Read Time: 09 minutes

The Allahabad High Court recently dismissed an application that sought quashing of the proceedings of the complaint case under the Protection of Domestic Violence Act, 2005 on the ground that the applicants (Husband & his famiy) are not living with the opposite party (Wife represented by Sate of UP) in a 'shared household’ and hence not maintainable.

The Single Bench of Justice Dr. Y.K. Srivastava during the course of hearing was informed by the State Counsel that,

“Looking to the beneficial nature of the statute and its affirmative purpose, a claim for protection under the DV Act may not be thrown out at the threshold and the question of maintainability would require   a   proper   appreciation   of   facts   of   the   case   and   a thorough deliberation of the issues raised.”

The Learned AGA representing the State asserted that, “the contention, which is sought to be raised by the applicants with regard to the parties not living together in a   shared   household,   would   require   adjudication   by   the competent court and the applicants can raise their defence in the   proceedings   before   the   court   below.”

“In   the   facts   of   the   present   case,   the complaint filed by the opposite party no. 2 has merely been registered, and the present application seeking quashing of the proceedings,   is   clearly   premature   and   is   not   liable   to   be entertained at this stage,” Stated AGA

The AGA made the following contention to support his argument before the Bench –

1. The proceedings, which are sought to be challenged in the   present   case relate   to ‘The Protection of   Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which was enacted to provide for   a   more   effective   protection   of   the   rights   of   women guaranteed   under   the   Constitution,   who   are   victims   of violence   of   any   kind   occurring   within   the   family   and   for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
2. The United Nations Committee on Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)   also recommended that State parties should act to protect women against violence of any kind especially that occurring within the family.
3. The provisions under the DV Act seek to cover those women,   who   are   or   have   been   in   a   relationship   with   the abuser, where both parties have lived together in a 'shared household' or related by consanguinity or marriage or through a   relationship   in   the   nature   of   marriage   or   adoption.
4. The   expression   'domestic   violence'   under   the   Act   has been defined in a manner so as to include actual abuse or threat or abuse that is physical, sexual, verbal, emotional or economic. Harassment by way of unlawful dowry demands have   also   been   covered   under   the   definition. The Magistrate is further empowered to grant an ex­parte order and also to pass such ad­interim order as he may deem just and proper.
5. The   DV   Act   was   enacted   keeping   in   view   the   rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution to provide for a remedy under the civil law intended to protect the women from being victims of domestic violence and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society.
6. It would be obligatory on the Court in a given case to scrutinise the facts from all angles so as to examine whether the plea advanced with regard to maintainability is on a sound legal basis or has been raised solely with a view to nullify the grievance   of   the   aggrieved   person. 
7. Questions relating to maintainability and a narrow interpretation, which may leave the aggrieved woman in distress, remediless or in a situation of non­adjudication, would have to be eschewed.

 

The Learned counsel for the applicants, at this stage, submitted that, “the applicants would appear before the court below and file their objections and contest the case on merits.”

Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the Court wasn’t inclined to exercise its inherent jurisdiction, at the present stage.

The Bench observed,

“It is made clear that the observations made hereinabove, are prima facie in nature and the dismissal of the present application would not preclude the applicants from raising all objections,   which   may   be   available   to   them,   including   the point with regard to maintainability of the proceedings.”

The Application stood dismissed.

[Case Title - Nivesh Gupta @ Ankur Gupta And 2 Others v. State of U.P. and Another]