Setting the Record Straight on the Ayodhya Case: A Response to Justice Muralidhar’s Remarks

Setting the Record Straight on the Ayodhya Case: A Response to Justice Muralidhar’s Remarks
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Justice S Muralidhar 

Recently, senior advocate and a former judge of Delhi High Court, Dr. S Muralidhar criticised the Supreme Court (SC)’s ruling on the Ayodhya dispute and made certain questionable assertions regarding the same. These assertions and criticisms were made by him in the A.G. Noorani Memorial Lecture on Secularism and the Judiciary: An Uneasy Relationship at the India Islamic Cultural Centre. Justice Muralidhar questioned the haste in delivering the judgement just two months after reserving it, as well as the use of Article 142 to direct the construction of the temple along with references to Places of Worship Act, 1991.

This article seeks to critically examine and dismantle these assertions, demonstrating that Justice Muralidhar’s claims rest on selective readings and overlook the broader constitutional and legal reasoning underpinning the SC’s verdict.

Revisiting The Court’s Efforts At Mediation In The Ayodhya Dispute

During the hearings, when the proposal for mediation was considered, it was argued that the Ayodhya dispute, being a representative suit with implications for the public at large, cannot be resolved through a mediation alone, as any agreement reached would not be binding on the wider public. Despite these arguments, the court referred the case for mediation under Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure ensuring that the matter remains confidential

The mediation panel, headed by Justice F.M.I. Kalifulla along with Sri Sri Ravi Shankar and Senior Advocate Sriram Panchu, was granted several extensions to facilitate negotiations. Even during the final hearings, the Court kept the door to settlement open, explicitly allowing any consensus reached to be placed before it. A conditional settlement executed by the Chairman of the Sunni Central Waqf Board was submitted, but it could not be treated as binding, as it was neither unanimous nor unconditional.

Far from being ignored, these efforts show that the Supreme Court actively engaged with mediation, contrary to Justice Muralidhar’s assertion. The Court in its order dated 8th March, 2019 clearly reflects that a Court appointed and supervised mediation committee was set up. However, due to the conditional and unanimous nature of the settlement, the Court rightly held that such an agreement could not attain the status of a binding settlement in a centuries-old, multi-party title dispute. Far from neglecting mediation, the Supreme Court ensured it was pursued comprehensively within judicial limits and also acknowledged and appreciated the mediators’ sincere efforts.

Reassessing The Places of Worshipping Act To Address Historical Injustice

In his lecture, Dr. S Muralidhar expressed discomfort with the Ayodhya verdict being keeping the Places of Worship Act, 1991 in consideration. He highlighted that despite references to the Act, fresh litigations continue to challenge the status of religious sites. The Act seeks to prohibit the conversion of any place of worship but excludes Ram Janambhoomi dispute by virtue of Section 5. At the time of enactment, the Union Minister of Home Affairs justified the legislation as a measure to preserve, promote, and restore India’s long-standing traditions of communal amity, harmony, and mutual respect.

However, several aspects of the legislation have raised issues including arbitrarily fixing the cutoff date as 15th August, 1947. Furthermore, the timing of the 1991 Act’s enactment by the Congress government under P.V. Narasimha Rao suggests it was less a neutral preventive measure and more an appeasement move aimed at managing rising communal tensions, when viewed against the background of 1990 Ramjanmabhoomi movement, L.K. Advani’s rath yatra, his arrest in Bihar, and the firing on kar sevaks in Uttar Pradesh.

It is notable to mention that the Act excludes the State of Jammu & Kashmir thereby overlooking a significant number of Hindu temples destroyed in Kashmir during the insurgency. It is reported that over 438 temples across the valley, including 57 in Srinagar and 56 in Anantnag, were damaged. Temples such as the Raghunath Mandir, Nandkishore Temple, Shadipur Temple, and Shri Vishnu Temple were desecrated, with murtis broken and shrines abandoned. Even today, Kashmiri Pandit activists continue to demand full restoration and legal protection of these sites.

Beyond Kashmir, other instances such as the ongoing controversies over the Gyanvapi Mosque complex in Varanasi and Krishna Janmabhoomi in Mathura reveal the Act’s inability to provide legal clarity, leaving centuries-old disputes over hindu temples unaddressed and the community dissatisfied. Cases like the Shahi Idgah in Mathura and disputes over temples in Sambhal and other regions further illustrate the piecemeal and selective application of the Act. Even today, the activists and residents continue to fight and demand the full restoration and legal protection of these temples.

Given its inherently biased nature, arbitrary cut-off date, and failure to address subsequent instances of religious site desecration, the Places of Worship Act, 1991, needs to be reconsidered. A reevaluated version of the Act could address historical inequalities, ensuring that India’s cultural and religious heritage is preserved while providing fair legal recognition and protection to all faiths, rather than only appeasing one or silencing the other.

Powers of SC under Article 142

The Article 142 of the Constitution grants it the power to pass any order it deems necessary to secure complete justice. In Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat, the Court emphasized that its power under Article 142 was entirely of a different level and of a different quality and that ordinary statutory prohibitions or limitations cannot curtail this constitutional authority. Furthermore, the expression 'necessary for doing complete justice’ has a wide amplitude which allows the Court to go beyond the strict application of laws or in the present case beyond the specific prayers to ensure fairness.

In the Ayodhya case,the Court referenced Union Carbide Corporation v Union of India to underline that complete justice under Article 142 must be assessed in light of fundamental public policy. The Ayodhya dispute involved overlapping issues of religion, history, property rights, and societal harmony in a context where conventional statutory rules alone could not resolve the matter conclusively. The Court highlighted that Article 142 allows it to craft remedies tailored to the specifics of a case when rigid application of laws is inadequate. This power ensures that justice is not confined to rule-based adjudication but incorporates equitable principles to achieve outcomes that are fair, reasonable, and consistent with the Constitution’s vision.

It is in this context that the criticism by Dr. Muralidhar appears misplaced and inconsistent as Supreme Court’s use of Article 142 aligns precisely with the purpose it was created for which is to secure complete justice in complex, multifaceted disputes where ordinary may not solve the issue.

The Ayodhya judgment reflects the Supreme Court’s constitutional role in delivering complete justice in disputes which could not have been adjudicated under existing laws. Contrary to Dr. Muralidhar’s claim of judicial overreach, the Court’s use of Article 142 was firmly within its mandate addressing overlapping issues of faith, property, and societal harmony.

A reference to the history of the site of Ram Janmbhoomi as expounded by the High Court consistently records the destruction of a Ram temple and reuse of its materials in Babur’s mosque, underscoring that this was not a recent controversy but a long-standing grievance. By drawing on history and equity, the Court ensured that justice was not confined to rigid legalism but responsive to India’s constitutional vision.

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