Snake Venom Case: Supreme Court Hears Elvish Yadav’s Plea, Questions NDPS Invocation

The bench of Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh heard detailed submissions on the maintainability of the case, particularly the invocation of provisions under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, the NDPS Act, and the IPC.

Appearing for Yadav, Senior Advocate Mukta Gupta mounted a multi-pronged challenge to the prosecution. She argued that under Section 55 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, no court can take cognizance of an offence on a police report, as the statute mandates that only a complaint by authorised wildlife officials can trigger prosecution.

Relying on Supreme Court precedents including State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan and Jeevan Kumar Raut v. CBI, she submitted that the very cognizance taken in the present case was barred in law.

On the NDPS charge, Gupta contended that the police had impermissibly “created an offence” not recognised by statute. She pointed out that there was no recovery of snake venom from Yadav, no possession, no consumption, and no link to any scheduled psychotropic substance. The entire NDPS case, she argued, rested on the alleged recovery of just 20 ml of liquid and the presence of antibodies, not venom. “Criminal law cannot be expanded by investigative imagination,” she told the Court, adding that snake venom is not a scheduled substance under the NDPS framework.

Addressing the factual allegations, Gupta submitted that there was no rave party, no guests, and no recovery from Yadav. She emphasised that Yadav was not present at the alleged location and that medical reports on record showed the nine snakes examined were not poisonous. The only material relied upon by the prosecution, she said, was a recycled YouTube video from a song shoot by another artist, in which Yadav made a brief guest appearance after permissions were obtained. A separate FIR over the same video had already resulted in a closure report in Gurugram, she added, calling the present case a clear instance of duplication and harassment by members of the same family of complainants.

Opposing the plea, counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh argued that the court must first examine whether the FIR disclosed the commission of any offence. On the NDPS aspect, the State contended that the understanding of psychotropic substances is evolving and that substances posing danger to society cannot be excluded merely because they are not presently listed in the schedule. The State also pointed to call detail records and location data allegedly placing Yadav at locations linked to co-accused persons, and questioned his use of a virtual number.

During the hearing, the bench raised concerns about the broader message such cases send. Justice Sundresh observed that if influential persons are perceived to be using “voiceless victims,” it could send a “very bad message” to society, while also indicating that the court would closely examine what action is legally warranted under the Wildlife (Protection) Act.

Reiterating his defence, Yadav’s counsel maintained that mere guest appearance in a video, without evidence of a party or illegal activity, could not sustain criminal prosecution. The court ultimately granted time to the respondents to file their counter affidavits and adjourned the matter, listing it for further hearing in March.

Yadav faces prosecution under Sections 284, 120-B, and 289 of the Indian Penal Code; Sections 8, 22, 29, 30, and 32 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; and Sections 9, 39, 48A, 49, 50, and 51 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972.

The case was initiated on the complaint of Gaurav Gupta, a member of the NGO People for Animals. Acting as part of a sting operation, Gupta allegedly approached Elvish Yadav and was provided with a contact number. He subsequently reached out to five individuals who were later arrested. During interrogation, these individuals reportedly told the police that they supplied snake venom for rave parties allegedly organized by Yadav.