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Court ruled that while sexually colored remarks fall under Section 2(n) of the 2013 Act which defines "sexual harassment", the terms "sweety" and "baby" may not inherently carry sexual connotations as they may be prevalent in certain social circles
The Calcutta High Court recently rejected a petition filed by a retired Deputy Commandant of the Coast Guard, Mumbai, challenging the Internal Complaints Committee's decision to dismiss her sexual harassment complaint against her Commanding Officer.
The bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya upheld the ICC's finding that the terms "baby" and "sweety" used by the petitioner's Commanding Officer were not intended to be sexual.
Court underscored that while the ICC deemed the use of "baby" and "sweety" inappropriate, it had also acknowledged the petitioner's communication of discomfort to her Commanding Officer, after which, he ceased using such terms to address her.
"Such expressions may be prevalent in certain social circles and need not always be sexually coloured," held the court.
Before the high court, the petitioner's counsel alleged multiple forms of harassment by the accused Commanding Officer, including inappropriate stares, attempted intrusion into her room, and unwelcome physical contact. They also claimed that the officer addressed her inappropriately with terms like "baby" and "sweety," with sexual connotations.
Moreover, the petitioner's counsel asserted that the Commanding Officer attempted to summon her from leave on two occasions coinciding with her birthday and wedding anniversary, alleging these attempts were deliberate acts of harassment.
They claimed that the Commanding Officer's actions were aimed at deliberately obstructing the petitioner's professional advancement, following her resistance to his attempted sexual harassment.
Furthermore, questioning the ICC's decision, the counsel argued that the use of the inappropriate terms "baby" and "sweety" was entirely overlooked by the ICC solely because they were not repeated.
The Commanding Officer refuted all allegations, asserting that they were mere figments of the imagination of the petitioner.
The counsel appearing for the Commanding Officer argued that regarding the allegations of staring and peeping, the petitioner deliberately chose not to raise them at the relevant time despite CCTV cameras being installed around her residence. They pointed out that CCTV footage, like in many institutions, is retained for a limited period, and the allegations were made much later, leaving no opportunity for the footage to corroborate or refute the claims.
Regarding the leave recall allegations, the counsel stated that for the first time, the petitioner was required for Republic Day parade prep but she chose to enjoy her entire leave period and for the other date, a recall request was made but later revoked, allowing the petitioner to complete her leave.
Furthermore, the counsel apprised the court of the petitioner's recurring misconduct, leading the accused Commanding Officer to recommend her removal from the squadron and suggest psychological treatment. It was also told that there was another complaint filed by a different Commanding Officer for petitioner's refusal to serve as a co-pilot.
They alleged that the sexual harassment complaint was strategically lodged by the petitioner only after disciplinary proceedings began on the other Commanding Officer's complaint.
The high court noted that ICC was chaired by a lady and comprised of one male member and two other female members. Hence, the constitution of the Committee squarely met the requirements of the Sexual Harassment of Woman at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act), court held.
Court pointed out that the ICC elaborately dealt with all the allegations made by the petitioner and had given sufficient opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, adverting to and appreciating the entire evidence adduced by both sides in the process.
Court asserted that the allegation of staring and peeping in the room of the petitioner could not be substantiated by any witness.
The very fact that the petitioner waited for almost a year after the alleged incident to lodge her complaint robs the adjudicating body of the opportunity to look into such footage to ascertain the veracity of the allegation, court said.
Moreover, court stressed that it was not the case of the petitioner that the Commanding Officer peeped into her room or stared at her at a time when she was in a compromising or embarrassing position.
'Staring' has various shades and does not always necessarily lead to sexual harassment as contemplated in the 2013 Act, court held.
The high court ruled that while sexually colored remarks fall under Section 2(n) of the 2013 Act which defines "sexual harassment", the terms "sweety" and "baby" may not inherently carry sexual connotations.
Contrarily, court opined that the conduct and chronology of events spoke volumes against the petitioner.
There were several prior charges against the petitioner by her colleagues across the board. Thus, the possibility of the petitioner using the allegation of sexual harassment as a ruse and afterthought to save her skin from such allegations cannot be ruled out, court held.
Court highlighted that the psychological ill-health of the petitioner was corroborated not only from her affidavit-in-reply but was also borne out by several materials on record, which had been placed on record by the ICC in its compilation.
Hence, court held that there was no scope of interference whatsoever with the impugned decision of the ICC.
Case Title: xxx v. Gender Sensitization and Internal Complaint Committee & Ors.
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