Shariat Law Allowing Marriage at Puberty Runs Against Child Marriage Law, POCSO: Allahabad High Court

Holding that the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA) overrides Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) on the question of the minimum age of marriage, the Allahabad High Court has ruled that a Muslim girl cannot be married merely because she has attained puberty.

Court observed that the legal age of marriage prescribed under the PCMA applies uniformly to every citizen, irrespective of religion, and that the Shariat principle recognising puberty, generally at 15 years, as the age of marriage "runs clearly in the teeth" of both the PCMA and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act.

The bench of Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Achal Sachdev dismissed a plea to quash an FIR lodged against 19 persons accused of obstructing police and Child Line officials from stopping the marriage of a 16-year-old girl in Bulandshahr.

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The FIR was lodged after police and members of the Child Line Team allegedly faced resistance while attempting to prevent the marriage of a 16-year-old girl in Bulandshahr district.

What happened during the attempted child marriage?

According to the FIR, police officials and members of the Child Line Team reached Village Sunpeda Baksuwa on February 15, 2026 after receiving information that the minor girl's marriage was about to take place. After speaking to the girl and her parents, the team informed them that she would be produced before the Child Welfare Committee.

The FIR alleges that the accused, along with several unidentified persons, abused and threatened the officials and forcibly took the girl away from the custody of a Child Line worker. The police party and Child Line officials allegedly had to flee to save themselves before ultimately rescuing the girl. A video recording of the incident was also claimed to have been made.

The petitioners argued that under Muslim Personal Law, a girl who has attained puberty, generally at the age of 15 years, is competent to marry. They relied upon provisions of the Majority Act and the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act to contend that the PCMA would not override their personal law.

Rejecting the submission, the bench observed that it was in complete agreement with the reasoning adopted by the Kerala High Court in Moidutty Musliyar, which held that no personal law can wipe out the prohibition on child marriage created by the PCMA.

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"The age of marriage, in our considered opinion, for every citizen of the country, irrespective of religion, is that, that is spelt out by the PCMA," court said.

It further observed that allowing marriage below 18 years would inevitably lead to consummation, which would amount to an offence under the POCSO Act because a child under that law is any person below 18 years. The bench described both statutes as based on public health, scientific understanding and national policy, adding that "there can be no escape from it for anyone."

Court acknowledged that conflicting views have been expressed by various high courts on the issue and that the Supreme Court has not yet authoritatively settled the controversy.

However, it held that this did not prevent it from adopting what it considered to be the correct legal position that Shariat provisions permitting marriage after puberty run contrary to the PCMA and the POCSO Act.

Why did the High Court refuse to quash the FIR?

Examining the allegations, the bench held that the police and Child Line officials were acting squarely within the law while attempting to prevent the child marriage and a possible violation of the POCSO Act. It described their actions as "commendable".

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Court noted that the gravamen of the FIR was not merely the attempted child marriage but the alleged assault on officials performing their statutory duties. According to the allegations, the officials were abused, threatened and prevented from carrying out their work, making out a prima facie case of obstruction of public servants besides other offences requiring investigation.

Rejecting the petitioners' argument that certain penal provisions were wrongly invoked or that there were no independent witnesses, the bench observed that questions regarding the exact offences or the involvement of individual accused were matters for investigation and, if necessary, trial.

Holding that it was not a fit case to interfere at the threshold, court dismissed the writ petition, vacated the interim stay granted earlier and directed that the order be communicated to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Bulandshahr and the Station House Officer of Kakor police station.

Case Title: Rubi and others vs. State of U.P. and others

Order Date: July 01, 2026

Bench: Justices J.J.Munir and Achal Sachdev