Privy Purses Were Political Arrangements, Not Legally Enforceable Rights: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has held that privy purses and other privileges granted to the erstwhile rulers of princely states were the result of specific political and contractual arrangements made with the Government before the Constitution came into force. These arrangements, the Court said, cannot be treated as legally enforceable rights or fundamental rights available to all erstwhile rulers.

Court said it would be legally incorrect to equate such political settlements with constitutional rights. “Such political arrangements cannot be claimed as a matter of a legally enforceable right, much less a fundamental right,” the Apex Court observed.

A Bench of Justices J B Pardiwala and R Mahadevan dismissed a writ petition filed by the Mizo Chief Council through its President on behalf of the tribal chieftains of the erstwhile Lushai Hills district, now Mizoram, and their legal heirs. Court held that the petitioners had failed to prove ownership over the lands in question.

The main grievance of the petitioners was that the Union Government and other authorities had acquired the lands of the Mizo chiefs without paying proper compensation. According to them, this violated the chiefs’ fundamental right to property, which existed at the time the land was acquired.

The petition challenged a 1955 notification issued under the Assam Lushai Hills District (Acquisition of Chief’s Rights) Act, 1954. The petitioners alleged that their lands were taken without lawful authority or adequate compensation, violating their rights under the then-existing property provisions as well as Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

The petitioners also argued that the Mizo chiefs stood on the same historical footing as rulers of erstwhile princely states and therefore should have received similar compensation or privy purses. Rejecting this contention, the Bench said: “This assertion, much like its claims, is entirely devoid of any legal basis and thereby merits outright rejection.”

Court noted that although the petition had been filed after nearly six decades, it could not be dismissed at the threshold solely on the ground of delay because the chiefs had continuously pursued their claim and the conduct of the State had created a reasonable expectation of settlement. However, the Bench said the petitioners failed to prove a key issue that the chiefs had legally recognised ownership rights over the entire territory claimed or that the compensation granted under the law was merely “illusory” under Article 31 jurisprudence.

As a result, Court held that no violation of fundamental rights had been established and dismissed the writ petition without examining the constitutional validity of the 1954 Act.

Explaining the law on delay in filing petitions under Article 32, the Bench said the doctrine of laches is a flexible rule of practice and not a rigid rule of law. Court said two factors are crucial while considering delay: whether entertaining the petition would disturb settled matters and affect third-party rights, and whether the petitioner has satisfactorily explained the delay.

The Bench observed that the real test is not merely whether there has been “unreasonable delay” but whether there has been “unexplained delay.” The adequacy of the explanation for the delay, it said, is the most important factor while deciding whether an Article 32 petition should be rejected on grounds of laches.

“For relief to be granted in a writ petition under Article 32, a case must be made out establishing the existence of a fundamental right and its breach, actual or threatened,” the Bench said.

Court further noted that the right to property was originally protected under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution before these provisions were repealed by the 44th Constitutional Amendment in 1978. However, since the amendment operates prospectively, actions taken before June 20, 1979, would still be tested on the basis of the earlier constitutional protections.

The Bench said that since the petitioners had failed to establish any violation of the chiefs’ fundamental rights, there was no need to examine the validity of the 1954 Act or the legality of the 1955 notification.

Court also pointed out that the record did not contain any complete analysis of the “boundary papers” issued to the chiefs, nor was there evidence showing that these documents uniformly granted ownership rights. On examining the available boundary papers, the bench found nothing to suggest absolute ownership of land had ever been conferred on the chiefs.

Court ultimately held that the petitioners had failed to establish any violation of the fundamental rights of the Mizo chiefs. 

Case Title: Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr President Shri L Chinzah Vs Union of India & Ors

Bench: Justices J B Pardiwala and R Mahadevan

Date of Judgment: March 13, 2026