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Synopsis

In a significant hearing, the Delhi High Court recently upheld the conviction of accused persons under Sections 376/342/506/120B/109 IPC and Section 4/6 of the POCSO Act.

The bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh while upholding the order dated 31.01.2020 and order on sentence dated 27.06.2020 passed by the Special Judge (POCSO ACT) Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in case S.C. No. 55924/2016, FIR No. 224/2013, u/s 376/342/506/120B/109 IPC and section 4/6 of POCSO Act, registered at P.S. Punjabi Bagh, Delhi, held that:

“The judgment of the learned Trial Court is well reasoned and the Trial Court has correctly observed that the fact that both the appellants were employed at the same place at the time of the incident and the prosecutrix was also residing at their place from 25.05.2013 till 27.05.2013 which proves that the offence has taken place and the same is also corroborated by the testimony of PW-3 (Ms. Pushpa Rani). In addition, it has also been correctly observed that the DNA profiles generated from the exhibits were sufficient to prove the guilt of appellant No.1 in commission of the offence.”

The bench while rejecting the contention of the appellant that the hymen had an old tear and there was also no edema, congestion or physical injuries on the genitalia of the prosecutrix or any other part of her body observed that considering the entire evidence on record, namely the statement of the prosecutrix, the MLC confirming her hymen tear, the FSL report concluding the presence of semen on the underwear of the prosecutrix which matched with that of the appellant No.1, the mere absence of injuries on the vital parts/organs of the prosecutrix was not enough to refute the otherwise strong factual matrix of the case establishing the offences under Section 6 and 16 of the POCSO Act.

The bench relied on the testimony of the doctor who was a witness of the prosecution and concluded that “the PW-5 (Dr. Aditi Aggarwal) had explained that congestion over the area of the body is usually present in injuries which are less than 24 hours old and the fact that the absence of congestion in the present case was possible due to lapse of time had also been rightly appreciated by the learned Trial Court.”

The bench further concurred with the Trial Court and upheld that “the Trial Court had also rightly relied upon the judgments to state that the testimony of the victim alone was sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused and minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case.”

The bench further concluded that the role of appellant No.2 in commission of the offence had also been correctly examined by the learned Trial Court as there was also sufficient evidence against the appellant No.2 in abetting the offence committed by appellant No.1, being her presence in the room at the time of commission of offence and the testimony of the prosecutrix.

The court while upholding the law that the statement of prosecutrix can be the sole basis for conviction unless there are cogent reasons for the Court to be hesitant in believing the statement at its face value or to seek corroboration relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in “State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar”[(2017) 2 SCC 51] wherein the Supreme Court  held that:

“30…We have already discussed above the manner in which the testimony of the prosecutrix is to be examined and analysed in order to find out the truth therein and to ensure that deposition of the victim is trustworthy. At the same time, after taking all due precautions which are necessary, when it is found that the prosecution version is worth believing, the case is to be dealt with all sensitivity that is needed in such cases.

31…By now it is well settled that the testimony of a victim in cases of sexual offences is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of a statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of a sexual assault alone to convict the accused. No doubt, her testimony has to inspire confidence. Seeking corroboration to a statement before relying upon the same as a rule, in such cases, would literally amount to adding insult to injury. The deposition of the prosecutrix has, thus, to be taken as a whole. Needless to reiterate that the victim of rape is not an accomplice and her evidence can be acted upon without corroboration. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness does. If the court finds it difficult to accept her version, it may seek corroboration from some evidence which lends assurance to her version. To insist on corroboration, except in the rarest of rare cases, is to equate one who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime  and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that her claim of rape will not be believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars, as in the case of an accomplice to a crime.”

In the present case, the testimony of the prosecutrix was of sterling quality. The court found no reason to discredit or disbelief the statement of the prosecutrix. In addition, the statement of the prosecutrix had also been duly corroborated.

The intention of the prosecutrix in falsely implicating the appellants could also not be made out, the bench observed.

The bench further concluded that the appellants had not been able to rebut the presumption of guilt which operated against them under section 29 of the POCSO Act. The prosecution had successfully proved the guilt of the appellants in committing the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed by the bench.

The bench also passed a direction to DSLSA Member Secretary to ensure that compensation had been paid to the prosecutrix.

Case Title: RAJU YADAV Vs. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI and LAKHI VISHWAS Vs. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI)