Read Time: 14 minutes

Synopsis

The Supreme Court recently upheld conviction of a man in a case of killing his wife and four minor daughters in 2011 but commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment till his last breath, holding the crime did not meet the threshold of “the rarest of rare".

A bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta found no cogent basis to disturb the concurrent findings of the trial court and the Allahabad High Court that the appellant, Deen Dayal Tiwari committed the murders of his wife and four minor daughters in the intervening night of November 11/12, 2011, holding that his conviction of the under Section 302 IPC was fully justified and warranted no any interference at this stage.

However, while weighing the totality of circumstances and having regard to the legal principles, the bench said, "We are of the view that while the crime is heinous and deserves the highest degree of condemnation, it does not meet the threshold of “the rarest of rare” so as to irrevocably foreclose the option of life imprisonment."

As per facts of the case, Tiwari resided in village Pure Brijlal Tiwari Moiya Kapurpur, Police Station Pura Kalandar, District Faizabad (now Ayodhya), Uttar Pradesh. He was married to one Smt Siyallali and had four minor daughters, namely Mani, Riya, Guddan, and Mahima.

According to the prosecution, he was arrested immediately after the incident with blood stained axe from the room bolted inside, while the bodies of the four deceased persons were lying in a pool of blood over there.

After hearing the counsel and upon a cumulative evaluation of the circumstances, the court noted, it appeared that the victims were last seen alive in the appellant’s exclusive custody (his own house) on that fateful night, he was found inside the same house soon after the murders, with a blood-stained axe, the postmortem reports confirmed cause of death by repeated blows of sharp-edged weapons, and no satisfactory explanation had been provided by him to displace the inference of guilt.

The bench also noted an additional factor that emerged from the record was the appellant’s alleged suspicion regarding his wife’s moral character. The prosecution claimed that he believed his wife was engaged in an illicit relationship, which caused frequent discord within the family. This suspicion was said to have motivated him to eliminate his wife, and in the course of events, he also killed his four minor daughters when they intervened or witnessed the assault.

"Though the presence of a motive is not an indispensable requirement for conviction in every case, proof of motive here reinforces the prosecution’s version that the appellant acted with a deliberate intention to commit these crimes," the bench said.

The appellant’s principal defense was that he was sleeping in his barn (khalihan) at the time of the murders, thereby suggesting a possibility that unknown miscreants killed his family. However, the bench said, he had produced neither documentary evidence nor any witness to substantiate this claim.

"Once it is established that the appellant was found at the scene and his family members were discovered murdered in the very room to which he had access and control, the burden to explain how the murders occurred within his locked premises shifts to him under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. His failure to offer a plausible explanation—particularly when there is no material on record supporting his alibi— fortifies the prosecution’s case," the bench said.

The appellant argued that his signature on the recovery memos was absent. On this, the court said, such a procedural gap by itself did not necessarily vitiate the entire process, in view of the presence of independent witness at the spot, as well as the contemporaneous nature of the recovery.

The bench also noted the medical evidence remained consistent with the prosecution theory, reinforcing the conclusion that the assault was brutal and matched the nature of the weapons seized.

Examining the question whether the present case fell under the rarest of rare category so as to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the bench weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, in light of the sentencing framework delineated in the judgements of Bachan Singh Vs State of Punjab, and Machhi Singh, and subsequent precedents.

"We must scrutinise not only the nature of the offence but also the totality of the offender’s circumstances. In the instant case, while the offence is undoubtedly brutal, certain mitigating factors, especially the appellant’s lack of criminal antecedents and his reported conduct in prison, tilt the scales in favour of commutation," the bench said.

The court noted there was no material demonstrating that he would remain a perpetual threat to society or that he was beyond reform. Indeed, the Probation Officer’s input and the Superintendent of District Jail’s report showed a potentially reformable individual, it said.

"Further, this court has consistently recognised that the imposition of capital punishment is an exception and not the rule. Even where multiple murders have been committed, if there is evidence or at least a reasonable possibility of reform, a lesser sentence must be preferred," the bench said.

Relying upon the principles laid down in Swamy Shraddananda Vs State of Karnataka (2008), the bench pointed out the power to impose or modify a sentence within the prescribed framework of the Penal Code was exclusively vested in the high court and the top court.

"The alternate punishment for offences punishable by death, such as imprisonment for a specific term exceeding 14 years or until the natural life of the convict, remains within the judicial conscience of this court and the High Court. This ensures that the gravity of the offence, the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and the possibility of reformation are thoroughly assessed before irrevocable sentences such as capital punishment are affirmed," the bench said.

Therefore, the court pointed out, the commutation of a death sentence to imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s natural life, as an alternative to death, was well within the judicial prerogative of the apex court and adhered to the constitutional mandate of ensuring justice.

The court also cited the Constitution bench judgment in Union of India Vs V Sriharan (2016), which held the power to impose a modified punishment providing for any specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convict's life as an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the high court and the Supreme Court and not by any other inferior court.

Thus, while confirming the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, the bench found it appropriate to commute the death sentence to one of life imprisonment till his last breath or until end of his natural lifespan.

Case Title: Deen Dayal Tiwari Vs State of Uttar Pradesh