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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

Date of decision: 22nd SEPTEMBER, 2025

IN THE MATTER OF:

+ **W.P.(C) 1712/2019**

KHAJA HUSSAIN

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Ajit Kakkar and Mr. Tejas
Bhonge, Advocates.

versus

DIRECTOR GENERAL, CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY
FORCE & ORS

.....Respondents

Through: Ms. Monika Arora, CGSC with Mr.
Subhrdeep Saha, Ms. Anamika
Thakur, Mr. Prabhat Kumar and Mr.
Abhinav Verma, Advs.
Mr. Rohtas, CISF.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIMAL KUMAR YADAV

JUDGMENT (ORAL)

SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J.

1. Aggrieved by the Order dated 29.09.2016, passed by the Deputy Inspector General, CISF, North Zone-II, Delhi, awarding the punishment of “*reduction of pay by one stage from Rs.38,700/- to Rs.37,600/- in the time scale of pay [level-6] for a period of two years with further direction that he will not earn increment of pay during the period of reduction and that on expiry of this period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing his future increment of pay*”, and Order dated 01.11.2017, passed by the Director General, CISF, rejecting the Revision Petition filed by the Petitioner herein against the Order dated 29.09.2016, the Petitioner has



approached this Court by filing the present Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

2. Facts of the case reveals that the Petitioner herein was appointed as a Sub-Inspector (Executive) in the CISF 10.08.2013. It is stated that after completion of basic training from NISA, Hyderabad, the Petitioner was posted at CISF unit VSTPP, Vindhyanager, from 05.08.2014 to 08.01.2019. It is stated that while the Petitioner was posted at CISF unit VSTPP, Vindhyanager, a complaint was made against the Petitioner by one lady Sub-Inspector of the CISF, who was working in the same unit with the Petitioner herein, alleging that the Petitioner herein had sexually harassed her by sending her vulgar messages on WhatsApp and had also harassed her through mobile calls. The complainant also alleged that during general conversation with her, the Petitioner used to use words like “I love you”, “darling”, etc. The complainant further alleged that on 19.07.2015, the Petitioner herein managed to enter her house with mala fide intentions. On the complaint of the Complainant, a Departmental Inquiry was conducted against the Petitioner and vide charge memorandum dated 05.04.2016, the Petitioner herein was charged with the following charges:

“An act of gross misconduct, indiscipline on the part of CISF No.130200941 SI/Exe. Khaja Husain of CISF Unit, VSTPP Vindhyanager, in that he has sexually harassed CISF No.085220036 Lady SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel of CISF Unit, VSTPP Vindhyanager (now posted at CISF Unit, ATPP Anpara) by sending her porn messages through whatsapps, Mobile calls. During general conversation with her, he used unwanted words such as, "I love you" Sonam or Darling etc. Besides above on 19.07.2015 the alleged SI/Exe Khaja Husain managed to enter in the



complainant's house with malafide intention. Hence, the charge.”

3. An enquiry under Rule 36 of the CISF Rule 2001 was scheduled to be conducted against the Petitioner herein for which an Enquiry Committee was constituted. The Enquiry Committee recorded the statements of the Petitioner, the Complainant, and other witnesses. Seven witnesses, including the mother and the father of the Complainant, were examined on behalf of the CISF. Six exhibits, including the call recordings, WhatsApp messages and the complaint given by the Complainant, were also produced before the Enquiry Committee. In her statement, the Complainant stated that in March, 2015, the Petitioner sent her inappropriate messages on Whatsapp and when she confronted him as to whether he had sent those messages to her by mistake, the Petitioner herein confessed that he has fallen in love with the Complainant. However, on being reprimanded by the Complainant, the Petitioner herein started behaving like a common colleague with her. The Complainant further stated that on occasions when she could not go to market to buy vegetables, she use to buy them from the Mess Secretary. It is stated that when the Petitioner took charge of Mess Secretary, she use to buy vegetables from him as well but the Petitioner herein took it in a different way. The Complainant further stated that on one occasion, the Petitioner herein knocked on the doors of her room at about 09:30 in the night in inebriated state and when the Complainant enquired as to why the Petitioner has come to her room this late in the night, the Petitioner herein replied that he was missing his girlfriend who looked just like the Complainant. It is stated that when the Complainant threatened to call the control room, the Petitioner herein apologised for his behaviour and left from the place. The



Complainant further stated that after that day, the Petitioner started sending her indecent messages. It is stated that on 19.07.2015 when the Complainant went to her room after finishing the day's work, due to terrible headache she became unwell and called the Control Room to get ambulance. She further stated that she went to the Hospital where the nurse administered her some medicines. It is further stated that the Petitioner herein came to the Hospital and the Complainant came to her room along with the Petitioner herein. It is stated that when the Complainant reached her room, the Petitioner herein tried to force himself upon her but the Complainant saved herself on the pretext of stomach ache. It is stated that the Complainant locked herself in her bedroom while the Petitioner herein stayed in the living room for the whole night and in the morning when the Complainant told the Petitioner that she will file a complaint against the Petitioner, he threatened to tarnish her image and reputation. The Complainant further stated that on 28.07.2015, the Petitioner herein came to the office and sat on a chair besides the Complainant and rubbed the waist of the Complainant while making inappropriate comments on her. It is stated that when the Complainant objected to it, the Petitioner herein threatened her with consequences. The Enquiry Committee, after perusing the statements of the Witnesses and the material on record, awarded the punishment of *“reduction of pay by one stage from Rs.38,700/- to Rs.37,600/- in the time scale of pay [level-6] for a period of two years with further direction that he will not earn increment of pay during the period of reduction and that on expiry of this period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing his future increment of pay”* after observing as under:

“The accused Force member SI/Exe Khaja Hussain



himself has admitted regarding this charge that he sent the indecent whatsapp message to Shweta Patel on 21.07.2015 but he has tried to prove this that he was continuously blackmailing by the SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel for marriage, for which he used the filthy words. He further stated that on 21.07.2015 'I was the gate incharge and SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel' was the Control Room IC. SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel asked him to relieve her in control room with GD and when I refused to do so, SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel on 21.07.2015 sent the whatsapp messages, but in this regard SI/Exe Khaja Hussain has not produced any witness or evidence which may prove that SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel on 21.07.2015 used defamatory words for SI/Exe Khaja Hussain during the duty or blackmailed him in any manner for the marriage. On contrary, he has stated in his clarification that he had not taken the dispute dated 21.07.2015 seriously, because he is known about the illness SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel. It is cleared by the statement of prosecution witness 1,2 and Court witness 5 that they were informed by SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel that she was in stress and disturbed by the indecent messages sent by SI/Exe Khaja Hussain and therefore she had given its oral complaint dated 05.08.2015 in Intelligence Department to Prosecution Witness 1 Insp/Exe Inderjeet Joshi. Hence the charge of sending obscene /indecent whatsapp message to Lady SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel is proved against the accused force member.

The SI/Exe Khaja Hussain has stated in regard to using the unwarranted words e.g. 'I Love You' 'Sanam' and Darling during the general conversation with SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel that he used to use these words on the instance of SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel with her consent and due to friendship relationship and therefore, SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel never objected for



using these words. He also tried to prove that he has used these words on the instance of SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel. It is proved by Ex.1A and 1B (Call Recording) that he used to use the words e.g. 'Darling I Love You and 'Janu' for the SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel during the phone conversation and the same was not objected by the SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel, but it is also clear by the above said exhibits that SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel never said the SI/Exe Khaja Hussain to use such words, nor she used such words for SI/Exe Khaja Hussain. Hence, the charge of using unwarranted words for SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel is proved against the accused force member.

The SI/Exe Khaja Hussain has stated in regard to entering in the house of SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel without her consent on 19.07.2015 that SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel herself called him for the help and because the voice of SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel was also seem to be tired and sick, therefore, he had gone to Hospital to see SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel. He dropped SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel to her home and went to his hostel. He has also proved by Ex.2A to 2U that he had night checking on 19.07,2015 from 2 AM to 4 AM and he had gone for night checking, but during her examination this fact has come forward that he was neither appointed as attendor nor the information was given to company commander/control room while going to Hospital. Besides this, he had not appointed any Lady constable as attendor for the SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel, however, as per the statement of SI/Exe Khaja Hussain, the SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel was not in the condition to go home from the hospital by herself. As per the prosecution Witness-1 when any lady gets sick in the unit then any lady force member is appointed as attendor with her. SI/Exe Khaja Hussain himself has admitted that he had gone to leave SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel at her home alone, but he has not



produce any proof that thereafter he had come back from there. On hearing the conversation of prosecution Ext. 1B on phone (which clears by the examination of SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel during the enquiry that the said conversation is related to the incident dated 19.07.2015) and in view of the written clarification by SI/Exe Khaja Hussain that "Yes I admit my fault that I came in her lavish talks but never ever crossed my limits of being in physical relation even when she created that opportunities many times before 19.07.2015. As that she is making allegation, though nothing was happened on that day also as she did not able to complete her desire of being physically involved with me to pressurize me for marriage". It is possible that SI/Exe Khaja Hussain on 19.07.2015 stayed in the house of SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel after leaving her at home in night and at that some objectionable possibilities took place, but the same could not take the practical shape. Besides this, providing by the SI/Exe Khaja Hussain that on 19.07.2015 he was in night checking from 2 AM to 4 AM does not disprove this charge. Hence the charge of staying of SI/Exe Khaja Hussain in the House of SI/Exe Mahashweta Patel on 19.07.2015 after leaving her to her home from Hospital is proved.

The complainant has mentioned in her statement during the departmental enquiry that on 28.07.2015 the SI/Exe Khaja Hussain had put his hand on her waist and said how are you darling, your handwriting is so 'beautiful as beautiful you are. The above said charge has been analyzed by all the witnesses and documents and the same has been found baseless in the absence of witnesses and facts."

4. Section 18 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (*hereinafter referred to as*



‘the POSH Act’) provides for an appeal in accordance with the Service Rules, if so framed. The Central Industrial Security Forces provides for an appeal. Instead of filing the appeal, the Petitioner herein chose to file a Revision Petition before the Director General, CISF. In the Revision Petition it was contended by the Petitioner herein that the complaint given by the Complainant is false and base-less as the Complainant had herself taken the advantage of their friendship and tried to blackmail the Petitioner for marriage. It was further contended by the Petitioner that his request for providing copies of the statements recorded during the preliminary enquiry was denied by the Disciplinary Authority and that the Complaints Committee has failed to analyse the case properly. After analysing the material on record. The Revisional Authority *vide* Order dated 01.11.2017 dismissed the Revision Petition filed by the Petitioner herein on the ground that the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Committee could not be found fault with and that being a member of the force, the conduct of the Petitioner herein is not acceptable as he is not expected to indulge in any undesirable, immoral and unethical behaviour of sending vulgar messages to a female colleague even if it is assumed that they shared friendly relations. The Revisional Authority rejected the plea of the Petitioner that he was not provided with statements of witnesses on the ground that the Preliminary Enquiry Report was not relied on during the Departmental Enquiry by the Enquiry Committee. The Revisional Authority further held that the allegation of the Petitioner regarding non-consideration of his defence version is not supported by any specific details and such vague, unspecific and that unsubstantial pleas cannot be accepted. The Revisional Authority further held that the Disciplinary Authority examined the pros and cons of



the case and has issued a detailed speaking order after examining all the arguments advanced by the Petitioner.

5. It is this Order which is under challenge in the present Petition.

6. Heard learned Counsel for the Parties and perused the material on record.

7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner strenuously contends that the Enquiry Officer has failed to appreciate that the Complainant and the Petitioner are in regular conversations and that she was attracted to the Petitioner. Both of them knew about their personal lives and only because of the quarrel, she decided to lodge a complaint against the Petitioner. Therefore, learned Counsel for the Petitioner stated that the complaint is totally false, *mala fide*.

8. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further contends that no porn messages were sent by the Petitioner. Messages were exchanged because of the informal relationship between the Complainant and the Petitioner. He states that the Enquiry Officer has selectively taken material against the Petitioner without taking into account several material facts like the Complainant herself has given an apology to the Petitioner.

9. He states that the Members in the Force Unit were aware of the relationship of the Complainant and the Petitioner. He states that there are several paragraphs, which are self-contradictory.

10. *Per contra*, the Counsel appearing for the State contends that the allegations made by the Complainant and the material supplied by her comes squarely within the definition of sexual harassment under Section 2 (n) of the POSH Act. The messages which have been sent by the Petitioner and received by the Complainant and which finds mentioned in the Enquiry



Report reflects that the messages come within the definition of the term 'sexual harassment'.

11. The Departmental Enquiry has been conducted after observing the principles of natural justice. It cannot be said that the Petitioner has not been given proper opportunity to defend himself. The Enquiry Authority has considered all the relevant material before holding that the Petitioner is guilty of harassing the Complainant and the nature of messages are such, which cannot be accepted from a member of the Uniform Force.

12. It is relevant to mention that the Petitioner did not file an Appeal as provided for under Section 18 of the Act which has been filed within 90 days of the Order rather he filed a Revision Petition.

13. The scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in disciplinary proceedings is now well settled in a series of judgments.

14. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao, **AIR 1963 SC 1723**, the Apex Court has observed as under:-

"7... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to



arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution."

15. In State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557, reads as under:-

"21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723 : (1964) 3 SCR 25 : (1964) 2 LLJ 150] . First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to



declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226.

22. Again, this Court in *Railway Board, representing the Union of India, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh* [(1969) 1 SCC 502 : (1969) 3 SCR 548] said



that the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjana Singh case this Court held that the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent was instrumental in compelling the shut-down of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court should not have interfered with the conclusion.

23. *The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on*



no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477 : (1964) 5 SCR 64] .

24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do."

16. Similarly, in State of Haryana & Anr. v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491, the Apex Court has observed as under:-

"4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are



permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The 'residuum' rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence — not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the



order is invalid on that ground.”

17. The Apex Court in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, while considering the abovementioned Judgments, has observed as under:-

"12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no



reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;

(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

(i) reappreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience."

18. The Revisional Authority has carefully gone through the enquiry proceedings and the submissions given by the Petitioner. The Disciplinary



Authority, Director General, CISF has also gone through the audio recordings in the form of CDs. It has been observed in the Revisional Order that the CD audio recordings indicating the rejection of the proposal of the Complainant has also been gone into. The Revisional Authority is of the opinion that the Petitioner being married, was under moral obligation not to indulge in a relationship with another lady and send vulgar messages.

19. Applying the law laid down in the catena of judgments, this Court does not find any infirmity in the enquiry proceedings. It cannot be said that the extraneous material has been considered by the Enquiry Committee or that any relevant material has been omitted to be considered. The principles of natural justice have been followed.

20. As correctly pointed out in the enquiry proceedings and the Revisional Authority, the Petitioner being a member of a Uniform Service was already married had no business to indulge in a relationship with other lady and send vulgar messages. This conduct is definitely unbecoming of an officer of a Uniform Force.

21. The punishment given to the Petitioner is also commensurate to the misconduct rather this Court is of the opinion that the Petitioner has been left very lightly.

22. With the above observations, the Writ Petition is dismissed of along with pending application(s), if any.

SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J

VIMAL KUMAR YADAV, J

SEPTEMBER 22, 2025/Rahul