Not Anyone’s Uncle: The Supreme Court’s Duty is Justice, Not Favouritism

On 4th August, the honorable Supreme Court of India censured the Leader of Opposition Rahul Gandhi for controversial claims he made during his much touted Bharat Jodo Yatra on 16th December, 2022, regarding the clash in 2020 between the armed forces of India and China. The current Leader of Opposition, had alleged then that the Chinese Army had “captured 2,000 sq km of Indian territory,” “killed 20 Indian soldiers", “thrashed our soldiers”. These claims became the subject of a criminal defamation complaint by the former Border Roads Organisation (BRO) director Uday Shankar Srivastava, who strongly condemned them as both false and malicious. According to the petitioner, Rahul Gandhi intended to defame the Indian Army and dampen the morale of the armed forces.

In February 2025, when Rahul Gandhi made a plea to quash the defamation proceedings and the summons issued by a special MP/MLA court in Lucknow, the Allahabad High Court rejected the same on 29th May, 2025, delivering a crucial reminder that Article 19(1)(a) guarantees free speech but does not provide licence to defame, especially institutions like the Indian Army. The Court emphasised, “No freedom to make statements which are defamatory to any person or to the Indian Army.”

Being aggrieved by the High Court’s judgement, Rahul Gandhi filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court to quash the summons. The Apex Court though stayed the proceedings did questioned Rahul Gandhi if the latter had any proof backing his contentious claims, even adding a terse comment “If you are a true Indian, you wouldn’t say this”. The aforementioned comment attracted criticism from the Congress leadership with Priyanka Gandhi asserting that the judiciary cannot decide who qualifies as a true Indian.

In addition, former Additional Solicitor General and senior Supreme Court advocate Raju Ramachandran, went one step further, writing, 'The court is not Rahul Gandhi’s uncle. Its job is to protect rights, not preach' in an essay which besides being heavily partisan is filled with several inaccuracies which need to be pointed out.

Firstly the Court’s terse remarks were made “verbally” during the hearing and were not included in the formal order granting interim relief. Yet, the author expresses dissatisfaction, and alleges the Court for “preaching”. Mr Ramachandran must be aware that the Constitution grants the Supreme Court the liberty to be outspoken and even challenge the establishment when the situation demands.

Articles 124 to 147 afford the Court a high degree of autonomy. This autonomy and independence of the court is protected through security of tenure, protection from arbitrary removal, fixed service conditions, prohibition on post-retirement practice, and crucially, the power to punish for its own contempt. This is not a privilege but a prerequisite for the Court’s role as a guardian of fundamental rights, a shield for minorities, and a check on arbitrary power. Mr Ramachandran then went on to offer support to the claim of the INDIA bloc leadership’s description of the remarks of the Supreme Court as “extraordinary” and “unwarranted”. But, giving sharp remarks, scolding the defaulters and even using sarcasm, are an absolute norm of the courts, whether higher or lower. For example, in 2022, the Supreme Court sarcastically chided a lawyer challenging the Agnipath scheme, saying, “You may be a ‘Veer’ but you are not an ‘Agniveer’."

Also a notable example of the Supreme Court’s harsh vocabulary would be from November 2024, when the Apex Court, while declaring nationwide guidelines on due process to be followed for demolitions, chastised the administrations of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan remarking “Bulldozer demolitions remind of a “lawless, ruthless state of affairs”.

Beyond issues of governance, the courts have been equally stringent in restricting public figures whose comments cause harm or defamation. For instance, when an MP made unkind remarks on Colonel Sofiya Qureshi after Operation Sindoor, the Madhya Pradesh High Court fiercely condemned his language as "disparaging," "dangerous," and "language of the gutters." Similarly, in 2019, the then Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal was summoned in a criminal defamation case for retweeting defamatory tweets. The Delhi High Court, in the latter case, reinforced that public figures bear heightened responsibility to avoid defamation, even if there is no explicit intent.

Going back to the essay, Mr Ramachandran lends his support to the opposition’s statement- “It is the responsibility of political parties, especially the Leader of Opposition, to comment on issues of national interest. When a government fails so spectacularly to defend our borders, it is every citizen’s moral duty to hold it accountable.” However, as both the Allahabad High Court and Supreme Court observed, there is a profound difference between challenging policy decisions and creating absurd claims on the armed forces, intended to humiliate them, while they risk their lives for the nation during harrowing times as was the case during Operation Sindoor.

Advocate Ramachandran then remarks that judges “ought to be circumspect and apply constitutional tests to cases coming before them”. This, however, seems a mockery of the very judicial system to which he belongs. It is because firstly, the Supreme Court has only given preliminary remarks and will give a final judgement only after hearing both sides, examining the evidence and applying the judicial tests. Secondly, a circumspect or hesitant court, would serve politicians and power, not the people. The institution of the Supreme Court is not to be influenced by the opinions, whether positive or negative, from the opposition or the ruling party.

Mr Ramachandran is also blatantly prejudiced in claiming that the “Supreme Court has only itself to blame for being censured by an opposition bloc and becoming part of a political slugfest.” He must know that ‘Democratic Accountability’ demands sharp questions—not just of those who wield constitutional power, but also of those who would critique it.

Lastly, Mr Ramachandran remarked that, “When a citizen approaches a court complaining that their right to free speech, or any other fundamental right, has been violated, it only needs to see whether they are entitled to constitutional protection. The citizen does not need to be told what they ought to have said or done.”

However, to bring to Mr Ramachandran’s notice, free speech is subject to the reasonable restrictions such as security of the state, relations with foreign nations, defamation and public order, as held in the landmark case of State of Madras v. V.G. Row (1952), and it is the duty of the courts to determine whether such restrictions are fair, just, and appropriate in each case.

Also, the very "reasonable restrictions" on free speech that Rahul Gandhi is being held to were introduced by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951—a landmark legislation passed under the leadership of his own great-grandfather, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The Supreme Court Bench, therefore, is not acting as ‘uncle’ but only following the path laid down by “Chacha Nehru”.