence in Nuh District on July 31, 2023.

The Supreme Court reiterated that a fair trial forms part of the guarantee under Article 21.

"Departure from established legal procedure – particularly without hearing the affected party – constitutes a serious constitutional infraction. The segregation order passed suo motu by the trial court falls short of these requirements. A unilateral order for a separate charge sheet and segregated trial, passed without notice or application, violates the basic principles of procedural fairness inherent in Article 21,'' the bench said.  

Court found that segregation was ordered solely due to Khan’s political office, misapplying the directions in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay Vs Union of India (2024). The trial court had also exceeded its jurisdiction by directing police to file a separate charge sheet, as filing a charge sheet is the discretion of the investigating agency.

"The discretion to file a charge-sheet lies solely with the investigating agency. Even where multiple charge-sheets are filed, if the offences arise out of the same transaction, they must be tried together,'' the bench said, adding that Khan's status as a sitting MLA cannot, by itself, justify a separate trial.  

“All accused stand equal before the law, and preferential segregation militates against the equality principle under Article 14. Speedy trial cannot come at the cost of fairness,” the bench emphasised.

Khan, MLA from Ferozepur Jhirka, Haryana, was named in two FIRs lodged on August 1, 2023. His counsel argued that the alleged offences arose from the same transaction as co-accused, mandating a joint trial under Section 223 CrPC. They cited precedents including Nasib Singh Vs State (2021), State of A.P. Vs Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (1963), and R. Dinesh Kumar Vs State (2015), which establish that multiple trials from the same incident cause injustice, prejudice, and delay.

It was also contended that the Code of Criminal Procedure permitted separate trials only in exceptional circumstances, such as the absconding of co-accused or the existence of distinct transactions – conditions that were absent in the present case.  

On the other hand, the state counsel submitted that separate charge sheets had already been filed against Khan, charges had been framed on November 25, 2024, and the prosecution had already commenced evidence with several witnesses having been examined. He said the segregation of Khan’s trial was necessitated to ensure judicial efficiency, as the presence of 43 accused in one FIR and 28 accused in another had rendered the conduct of a joint trial logistically and procedurally cumbersome. Repeated non-appearance of certain co-accused had already resulted in considerable delay, he argued. 

Examining the matter, the bench noted the prosecution case proceeded on the basis of an overarching conspiracy said to involve all the accused persons. The charge sheet reflected a consolidated investigative approach, founded upon common evidence, such as call detail records, electronic communications, video footage, witness statements, and forensic reports. It was undisputed that the prosecution relied largely upon common witnesses and interlinked evidence against all the accused.  

Court noted the segregation was ordered suo motu, without affording Khan an opportunity of hearing. It was done solely on account of the appellant’s status as an MLA, so as to facilitate a day-to-day trial in purported compliance with the directions of the Supreme Court in the Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay case, and the record disclosed that no notice was issued to Khan.

Court noted the trial court’s reliance on Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay was misplaced. While the judgment calls for prioritising trials of MPs/MLAs for speed, it does not authorise separate trials or charge sheets based solely on political status.

Referring to Nasib Singh, the bench highlighted the laid down principles:  

(i) Separate trial is the rule under Section 218 Cr.P.C; a joint trial may be permissible where the offences form part of the same transaction or the conditions in Sections 219 – 223 Cr.P.C. are satisfied, but even then it is a matter of judicial discretion; 

(ii) The decision to hold a joint or separate trial must ordinarily be taken at the outset of the proceedings and for cogent reasons; 

(iii) The two paramount considerations in such decision making are whether a joint trial would cause prejudice to the accused, and whether it would occasion delay or wastage of judicial time;  

(iv) Evidence recorded in one trial cannot be imported into another, which may give rise to serious procedural complications if the trial is bifurcated; and 

(v) An order of conviction or acquittal cannot be set aside merely because a joint or separate trial was possible; interference is justified only where prejudice or miscarriage of justice is shown.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court held the trial court’s segregation order unsustainable. Court observed that the only ground cited, the non-appearance of certain co-accused, did not justify separating Khan, who regularly appeared before the court.

In such circumstances, the court opined, the proper course in such a situation would have been to segregate the absconding or defaulting accused, not the appellant who was regularly before the court. 

"By doing so, the trial court inverted the settled principle and thereby committed a manifest error. No finding was recorded that a joint trial would delay proceedings or cause prejudice to the appellant,'' it said.

The bench rejected claims that counsel’s presence sufficed as a hearing, stating that mere presence does not equal meaningful participation. It also clarified that ongoing proceedings do not cure procedural illegality.

The court also rejected a contention that the segregation order was passed in the presence of the appellant’s counsel as equally untenable, emphasising that mere physical presence of counsel cannot be equated with a meaningful opportunity of hearing.

Court emphasised the foundational constitutional principle enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees that all persons are equal before the law and entitled to equal protection of the laws. This principle extends beyond mere formal equality and requires that legal procedures be applied fairly and uniformly, irrespective of an individual’s public position or status, it added.  

The Supreme Court directed the trial court to conduct a joint trial of Mammam Khan with the co-accused, regulating the schedule to ensure expeditious disposal without compromising procedural safeguards and after hearing all parties.

Case Title: Mammam Khan Vs State of Haryana

Judgment Date: September 12, 2025

Bench: Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan