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Synopsis

The Supreme Court on Monday said that sexual harassment in any form at the work place must be viewed seriously and the harasser should not be allowed to escape from the clutches of law. 

"We say so because the same humiliates and frustrates a victim of sexual harassment, more particularly when the harasser goes unpunished or is let off with a relatively minor penalty," a bench led by Chief Justice of India D Y Chandrachud said.

However, the bench, also comprising Justices J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, said that at the same time, it should be kept in mind that the charge of this nature is very easy to make and is very difficult to rebut. 

"When a plea is taken of false implication for extraneous reasons, the courts have a duty to make deeper scrutiny of the evidence and decide the acceptability or otherwise of the accusations. Every care should be taken to separate the chaff from the grain. The veracity and genuineness of the complaint should be scrutinised to prevent any misuse of such laudable laws enunciated for the upliftment of the society and for equal rights of people without gender discrimination by anybody under the garb of “sexual harassment”, lest justice rendering system would become a mockery," the bench said.

The top court allowed an appeal by the Union government against the Gauhati High Court's judgment of May 15, 2019 which set aside the decision to withhold 50% pension of senior Sashtra Seema Bal officer Dilip Paul in all times to come as part of disciplinary proceedings held against him for 2011 complaint of sexual harassment of a subordinate woman officer.

Paul had superannuated on March 31, 2013, as DIG. The bench held that the high court committed an egregious error in its judgment.

The high court had taken the view that the Central Complaints Committee was constituted by the competent authority to inquire into only the first complaint of August 30, 2011. During the course of its inquiry, it also looked into the allegations levelled in the second complaint of September 18, 2012 which it could not have.

The committee could not have acted as prosecutor to put questions to the witnesses, vitiating the proceedings, the high court had said.

The high court had also said that it was a case of 'no evidence' as the committee based on findings on surmises and conjectures.

Analysing the matter, the top court said, "Sexual harassment is a pervasive and deeply rooted issue that has plagued the societies worldwide. In India, it has been a matter of serious concern, and the development of laws to combat sexual harassment is a testament to the nation's commitment towards addressing this problem. Sexual harassment has existed in India for centuries, but it was only in the latter half of the 20th century that it began to gain legal recognition."

It noted the pathbreaking decision of the Supreme Court in 'Vishaka and Others v State of Rajasthan and Others' (1997), whereby the court recognized sexual harassment at the workplace as a violation of a woman's fundamental right to equality and dignity. 

The bench also noted that Rule 3C of the 1964 CCS Rules and the Proviso to Rule 14(2) of the 1965 CCS Rules along with the 2006 Standing Order encompassed the entire legislative scheme for dealing with sexual harassment at workplace in connection with the Central civil services and posts.

"In the instant case, the Central Complaints Committee was constituted on 06.08.2012 and its first hearing took place on 25.09.2012 whereas the second complaint had been filed by the complainant before the Central Complaints Committee on 18.09.2012. Thus, the second complaint had been promptly preferred right after the Central Complaints Committee was constituted and duly before its first hearing," it said.

The court declared that the high court’s reasoning that as the Central Complaints Committee was constituted on the basis of the first complaint, its scope of inquiry was restricted to its content, was completely erroneous.

The bench also said that it is open to the adjudicating authority to accept, rely and evaluate any evidence having probative value and come to its own conclusion, keeping in mind judicial approach and objectivity, exclusion of extraneous material and observance of the rule of natural justice and fair play. 

"In short, the essence of the doctrine is that fair opportunity should be afforded to the delinquent at the enquiry and he should not be hit below the belt. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is indeed limited. The High Court should not exercise appellate powers and substitute its findings for the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is no doubt true that if there is “no evidence” or the decision is “so unreasonable that no reasonable man could have ever come to it”, or the decision is “so outrageous” in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it “or that it is so absurd that one is satisfied that the decision-maker must have taken leave of his senses”, it calls for interference by a competent court of law," the bench said.

The court said that it would be quite preposterous to hold that the complainant was precluded from making the second complaint before the Central Complaints Committee merely because she had already made one complaint to the IG, Frontier Headquarters, Guwahati.

The court also pointed out that indisputably, in the case on hand, the respondent had filed his written statement of defence dealing with all allegations on the ten points framed for determination that were enquired into by the Committee and also cross-examined all the witnesses on the same.

"In our opinion, mere violation of Rule 14(9) of the 1965 CCS Rules would not vitiate the entire inquiry. Rule 14(9) is only procedural," it said.

"We are of the view that the High Court completely failed to advert itself to the principles laid down by this Court and mechanically proceeded to set-aside the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority on the ground that there was nothing to indicate that the respondent was asked whether he pleaded guilty to the charges imputed in the second complaint without applying the principle of “test of prejudice”," the bench added.

Going through the rules, the court further said that there appeared to be neither any statutory bar nor any logic to restrict the power of the complaints committee to put questions to the witnesses only to the context. The complaints committee being an inquiry authority and in some sense equivalent to a presiding officer of the court must be allowed to put questions on its own if a proper, fair and thorough inquiry is to take place, the bench opined.

"If the observations of the High Court are accepted, it would lead to a chilling effect, whereby the complaints committee which is deemed to be an inquiry authority would be reduced to a mere recording machine. We fail to understand what other purpose the complaints committee which is deemed to be an ‘inquiry authority’ would serve, if we are to hold that the complaints committee cannot put questions to the witnesses," the bench said.

The court also said that if Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 permits a Judge to put questions to the parties or to the witnesses in order to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant facts and this provision being widely used by the judges throughout the country, "we fail to understand as to how the complaints committee after being equated with a judge in a judicial proceeding be denied that privilege".

The apex court also rejected the high court's view that in respect of the allegations of making unsolicited phone calls to the complainant, no evidence of the call recordings had been produced, by saying that it was due to the fact that the complainant’s grievances were undertaken after a lapse of significant time. 

Case Title: Union of India and Others Vs Dilip Paul