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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

\+ W.P.(C) 1106/2024

SHRUTI VYAS & ORS. .....Petitioners

Through: Mr. Indra Sen Singh, Mr. Nasir Mohd and Ms. Kaberi Sharma, Advs.

versus

UNION OF INDIA THROUGH & ANR. .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG with Mr. Satya Ranjan Swain, CGSC, Mr Amit Gupta, SPC with Mr. Kautilya Birat, Mr. Ankush Kapoor and Mr. Vishwadeep, Advs. with Major Anish Muralidhar and Capt Carolin Johnson

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA

JUDGMENT (ORAL)

% 16.09.2025

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

1. The petitioners are young girls who desire to join as Short-Service Commissioned[1] Officers (Non-Tech) in the Indian Army.

2. The Union Public Service Commission[2] issued an Examination Notice on 4 August 2021 inviting applications from candidates who desire to join the Army via the Combined Defence Service Examination (II) 2021[3]. Among the posts, to be filled by the CDSE,

[1] "SSC" hereinafter
[2] "UPSC", hereinafter
[3] "CDSE", hereinafter

were SSC Women (Non-Technical) Posts, to which the petitioners aspire. For recruitment to the SSC, the Examination Notice notified 169 vacancies for men and 16 vacancies for women.

3. The petitioners are seven in number. Of these, Petitioners 5 and 6 have been selected and are presently undergoing training. Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, therefore, the *lis* survives only qua Petitioners 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7[4].

4. The petitioners cleared the examination following their applications for the SSCW (NT)[5]. The petition also sets out their respective scores in the examination but we do not deem it necessary to make reference thereto. Suffice it, however, to state, of the 169 notified vacancies for men, only 107 vacancies have been filled whereas all 16 vacancies reserved for women have been exhausted. There are, therefore, 62 vacancies earmarked for men which remained unfilled.

5. The petitioners stake their claim to these 62 vacancies. The prayer clause in the petition reads thus:

> "It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to:-
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> > a) Issue a writ of *'Mandamus'* thereby commanding and directing the Respondents to assign/allot the same number of vacancies for the women candidates equal to the vacancies allotted/assigned to male candidates for short-service-commission; Or, in the alternative, at least the same number of vacancies sanctioned by the Government of India as intimated vide the RTI Reply dated 01.09.2023

[4] collectively, "the petitioners", hereinafter
[5] "Short Service Commission for women (Non-Technical)", hereinafter

(Annexure P-10, Pg 355);

b) Issue a writ of '*Mandamus*' thereby commanding and directing the Respondents to issue call-up/joining letters to, and allow, the Petitioners to join the pre-commission training at Officers Training Academy (OTA) Chennai along with SSC-32 course of Women which has commenced on 03.10.2023; Or, in the alternative, the next SSC (Non-Tech) course for Women , i.e. SSC-33 (NT) or SSC-34(NT), which will commence in March 2024 & October 2024 respectively or any other subsequent similar course;

c) Issue a writ of '*Mandamus*' thereby commanding and directing the Respondents to grant age-waiver in respect of Petitioners who have attained/will soon attain 25 years of age which, as per Respondents' existing policy, is the maximum age limit to join pre-commission training at Officers Training Academy at Chennai /for commission in the Indian Army as Women SSCO; and

d) Pass such other directions/orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case."

6. Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the dispute in issue is no longer *res integra* as it stands covered by paras 45 to 50 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in ***Arshnoor Kaur v UOI***[6].

7. *Arshnoor Kaur*

7.1 As Mr. Chetan Sharma, learned ASG, correctly submits the exact dispute before the Supreme Court in ***Arshnoor Kaur*** related to induction of women into the Judge Advocate General[7] Branch of the Army. The appellants before the Supreme Court had applied consequent to a Notification dated 18 January 2023 for the 31 corps of

[6] **2025 SCC OnLine SC 1668**

[7] "JAG Branch", hereinafter

the JAG stream to be filled via SSC. Six vacancies were notified for men and three vacancies were notified for the women. Separate merit lists were drawn up. The two appellants before the Supreme Court, Arshnoor Kaur and Astha Tyagi, could not qualify for appointment against the three vacancies reserved for women as they ranked 4th and 5th in the merit list of women candidates. As there were more than three vacancies of male candidates which remained unfilled, the appellants contended that they were entitled to be appointed against the said vacancies and that, in fact, the specification of a limited number of vacancies for female candidates was unconstitutional.

7.2 The Supreme Court has exposited in detail on the principle of gender neutrality as a constitutional imperative and has also contradistinguished gender neutrality and gender equality. We need not, for the limited purposes of the present petition, delve, in detail, with all that has been said in the said judgment. In para 38 of the report, the Supreme Court has identified the exact issue arising before it for consideration thus:

> "38 Having heard learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that the primary issue that arises for consideration is whether after allowing induction of women *in a particular corp or branch under Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950*, can the Respondents by way of a policy and/or administrative instruction restrict the number of women candidates joining the said branch."
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> (Emphasis supplied)

7.3 Thus, it is clear that the Supreme Court was not restricting the scope of its examination to officers desiring to join the JAG Branch, but was covering all branches or Corps, which were notified under Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950. The Supreme Court has

specifically addressed the issue of whether, *in respect of any corps or Branch of the Army for which a Notification had been issued under Section 12 of the Army Act*, it was constitutionally permissible to limit the number of women who could gain entry.

7.4 The Supreme Court clarified, at the very outset, in para 44, thus:

> "44. Upon a harmonious reading of Articles 14, 15, 16, 33 of the Indian Constitution and Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950, this Court is of the view that no women is eligible for employment in the regular Army, except in such corps, department, branch or other body forming part of, or attached to any portion of, the regular Army as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf."

The Supreme Court, therefore, clearly held that except for corps, departments, branches or any other part of the Indian Army, for which a Notification had been issued under Section 12 of the Army Act, women could not have any right of entry.

7.5 Thereafter in paras 45 to 50 of the report, the Supreme Court proceeded to hold as under:

> "45 Under Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950, the Respondents had issued notifications on 30th January 1992 (published on 15th February 1992) and 31st December 1992 making women eligible for appointment as SSC officers in the following ten (10) streams:—
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> i Army Postal Service;
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> ii Judge Advocate General's Department;
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> iii Army Education Corps;
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> iv Army Ordinance Corps (Central Ammunition Depots and Material Management);

v Army Service Corps (Food Scientists and Catering Officers);

vi Corps of Signals;

vii Intelligence Corps;

viii Corps of Engineers;

ix Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering;

x Regiment of Artillery.

46. Accordingly, *SSC appointments for women in the above ten (10) streams are limited to Combat Support Arms and Services and not to Combat Arms like Artillery, Armoured Division and Mechanised Infantry.* Neither the Petitioners nor this Court is insisting that Women be enrolled in Artillery, Armoured Division and Mechanised Infantry as they are not the corp or branch of the Army where the Central Government has by notification permitted the women to join.

47. *Consequently, this Court is of the view that once the Army permits women officers to join any corps, department or branch forming a part of the regular Army, it cannot impose an additional restriction with regard to 'extent of induction' of women officers in the said corps, department or branch—as Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950 does not empower it do so.*

48. Further, on 26th September 2008, the Respondents issued a circular envisaging the grant of Permanent Commission prospectively to SSC Women Officers in the JAG Department and the Army Education Corps. Subsequently, on 25th February 2019, the Respondents granted Permanent Commission to SSC Women Officers in the remaining eight (08) arms. This Court in ***Babita Puniya (supra)***[8] has held that the grant of Permanent Commission to all ten (10) streams (including JAG) is 'is a step forward in recognizing and realizing the right of women to equality of opportunity in the Army'.

49. Also, *while making women officers eligible for appointment in such streams, no notification has been published in the official gazette laying down the 'extent of induction'*. It is settled law that 'when a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and other methods of performance are forbidden' [See: ***Taylor v Taylor***[9], ***Nazir v King***

[8] **Ministry of Defence v Babita Puniya, (2020) 7 SCC 469**
[9] **[1876] L.R.] 1 Ch. 426**

> ***Emperor***[10], ***Babu Verghese v Bar Council of Kerala***[11]]. Accordingly, there is no basis to say that women can be appointed 'only up to a certain extent' in such streams.
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> 50. Consequently, this Court is of the view that *once the Service Headquarters decides to induct women officers in a particular branch or corp by way of a Notification under Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950, it cannot restrict their numbers and/or make a reservation for male officers by way of a policy or administrative instruction under the guise of 'extent of induction'. Accepting the submission of the Respondents would amount to 'setting at naught' the Notification issued under Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950.*"
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> (Emphasis supplied)

7.6 The ambit and import of these paragraphs are clear and categorical. *In respect of corps, departments, or streams of the Army, which stand notified under Section 12 of the Army Act*[12] *as streams in which women could also be recruited, the percentage of women could not be restricted, nor could reservation for male candidates be permitted, by way of an advertisement or executive instruction. It is further clarified, by the Supreme Court, that Section 12 of the Army Act does not permit specification of any extent to which women could be inducted into the notified streams, corps or branches.*

7.7 These paragraphs deal specifically with appointment as SSC officers. The Supreme Court has identified ten streams in the Army, which stand notified under Section 12 of the Army Act, and to which women officers would be eligible to gain entry, as enumerated in para

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[10] **AIR 1936 PC 253**
[11] **(1999) 3 SCC 422**
[12] **12. Ineligibility of females for enrolment or employment**. – No female shall be eligible for enrolment or employment in the regular Army, except in such corps, department, branch or other body forming part of, or attached to any portion of, the regular Army as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall affect the provisions of any law for the time being in force providing for the raising and maintenance of any service auxiliary to the regular Army or any branch thereof in which females are eligible for enrolment or employment.

45 of the report. The Supreme Court, thereafter, has proceeded to hold in para 46 that appointments of women to these ten streams are limited to Combat Support Arms and Services and not to Combat Arms like Artillery, Armoured Division and Mechanised Infantry. The same paragraph goes on to qualify that women could not insist on being enrolled to Combat Arms such as Artillery, Armoured Division and Mechanised Infantry but that, for the remaining 10 streams which were limited to Combat Support Arms and Services, as the Notifications dated 30 January 1992 and 31 December 1992 issued under Section 12 of the Army Act permitted entry for women without specifying any extent of induction, there could be no constitutional restriction on the number of women who could be recruited to these corps or services. It stands further clarified that Section 12 of the Army Act only empowers notification of corps or services into which women could be inducted and does not thereafter permit restriction of the number of women who could be inducted there into.

7.8 We are aware that our observations are somewhat repetitive, but we regard the cause as sufficiently important to justify the repetition. Our obligations, vis-à-vis the Supreme Court, are not restricted to Article 141, but also encompass Article 144. It is the constitutional duty of every executive and judicial authority, in the territory of India, to act in aid of the Supreme Court. This would include ensuring that the law declared by the Supreme Court, especially where it is aimed at social emancipation and in which public interest is deeply ingrained, is implemented to optimum effect. Elimination of the anachronistically artificial chromosomal distinction between women and men is a

cherished constitutional goal, and the Supreme Court has, especially in recent times, been, through one judicial pronouncement after another, been pushing the envelope to the maximum possible extent. We have to carry the torch forward.

7.9 Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the case of his client is squarely covered by the afore-extracted paragraphs from ***Arshnoor Kaur*** and we entirely agree.

7.10 The learned ASG, ably assisted by Mr. Satya Ranjan Swain, learned CGSC, sought to submit that the dispute before the Supreme Court in ***Arshnoor Kaur*** was restricted to induction into the JAG. For this purpose, reliance has been placed on paras 110 and 114 of the ***Arshnoor Kaur***, which reads thus:

> "110. Consequently, the Respondents have failed to establish how a merit-based 'gender-neutral' selection process would negatively impact functionality, manpower planning, or operational efficiency of the JAG branch. On the contrary, a merit-based selection process will improve efficiency of the JAG branch.
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> 114. Moreover, as held hereinabove, male and female JAG officers do not have distinct cadres with different conditions of service and the true meaning of concept of 'gender-neutrality' and 2023 recruitment policy is that Union of India shall recruit the most meritorious candidates in JAG branch irrespective of their sex/gender as the primary job of this branch is to give legal advice and conduct cases, but to 'correct the past' and to 'compensate the women for their previous non-enrolment', the Union of India shall allocate not less than 50% of the vacancies to women candidates."

The learned ASG would submit that ***Arshnoor Kaur*** has to be understood as limited to the issue which was before the Supreme

Court, which was induction of women into the JAG branch, and cannot be generalized.

7.11 The learned ASG further submits that if paras 45 to 50 of ***Arshnoor Kaur*** are to be read in absolute fashion, as Mr. Singh would seek to contend, they would run contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in ***Babita Punia***. He submits that in ***Babita Puniya***, the Supreme Court had recognized the advisability of courts steering clear of policy decisions in the matter of recruitment into the Armed Forces. He submits that there is no reference to ***Babita Puniya*** in paras 45 to 50 of the decision in ***Arshnoor Kaur,*** and that applying the principle of *stare decisis*, the Court has to read these paragraphs in the light of the issue which was before the Supreme Court i.e., entry into the JAG.

7.12 The learned ASG further submits that the policy of restricting the number of women who could enter into the Armed Forces through the SCC was sound and wholesome as it factored in considerations of combat operational preparedness, and the possibility of the inductees having to be engaged in dangerous insurgency operations and the like. Such policy matters, he submits, are typically *terra nullius* for courts and should be left to the policy makers.

7.13 We are not in a position to accept these submissions, *inter alia* because the very same submissions were advanced before the Supreme Court, and comprehensively addressed in ***Arshnoor Kaur***.

7.14 Besides, ***Arshnoor Kaur***, has taken note of and, in fact, placed

reliance on, ***Babita Puniya***. Once an earlier decision of the Supreme Court, irrespective of the strength of the Bench which had rendered it, is considered in a later decision, the Court is bound by the later decision of the Supreme Court. Else, it would amount to this Court holding that the Bench that rendered ***Arshnoor Kaur*** had not correctly understood ***Babita Puniya*** or that ***Arshnoor Kaur*** is *per incuriam* ***Babita Puniya***. A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has already held in ***South Central Railway Employees Co-operative Credit Society Employees Union v B. Yashodabai***[13] that no court, lower in the judicial hierarchy in the Supreme Court, can hold a judgment of the Supreme Court to be *per incuriam*.

7.15 As ***Babita Puniya*** has been considered and examined in ***Arshnoor Kaur***, therefore, we are bound by the enunciation of law in ***Arshnoor Kaur***.

7.16 The submission regarding combat preparedness, possibility of having to engage in the insurgency operations and the like stands specifically addressed in para 46 of the decision in ***Arshnoor Kaur.*** In that case, the Supreme Court has identified ten corps and services within the Army, as notified by the Notifications dated 30 January 1992 and 31 December 1992 under Section 12 of the Army Act which cannot be regarded as Combat Armed Services and are merely Combat Support Armed Services. So far as these ten categories of streams or corps are concerned, therefore, the Supreme Court has dealt with the very same argument that has been advanced by the learned ASG and has rejected it in para 46 of the report.

[13] **(2015) 2 SCC 727**

7.17 It is also important to remember, in this context, that the Supreme Court, as the supreme judicial authority for the nation, is not merely the arbiter of disputes and ultimate interpreter of the law. It also functions as the sentinel on the *qui vive*, as the supreme guardian of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. Among the most pristine of these fundamental rights is the right to gender neutrality. In the discharge of its functions as the sentinel on the *qui vive*, the Supreme Court is unshackled by considerations of the limits of the *lis* before it. Where the Supreme Court lays down the law on matters of policy, gravely impacting fundamental rights, it would be folly, on the part of any Court, to restrict it to the *lis* with which the Supreme Court was concerned.

7.18 In para 46 of ***Kalpana Mehta v UOI***[14], the Supreme Court held:

> "46. While interpreting fundamental rights, the constitutional courts should remember that whenever an occasion arises, the courts have to adopt a liberal approach with the object to infuse lively spirit and vigour so that the fundamental rights do not suffer. When we say so, it may not be understood that while interpreting fundamental rights, the constitutional courts should altogether depart from the doctrine of precedents but it is the obligation of the constitutional courts to act as *sentinel on the qui vive* to ardently guard the fundamental rights of individuals bestowed upon by the Constitution. The duty of this Court, in this context, has been aptly described in ***K.S. Srinivasan v Union of India***[15] wherein it was stated:
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> > "50. … All I can see is a man who has been wronged and I can see a plain way out. I would take it."

7.19 We, therefore, are of the opinion that the controversy in issue is squarely covered by the decision in ***Arshnoor Kaur***, which binds us.

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[14] **(2018) 7 SCC 1**

8. The plea of estoppel

8.1 One other submission that was advanced by the learned ASG was that, having participated in the selection with full knowledge of the fact that only 16 vacancies were reserved for women, the petitioners cannot now seek to be inducted against the vacancies which were reserved for men. Mr. Singh correctly points out that this aspect also stands covered by the following paragraphs from the decision in ***Arshnoor Kaur***, which reads thus:

> "69. It is settled law that it is not open to the Respondent-Union of India to contend that a person is not entitled to enforce his/her Fundamental Rights, in particular his/her Right to Equality, because he/she has waived it. It is always open to an aggrieved person to challenge any policy or notification or statutory provision by filing a writ petition under Article 226 or under Article 32 on the grounds that it violates his/her Fundamental Rights. In ***K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India***[16], it has been held that Part III of the Indian Constitution which embodies Fundamental Rights is part of the wider notion of securing the vision of justice of the Founding Fathers and as a matter of doctrine, the rights guaranteed are not capable of being waived. This Court also in ***Basheshar Nath v Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi & Rajasthan***[17], has held as under:—
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> > "68. It is suggested that if a person, after waiving his fundamental right to property and allowing the State to incur heavy expenditure in improving the same, turns round and claims to recover the said property, the State would be put to irreparable injury. Firstly, no such occasion should arise, as the State is not expected to take its citizens' property or deprive them of their property otherwise than by authority of law. Secondly, if the owner of a property intends to give it to the State, the State can always insist upon conveying to it the said property in the manner known to law. Thirdly, other remedies may be open to the State —

[15] **AIR 1958 SC 419**
[16] **(2017) 10 SCC 1**
[17] **AIR 1959 SC 149**

> on that I am not expressing any opinion — to recover compensation or damages for the improvements bona fide made or the loss incurred, having regard to the circumstances of a particular case. These considerations, in my view, are of no relevance in considering the question of waiver in the context of fundamental rights. By express provisions of the Constitution, the State is prohibited from making any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. The State is not, therefore, expected to enforce any right contrary to the constitutional prohibition on the ground that the party waived his fundamental right. If this prohibition is borne in mind, no occasion can arise when the State would be prejudiced. The prejudice, if any, to the State would be caused not by the non -application of the doctrine of waiver but by its own action contrary to the constitutional prohibition imposed on it."

8.2 ***Dr (Major) Meeta Sahai v State of Bihar***[18] also addressed an objection of estoppel, raised by the respondent before the Supreme Court, and held as under:

> "12. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents questioned the maintainability of the appellant's challenge and urged that once a candidate had participated in a recruitment process, he/she could not at a later stage challenge its correctness merely because of having failed in selection. It was contended that the appellant was taking "two shots" at success, and her challenge was opposed for being opportunistic. Further it was argued by the respondents that the appellant's attempt to draw inference from the Dentist Rules has rightly not been accepted by the High Court. Moreover, the advertisement was shown as being merely clarificatory in stating that marks shall only be granted for work experience in hospitals of the Government of Bihar.
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> ***Preliminary issues***
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> 15. Furthermore, before beginning analysis of the legal issues involved, it is necessary to first address the preliminary issue. The maintainability of the very challenge by the appellant has been questioned on the ground that she having partaken in the selection

[18] **(2019) 20 SCC 17**

process cannot later challenge it due to mere failure in selection. The counsel for the respondents relied upon a catena of decisions of this Court to substantiate his objection.

16. It is well settled that the principle of estoppel prevents a candidate from challenging the selection process after having failed in it as iterated by this Court in a plethora of judgments including ***Manish Kumar Shahi v State of Bihar***[19], observing as follows:

> "16. We also agree with the High Court that after having taken part in the process of selection knowing fully well that more than 19% marks have been earmarked for viva voce test, the appellant is not entitled to challenge the criteria or process of selection. Surely, if the appellant's name had appeared in the merit list, he would not have even dreamed of challenging the selection. The [appellant] invoked jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India only after he found that his name does not figure in the merit list prepared by the Commission. This conduct of the appellant clearly disentitles him from questioning the selection and the High Court did not commit any error by refusing to entertain the writ petition."

The underlying objective of this principle is to prevent candidates from trying another shot at consideration, and to avoid an impasse wherein every disgruntled candidate, having failed the selection, challenges it in the hope of getting a second chance.

17. However, we must differentiate from this principle insofar as the candidate by agreeing to participate in the selection process only accepts the prescribed procedure *and not the illegality in it. In a situation where a candidate alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating consequences arising therefrom, the same cannot be condoned merely because a candidate has partaken in it. The constitutional scheme is sacrosanct and its violation in any manner is impermissible.* In fact, a candidate may not have locus to assail the incurable illegality or derogation of the provisions of the Constitution, unless he/she participates in the selection process."

(Emphasis supplied)

8.3 Where, therefore, the challenge is on the ground of invidious discrimination, and violation of constitutional principles, and is found

[19] **(2010) 12 SCC 576**

by the Court to be substantial, the plea of estoppel by participation must be consigned to oblivion.

9. The learned ASG fervently urged that the Government was committed to ensuring complete gender neutrality and that, towards this end, progressive steps are being made. We have absolutely no reason to doubt the truth of this assertion. We earnestly hope that this decision would act as an aid to the executive in ensuring the perpetuation and propagation of our cherished constitutional goals.

Conclusion

10. We, therefore, direct that the petitioners be considered against the 62 unfilled vacancies of men, as there could have been no limitation on the number of women who could be entitled to recruitment against the corps and services identified in para 45 of ***Arshnoor Kaur***. Needless to say, however, the petitioners would not be entitled for induction into any other corps or services, other than the corps or services, which are identified in para 45 of the decision in ***Arshnoor Kaur***.

11. A closing caveat

11.1 Maj. Anish Muralidhar, who ably assisted the learned ASG and Mr. Swain and has, we must acknowledge, been of considerable assistance to us in ensuring dispensation of justice in the present roster, points out that the actual identification of the streams to which the candidates would be deployed or posted takes place only after

training. As such, it is submitted that, before training commences, it is not possible to identify as to whether the petitioners would in fact be suitable for deployment against one of the ten corps or service identified in para 45 of ***Arshnoor Kaur***.

11.2 Though we feel that this is an aspect which should have been taken up before the Supreme Court when it rendered ***Arshnoor Kaur***, Mr. Indra Sen Singh also agrees that the right of the petitioners for deployment would only be against one or more of the ten categories of corps and services notified under Section 12 of the Army Act and identified in para 45 of ***Arshnoor Kaur.***

11.3 We, therefore, clarify that the entitlement of the petitioners to appointment and deployment against the remaining 62 unfilled vacancies of men would be conditional upon their being found suitable for deployment against one or more of the identified corps and services identified in para 45 of the decision in ***Arshnoor Kaur***.

12. As one of the issues that may arise is regarding the petitioners satisfying the age requirement for the post, we clarify that the benefits of this judgment would be available to those petitioners who were within the prescribed age on the date of declaration of the result.

13. If there are any pre-training formalities such as medical clearance, which are required to be fulfilled, it goes without saying that the petitioners would be required to fulfil them, before undergoing training.

14. Needless to say, should the petitioners qualify and be selected, they would be entitled to all other consequential reliefs as available in law.

15. The petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.

SEPTEMBER 16, 2025*/yg*