Read Time: 16 minutes

Synopsis

In a crucial judgment, the Allahabad High Court has on Thursday rejected the plea by the Muslim side under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, which challenged the maintainability of suits filed by Hindu devotees seeking possession of the Shahi Idgah Mosque in Mathura. The decision paves the way for the continuation of the legal proceedings initiated by the Hindu plaintiffs.

The bench of Justice Mayank Kumar Jain found that the issues raised by the plaintiffs (Hindu side) warranted a full hearing. This judgment delves into various objections raised by the defendants (Muslim side) including the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the Waqf Act, 1995, and the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991.

Court addressed each contention in detail and tabled its opinion, summarized as follows:

Applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963

In this case, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' suits were barred by the Limitation Act of 1963, claiming that the plaintiffs had known about the mosque's existence and the compromise made on October 12, 1968, for decades. The defendants contended that the plaintiffs should have acted within the limitation period of three years, as stipulated by Articles 58 and 59 of the Act, but had instead waited over 50 years to file the suits. 

Conversely, the plaintiffs contended that they were unaware of the mosque and the alleged fraudulent compromise until their visit to Mathura, when they discovered the superstructure. They argued that the limitation period should start from the date they gained knowledge of these facts. They also challenged the legitimacy of the 1968 compromise, asserting it was void because the Sewa Sansthan lacked the authority to make such an agreement.

It is to be noted that a compromise in 1968 was entered into between Sewa Sansthan and the Mosque Management Committee, which allowed the construction of the Shahi Masjid Idgah on the disputed site.

The court decided that the suits were not barred by the Limitation Act, determining that the plaintiffs' cause of action commenced when they first became aware of the issues, and that the limitation question was a mixed question of fact and law that required further examination through evidence.

Bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC:

The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' suits were barred by Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC, which prevents challenges to a decree based on an unlawful compromise if the compromise was part of the same proceedings. They contended that since Suit No. 43 of 1967 and the subsequent compromise on October 12, 1968, had settled the title and possession of Shahi Masjid Idgah, any challenge to that compromise should be made within those proceedings, not through new suits.

The plaintiffs countered that the compromise was invalid because the deity involved was not a party to Suit No. 43 of 1967 and lacked proper representation. They argued that the compromise and subsequent construction were based on fraud and misrepresentation, rendering them void from the start. They sought to declare the judgments and decrees from Suit No. 43 of 1967 as non-binding.

The court concluded that Order XXIII Rule 3A did not bar the plaintiffs' suits because this provision applies only to parties already involved in the original suit. Since the plaintiffs were not parties to Suit No. 43 of 1967, the bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A did not apply, and the suits could proceed.

Bar under the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991:

The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' suits were barred by Sections 3, 4, 6, and 7 of the 1991 Act. They asserted that the Shahi Idgah Mosque, constructed by Aurangzeb in 1669-70 and still used as a mosque, should not be disputed. They referenced historical notifications recognizing the site as a mosque.

The plaintiffs claimed that the site was originally a temple of Lord Krishna, with continuous worship practices since 5000 years ago. They argued that the mosque's presence does not change the site’s original religious character. They asserted that the 1991 Act does not define 'religious character' and argued that evidence such as historical records and previous legal documents should determine the site’s true nature. Notifications from 1920 and other documents indicate the site's history as both a temple and a mosque, they claimed. The plaintiffs further argued that the Act of 1991 does not apply to sites recognized as ancient monuments or archaeological sites, as per Section 4(3)(a). They also argued that the Act allows for disputes where religious character was altered before the Act's commencement.

The court acknowledged that determining the religious character of the property is complex and requires a full trial with evidence from both sides. It concluded that the plaintiffs' suits were not currently barred by the 1991 Act and that the religious character of the site should be decided based on detailed evidence and legal arguments during the trial.

Bar under the Waqf Act, 1995:

The defendants argued that the suit property was a waqf property, as evidenced by a Government Gazette Notification from 1944, and thus claimed that the plaintiffs' suits were barred under Sections 6, 85, and 108-A of the Waqf Act, 1995. They asserted that only the Waqf Tribunal had jurisdiction over such disputes.

The plaintiffs contended that the suit property was a Hindu temple, not a waqf property. They argued that the Waqf Tribunal could not decide the nature of the property and claimed the 1944 notification was insufficient as it lacked specific details and did not refer to the property in question. They also emphasized that no valid waqf declaration or survey had been conducted.

The court decided that, based on the current evidence, the 1944 notification did not conclusively establish the property as a waqf property. It found that the dispute could not be resolved solely based on the notification and required further evidence. Thus, it held that the civil court could retain jurisdiction over the case and the bar on jurisdiction under the Waqf Act did not apply at this stage.

Bar under the Specific Relief Act, 1963:

The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' suits were barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, because the plaintiffs did not seek possession of the suit property but only sought declarations and injunctions. They contended that since the plaintiffs were not in possession and did not request possession, reliefs like injunctions could not be granted.

Conversely, the plaintiffs argued that the property in question was a temple, and they claimed constructive possession through the deity. They sought a decree requiring the defendants to remove illegal constructions and return vacant possession to the Janmabhoomi Trust. They asserted that previous decrees were based on fraud and misrepresentation.

The court decided that the question of whether the suits were barred by Section 34 could not be determined at this stage. It concluded that the issue of whether the plaintiffs' claims were barred by this section could only be addressed after a full trial, where evidence would be presented and assessed. Therefore, the suits were not deemed barred by Section 34 at this preliminary stage.

Conclusion: 

The court opined that the plaints in all the suits of the plaintiffs disclosed a cause of action and they did not appear to be barred by any provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995; the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991; the Specific Relief Act, 1963; the Limitation Act, 1963 and Order XIII Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

Moreover, while not delving into the historical merits of the case, the court acknowledged the profound religious significance of the site to the Hindu community, underscoring the importance of a judicious and fair trial.

The rejection of the Muslim side's application clears the way for the suits to proceed in the trial court, where the substantive issues regarding the ownership and possession of the Shahi Idgah Mosque will be adjudicated.

Court posted the matter next on August 12 at 2:00 pm for issues.

Case Title: Bhagwan Shrikrishna Virajman At Katra Keshav Dev Khewat No. 255 And 7 Others v. U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board And 3 Others And Connected Matters