Specific Performance Decree Carries Implicit Possession Right, Says Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has held that a decree for specific performance implicitly includes the right to possession when the defendant held exclusive possession of the suit property at the time of the decree, even if the decree does not explicitly direct delivery of possession.

A Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan made this observation while dismissing an appeal by Sulthan Said Ibrahim, who challenged the right of the original plaintiff to obtain possession of the suit property despite having secured a decree for specific performance more than two decades ago.

The case arose out of a suit filed in 1996 before the Principal Sub Court, Palakkad, by the original plaintiff seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell executed by the original defendant. Under the agreement, the defendant had agreed to sell the suit property for ₹6,00,000, contingent on the payment of a balance amount of ₹1,50,000 within three months. Although an ex parte decree was granted in 1998 and later confirmed after a contested hearing in 2003, the plaintiff had not yet been handed over possession of the property.

The Bench strongly criticized the protracted litigation and the misuse of procedural devices by the appellant, which had prevented the decree holder from enjoying the fruits of a decree that had attained finality as far back as 2008. The Court remarked:

“The path to justice is often winding, shaped by the weight of hierarchy and the labyrinth of procedure. The seeker, weary yet resolute, climbs each rung of the judicial ladder, only to stand at the summit with hope overshadowed by the fear of denied relief.”

Rejecting the appellant’s contention that the execution of the sale deed alone satisfied the decree, the Court held that vacant and peaceful possession must be handed over to the decree holder. It emphasized that the Executing Court must ensure this is done—if necessary, with police assistance—within two months. A cost of ₹25,000 was also imposed on the appellant.

The appellant had argued that he could not be compelled to deliver possession, claiming tenancy rights over the suit property as the legal heir of his father, who had allegedly been a tenant since 1969. He further contended that his impleadment as a legal heir of the original defendant was erroneous and that under Mohammedan law, legal heirs of a pre-deceased son are not entitled to inherit from the grandmother.

The Supreme Court, however, rejected these arguments, affirming that tenancy rights, if any, could not be adjudicated under the guise of impleadment as a legal heir in a specific performance suit. It also found that the 1996 agreement for sale, to which the appellant was a witness, did not carry forward any prior tenancy arrangement.

On the question of res judicata, the Court held that the appellant’s application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) for deletion of his name from the party array was barred, since he had not objected to his impleadment under Order XXII Rule 4 at the appropriate time. The Bench reiterated:

“The principles of res judicata apply not only to two different proceedings but also to different stages of the same proceeding.”

The Court clarified that while the power to add or delete parties under Order I Rule 10 may be exercised at any stage, such liberty does not extend to re-agitating issues that have already been conclusively determined. It stated:

“Allowing the same would run contrary to the considerations of fair play and justice and would amount to keeping the parties in a state of limbo as regards the adjudication of the disputes.”

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, with the Court upholding the High Court’s decision and directing that possession be delivered to the decree holder, both as title holder and as beneficiary of the specific performance decree.

Case Title: Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7108 of 2025