Male 'Child' Below 21 Cannot Seek Protection for Live-In Relationship: Allahabad High Court

A male below 21 years of age cannot be permitted to continue in a live-in relationship through court protection orders when the law itself bars him from entering into marriage, the Allahabad High Court recently held while dismissing a plea filed by an interfaith couple seeking protection from family interference.

The bench of Justice Garima Prashad passed the order in a writ petition filed by a 20-year-old Muslim woman and her 19-year-old Hindu partner, who had approached the court claiming that they were residing together in a live-in relationship and apprehended threats from the woman’s family members.

The couple had sought directions restraining their relatives from interfering in their relationship and protection of their life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The petitioners contended that though they wished to stay together, they were unable to solemnise marriage under the Special Marriage Act because the male petitioner had not attained 21 years of age.

Opposing the plea, the State argued that under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, a male below 21 years is statutorily treated as a “child” for the purpose of marriage. It was submitted that courts could not indirectly validate a marriage-like arrangement by granting protection to a live-in relationship that effectively substitutes marriage.

After examining the statutory framework governing marriages in India, the high court observed that the Hindu Marriage Act, the Special Marriage Act and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act all uniformly prescribe 21 years as the minimum age for a male to marry.

Court said Parliament had consciously created a marriage-specific incapacity even though a male becomes a major at 18 under the law of majority.

Court noted that the child marriage law was enacted to address concerns such as lack of maturity, financial and emotional unpreparedness, interruption of education and long-term social consequences associated with premature unions. Court described the legislation as a “complete code” aimed not merely at classifying child marriages but at preventing and discouraging them.

Justice Prashad held that where parties consciously enter a live-in relationship because the law does not presently permit them to marry, the relationship assumes the character of a marriage substitute. In such circumstances, judicial protection would amount to indirectly sanctioning a legally impermissible marital arrangement.

“The doctrine that what cannot be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly applies with full force here,” the court observed while holding that writ jurisdiction cannot be used to dilute statutory restrictions governing marriageable age.

Court also rejected the argument that the consensual nature of the relationship was sufficient to justify protection. It held that where the statute treats one party as lacking legal capacity to enter into marriage, consent alone cannot override the legislative framework.

"Where a male is below twenty-one years of age and is treated as a ‘child’ for the purposes of marriage under the statutory framework, the concept of ‘consent’ cannot be used to bypass the legal restriction. A relationship cannot be permitted merely because it is described as consensual, when the law itself treats one of the parties as lacking the capacity to enter into such a union," Justice Prasad said.

The high court also expressed concern over the legal and social vulnerability that such relationships may create for women.

Referring to Section 3 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, court observed that the law preserves the right of the “child” party to later repudiate or seek annulment of the marriage.

Justice Garima Prashad noted that if courts permit a male below 21 years to continue in a marriage-like live-in relationship with an adult woman, the woman may restructure her entire life around the relationship while the law still allows the male partner to subsequently walk away from it.

Court held that a welfare legislation cannot be interpreted in a manner that increases the vulnerability and insecurity of a woman under the guise of protecting a male child.

At the same time, the high court clarified that individuals in such relationships continue to enjoy constitutional protection against violence, illegal detention, abduction and coercion. It said parents or relatives cannot resort to unlawful acts, but they also cannot be restrained from approaching authorities or taking lawful steps under the child marriage law.

Court found that the petitioners had made only vague allegations against family members and had not disclosed any specific incident of threat, violence or illegal restraint.

Observing that no contemporaneous police complaint had been placed on record, court held that no case was made out for issuing a general protection order. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed.

Case Title: Shajiya Parveen And Another Vs. State Of U.P. And 3 Others

Order Date: May 4, 2026

Bench: Justice Garima Prashad