Section 330 CrPC Mandatory; Ensures Safety of Mentally Ill Individuals and Society: Delhi HC Quashes Discharge Order

The Delhi High Court, recently, set aside an order of the trial court discharging a man accused of sexually assaulting a minor girl. The court observed that although individuals suffering from mental illness might not be held criminally liable in the conventional sense, their release into society without appropriate supervision or care could pose a risk to themselves or others. The bench further underscored the significance of the procedure prescribed under Section 330(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC).

The bench of Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma held, “It exists precisely because the law recognizes that while such persons may not be criminally liable in the conventional sense, they may still pose a threat – either to themselves or to others – if not placed under appropriate supervision or care”.

The State filed an appeal against a trial court’s order discharging a man accused of sexually assaulting a minor. The trial court relied on an medical report diagnosing the accused with severe mental retardation, finding him incapable of understanding the act or defending himself, leading to his discharge from the case.

The State, represented by Additional Public Prosecutor Naresh Kumar Chahar, contended that the discharge order was erroneous and was passed without adhering to the mandatory procedures prescribed under Sections 328, 329, and 330 of the CrPC.

In response, Advocate Arpit Srivastava, representing the accused, argued that the trial Court acted lawfully under Section 328 CrPC by ordering a medical evaluation prior to framing charges. Therefore, Advocate Srivastava requested the dismissal of the petition, asserting that the discharge order required no interference.

The principal issue before the bench was “whether or not the learned trial Court has followed the procedure set out under Chapter XXV of the Cr.P.C., while conducting inquiry into the mental state (unsoundness of mind or mental retardation) of the accused and discharging him in the present case”.

The bench reiterated that there is a legal and medical disctinction between unsoundness of mind and mental retardation. The court noted that though these terms are commonly misunderstood as interchangeable, their implications under criminal law vary significantly.

The bench emphasized that, “While unsoundness of mind or mental illness would generally refer to disorders that affect a person‘s thinking, emotional state, or behavior, and that significantly impair their judgment, perception of reality, or ability to function in daily life, with such conditions being episodic or progressive in nature and may, in certain circumstances, be responsive to treatment; the mental retardation, on the other hand, is recognized as a separate and distinct condition, as it denotes a developmental disability characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, which originates during the developmental period and is associated with limitations in adaptive behavior”.

The bench stressed the importance of correctly identifying the nature of the mental condition, as the procedures and legal consequences attached to each condition differed substantially. The court further analysed Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and noted that the crucial moment for determining criminal responsibility was the time of the offence. However, the court noted that Section 84 did not explicitly cover mental retardation, which is a static and developmental condition.

The court then delved into Section 330, which addressed bail and custody provisions for unsoundness of mind. If the accused did not require in-patient treatment, bail could be granted with appropriate security. Otherwise, the accused was to be kept in a secure medical facility. Section 330(3) empowered the court to decide, based on medical opinions, whether to discharge the accused with a security bond or transfer them to a specialized care facility.

The bench held that the procedures under Chapter XXV were mandatory and that failure to adhere to them could vitiate the trial. Following due procedure, the trial Court examined a medical expert and formed an opinion under Sections 328(1) and (1A) that the accused was incapable of understanding the nature of his act or defending himself.

The trial court was required to proceed under Section 330(3) CrPC, which mandates a judicial assessment to determine whether the accused could be safely released with adequate safeguards or required institutional care. However, the trial court discharged the accused solely on the ground that no case was made out and accepted a surety bond of ₹10,000 from his father, without any analysis of the nature of the alleged offence or expert input regarding the safety of his release.

The bench held that this omission violated Section 330(3), which obligates courts to consider the nature of the offence, the accused’s mental condition, and medical opinions before ordering release or referral to a care facility.

“This Court is fully mindful of the legal protections extended to individuals suffering from mental retardation or unsoundness of mind… However, this Court is equally conscious of the corresponding duty to ensure the safety of society at large. It must be remembered that while the law shields individuals with mental disabilities from unwarranted criminal liability, it does not – and cannot – permit a blind discharge of such individuals into society without a proper and informed judicial assessment”, the court highlighted.

The bench concluded that the failure to follow the mandatory procedure under Section 330(3) CrPC rendered the impugned order legally unsustainable. “If courts remain unaware of these statutory obligations or fail to follow them, it would not only amount to a grave procedural irregularity, but also create a vacuum where neither the rights of the mentally disabled nor the safety of the public are protected”, the court outlined.

The bench set aside the order, and the matter was remanded to the trial Court for reconsideration and compliance with Section 330 of the CrPC.

For State: Additional Public Prosecutor Naresh Kumar Chahar

For Accused: Advocate Arpit Srivastava

Case Title: State v Neeraj (2025:DHC:4233)