Bombay HC: Second Writ Maintainable to Enforce Earlier Writ Under Article 226

Reiterating the expansive constitutional jurisdiction vested in High Courts under Article 226, the Bombay High Court has held that a second writ petition seeking enforcement of an earlier writ judgment is maintainable, making it clear that assignment classifications or technical objections on maintainability cannot stand in the way of ensuring compliance with judicial directions.

The Court stated that where injustice continues despite an earlier order, the High Court is not stripped of its authority and, in fact, is duty-bound to intervene again to secure obedience to its own judgments.

The Division Bench of Justices R.I. Chagla and Farhan P. Dubash heard the matter and recorded at the outset that the petition was rightly placed before them because it involved enforcement of a prior order dated 19.09.2025.

Rejecting a preliminary objection raised by the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation (ESIC), the Court noted that although ESIC attempted to argue that the matter should be before a Single Judge or a Bench with labour and service assignments, the present case was distinctly one of non-compliance with a previous judicial pronouncement.

As the petitioners sought nothing but implementation of a concluded writ adjudication, the Bench held that the petition was maintainable. In the same sitting, the Court proceeded to grant ad-interim relief by staying the fresh show-cause notices which were challenged in this enforcement writ.

The petitioners, Foundever CRM India Pvt. Ltd. and another, approached the Court alleging that ESIC had issued fresh show-cause notices dated 6.10.2025 relying upon an Inspection Report from 15.07.2024; a document which formed part of the impugned orders expressly quashed by the High Court in its September, 2025 judgment.

Their case was straightforward: once the Court had set aside the Inspection Report along with the entire bundle of orders listed in Annexure-A of the earlier petition, ESIC could not, directly or indirectly, revive that very report to initiate fresh proceedings.

They submitted that such conduct amounted not only to non-compliance but a direct disregard of the Court’s mandate, leaving them no option but to seek enforcement of the previous writ. The Registry, they pointed out, had accordingly assigned the matter to the present Bench as one concerning implementation of a prior judgment.

ESIC objected to maintainability and asserted that the September, 2025 judgment directed recall of only the “impugned orders” and not the Inspection Report, thereby suggesting that it was free to rely on the report in future proceedings. It also relied on a communication dated 3.10.2025 by which it allegedly recalled the earlier orders.

The Bench found no merit in this distinction and read the September judgment as a whole, noting that the Inspection Report was not only listed explicitly at Item V of Annexure-A but was part of the collective set of impugned actions the Court had struck down.

The corporation could not rewrite or narrow the scope of the judgment through selective interpretation.

In determining maintainability, the Bench referred with approval to the Calcutta High Court’s decision in Bibekananda Mondal v. State of West Bengal (2002 SCC OnLine Cal 571), reiterating the principle that a litigant is entitled to move a second writ petition if the earlier writ order has not been complied with.

Relying on the reasoning in that precedent, the Court observed that Article 226 is couched in deliberately wide terms, enabling High Courts to remedy injustice “wherever it is found,” and that judicial directions cannot be rendered ineffective by non-compliance from the very authorities bound by them. When an order of the writ court is not adhered to, the High Court not only may, but must, issue appropriate directions to secure its enforcement.

In staying the fresh show-cause notices, the High Court underscored that questions of bench assignment, subject-wise roster, or procedural objections cannot override the Court’s overarching constitutional obligation to uphold the effectiveness of its own judgments.

The Bench also noted that ESIC itself had kept the personal hearing pursuant to the fresh notices in abeyance after the writ was filed, underscoring that even the authority recognised the importance of awaiting the Court’s determination.

The Court’s analysis strengthens jurisprudence that a writ court’s powers do not end with the pronouncement of an order; they extend to ensuring the order is meaningful in practice. Where an authority attempts to circumvent or dilute a judgment through subsequent actions relying on previously quashed material, a second writ lies squarely within the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction.

Case Title: Foundever CRM India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Employees’ State Insurance Corporation & Ors.

Date of Judgment: 19.11.2025

Bench: Justice R.I. Chagla and Justice Farhan P. Dubash