

**IN THE COURT OF SAMEER BAJPAI  
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-03  
(SHAHDARA), KARKARDOOMA COURT, DELHI**

**I.A. 07/2024**

S.C. No. : 181/2020

u/s : 3, 4 and 70 of the PMLA

Case No. : ECIR/05-STF/2020

**Assistant Director E.D. New Delhi vs. Tahir Hussain & Anr.**

29.03.2025

**ORDER**

1) The present application has been moved by Tahir Hussain under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 / 483 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 read with Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and section 436-A Cr.P.C./479 BNS for grant of bail.

2) In brief, the submissions on behalf of the applicant are that the complaint case in the present matter was filed against the applicant under section 44 of the PMLA on 15.10.2020 for the offences under section 3 and 4 of the Act. Further, the other cases in FIR no. 59/2020, 65/2020 and 88/2020 were taken into consideration as scheduled offence/predicate offence. Further, the applicant was arrested by the Special Cell in the case bearing FIR No. 59/2020 dated 06.03.2020 and while the applicant was in judicial custody, his statement was recorded under section 50 of the PMLA and he was formally arrested by the Enforcement Directorate under the provisions of PMLA on 20.08.2020. Further, on 03.11.2022 charge was framed against the applicant for the offence punishable under section 4 of

the PMLA.

2.1) It is further submitted that the applicant has not generated or illegally gained any proceeds from the scheduled offence.

2.2) It is further the submission on behalf of the applicant that the present application has been filed under section 436-A of Cr.P.C./479 of BNSS, 2023 as the applicant has suffered judicial custody for more than four years, whereas, the maximum period of sentence prescribed for the offence under section 4 of the PMLA is just seven years and as such, as the applicant has undergone detention of more than half of the period of sentence, he must be granted bail.

2.3) Further, the fate of the present case will depend upon the outcome of the cases regarding the predicate offences and in the case FIR no. 59/2020 even charge has not been framed and after consideration of charge, if evidence is to be led, the same will take a very long time.

2.4) Further, the court cannot pass any final verdict in the present complaint, unless the applicant is convicted for the predicate offences and as such, it would be highly unjustified not to grant bail to the applicant in the present matter.

2.5) Further, there is no delay in the trial of the case on the part of the applicant and his continued custody is in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

3) In support of his arguments, ld. counsel for the applicant has relied upon the following judgments :

*(i) Ajay Ajit Peter Kerkar vs. Directorate of E.D. (arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 6090-6091 of 2024).*

- (ii) *Vijay Nair vs. Directorate of E.D. SLP (Criminal) Diary Nos. 22137/2024.*
- (iii) *Badshah Majid Malik vs. Directorate of E.D. (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 10846/2024).*
- (iv) *Veerendra Kumar Ram vs. Union of India (Criminal Appeal No. 4615 of 2024).*
- (v) *V. Senthil Balaji vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Criminal Appeal No. 4011 of 2024.*
- (vi) *Sharjeel Imam vs. State of NCT of Delhi Crl. A. 215/2024.*
- (vii) *Modh. Enamul Haque vs. Directorate of Enforcement Criminal Appeal No. 3984 of 2024.*
- (viii) *Pavana Dibbur vs. The Directorate of Enforcement Criminal Appeal no. 2779 of 2023.*
- (ix) *Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary vs. Union of India 2022 SCC Online SC 929.*
- (x) *Satender Kumar Antil vs. CBI 2022 SCC Online SC 185*
- (xi) *Anil Kumar Sharma vs. State (NCT of Delhi) BA No.2088/2021.*
- (xii) *Soletto Justniano Fernando Tito vs. NCB BA No. 850/2023.*
- (xiii) *Tarun Kumar vs. Assistant Director 2023, SCC Online 1486.*
- (xiv) *Manish Sisodia vs. CBI 2023 SCC Online SC 1393.*
- (xv) *Satyender Kumar Jain vs. ED 2024 SCC Online SC 317.*
- (xvi) *Vikas Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan.*
- (xvii) *Jinofer Kuwaja Bujwala vs. State of Gujarat 2020 6 SCC 298.*
- (xviii) *Enforcement Directorate vs. Kapil Wadhwan.*
- (xix) *Chandeep Singh vs. NIA*
- (xx) *Rana Raj Kapoor vs. Enforcement Directorate.*

4) In reply, the submissions of the prosecution are that Delhi Police registered FIR No. 59/2020 under sections 147, 148, 149, 120B, 34, 201, 302, 307 and 385 IPC; FIR No.65/2020 dated 26.02.2020 under sections 147,148,149,120B IPC and FIR No.88/2020 dated 01.03.2020 under sections 385,302,201,34 and 307,34 and 120B IPC, against the applicant and other accused persons.

4.1) Further, since sections 120B, 302, 307 and 385 IPC are scheduled offences under PMLA, the inquiry was initiated against the applicant and other accused persons in ECIR/05-STF/2020 dated 09.03.2020, by the Special Task Force of the Directorate of Enforcement (HO) New Delhi.

4.2) Further, the investigation which resulted into the said ECIR, has concluded that the applicant was involved in the acts of criminal conspiracy, cheating and falsification of documents and on his direction, a huge amount of money was withdrawn from different companies and was used in the riots. As such, the proceeds of crime can be considered to be around Rs. 5.24 crores and out of this amount, investigation in respect of Rs. 1.5 crore has been completed, which corresponds to the amount as fraudulently removed by the applicant from the bank accounts of the companies owned or controlled by him from the period October, 2019 to January, 2020 and the cash was used in the anti CAA protests in North East Delhi and communal Riots.

4.3) Further, the applicant cannot be given benefit of the provision under Section 436-A of the Cr.P.C. and moreover, the proviso as given in the said section makes it clear that the court may order continued detention of the applicant for a longer period than one half of the period of sentence, and considering the gravity of the offence as committed by the applicant and multiple FIRs against him, the court should use the discretion against him.

4.4) Further, the explanation as given in the relevant provision makes it clear that in computing the period of detention under the section for granting bail, the period of detention passed due to the delay in the

proceedings as caused by the applicant shall be excluded, and it is evident from the record that the applicant sought repeated adjournments on frivolous grounds and the delay for a period of 463 days in total can be attributed solely to the applicant.

4.5) The prosecution has given the following table in calculating the number of days to show the delay allegedly caused by the applicant :

Date of order	NDOH	Delay (days)
28.08.2024	08.10.2024	42
30.05.2024	28.08.2024	91
22.02.2024	24.04.2024	63
02.02.2024	22.02.2024	21
02.01.2024	02.02.2024	30
28.11.2023	05.12.2023	08
16.08.2023	26.08.2023	11
21.07.2023	04.08.2023	15
10.07.2023	21.07.2023	12
31.05.2023	10.07.2023	41
15.12.2022	04.01.2023	21
14.11.2022	26.11.2022	13
08.09.2022	21.09.2022	14
03.06.2022	22.08.2022	81
	Total	463

5) In support of his arguments the Id. Special PP has relied upon the following judgments :

*(i) Vijay Mandal Choudhary vs. Union of India, 022 SCC OnLine SC 929.*

*(ii) Gautam Kundu vs. Enforcement Directorate, 2020 SCC OnLine Cal. 533.*

*(iii) Vijay Madan Lal Choudhary vs. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929.*

- (iv) State of Bihar & Anr. vs. Amit Kumar (2017) 13 SCC 751.*  
*(v) Y S Jagan Mohan Reddy vs. CBI (2013) 7 SCC 439*  
*(vi) Anil Kumar Yadav vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 12 SCC 129.*  
*(vii) State of Gujarat vs. Mohanalal Jitmalji Porwal (1987), 2 SCC 364*  
*(viii) Tarun Kumar vs. Enforcement Directorate 2023, SCC Online*  
*(ix) Religare Finvest Ltd. vs. Staet (2021) 2 HCC (Del) 535.*  
*(x) Tarun Kumar vs. Directorate of Enforcement 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486.*  
*(xi) Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram (1986) 4 SCC 447*  
*(xii) Vishin N. Khanchandani vs. Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani (2000) 6 SCC 724*

6) The court has heard the arguments and gone through the record.

7) During the course of arguments, ld. counsel for the applicant submitted that although the title of the application mentions section 439 Cr.P.C. and 483 BNSS but he is pressing the application for section 436-A Cr.P.C. only.

8) As the court has to analyse section 436-A Cr.P.C., it would be appropriate to reproduce the same as under :

**436A. Maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained** – Where a person has, during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for a period extending upto one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court on his personal bond with or without sureties :

Provided that the court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order the continued detention of such person for a period longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail instead of the personal bond with or without sureties:

Provided further that no such person shall in any case be detained during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial for more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said

under that law.

Explanation – In computing the period of detention under this Section for granting bail, the period of detention passed due to delay in proceeding caused by the accused shall be excluded.

9) As provided under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the punishment under section 4 of the Act is seven years and to get the benefit of section 436-A Cr.P.C. the applicant must have detention of three and a half years, excluding the delay caused by him.

10) As according to the explanation to the relevant provision, the delay as caused by the applicant becomes important, the court has to calculate the same.

10.1) The first entry as shown by the prosecution in the table is regarding the court proceeding dated 28.08.2024, which allegedly shows that the accused has caused a delay of 42 days. The relevant order shows that the adjournment was not sought on behalf of the applicant and the matter was adjourned, as the court left with no time for the cross-examination of PW-1 and as such the delay was not on the part of the applicant.

10.2) The next entry as shown by the prosecution in the table is dated 30.05.2024. On this date also, the accused or his counsel did not seek any adjournment but the court after part cross-examination of PW-1, deferred the matter as the Board was too heavy.

10.3) The next entry as given in the table by the prosecution is dated 22.02.2024. On this date ld. counsel for the applicant submitted that another matter was pending in some other court in which the applicant had to be produced and some important eye-witnesses had to be cross-examined there and prayed the court to allow the production of the accused before the other

court. Thus, for the reason that the accused had two cases in different courts on this particular day and some eye-witnesses had to be cross-examined in the case as pending in the other court, the applicant was not produced in this court. These facts show that in any case, the accused could be produced in either of the courts and if cross-examination of some witnesses in the other court was there and the accused was not produced in this court, the delay cannot be solely attributed to the accused but the delay was due to the fact that by chance, two cases of the accused were fixed on the same day in different courts. It is to be noted that the Id. counsel for the accused prayed to give a date after Ramzan and on his request from 22.02.2024, the court adjourned the matter to 24.04.2024.

10.4) The next entry as mentioned by the Prosecution is dated 02.02.2024 on which Id. counsel for the applicant moved an application for seeking adjournment on the ground that due to some urgent professional work he was unable to attend the court. Thus, on the said date, the delay was caused by the applicant.

10.5) The next entry is dated 02.01.2024, on which the prosecution witness was present but his cross-examination was deferred at the request of Id. counsel for the applicant.

10.6) Before that as mentioned by the Prosecution, on 28.11.2023 Id. counsel for the applicant sought adjournment on the ground that he was down with high fever and was unable to address arguments and on his request the matter was adjourned.

10.7) Prior to that, for 16.08.2023 also the prosecution alleged that the matter was delayed due to the accused, but the relevant order sheet shows that the applicant was not in fact produced due to the shortage of jail



staff and on account of Independence day arrangement. The fact if the matter was adjourned on the request of the accused or his counsel is not clear from the order sheet.

10.8) The next entry as mentioned by the prosecution is regarding the proceeding dated 21.07.2023, which shows that on the first call at 12.00 noon, the applicant and his counsel and the witness were present and the I.O submitted to the court that the Special PP was on the way and requested for a pass over. The matter was then taken up at 12.40 p.m. and after part cross-examination of the witness, on the request of the ld. counsel for the applicant that he had another matter in Rohini Courts, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India had ordered day to day hearing, was fixed at 2.00 p.m. and after considering the request of the ld. defence counsel, the present matter was deferred for further cross-examination of the witness. Thus, although the ld. counsel, who had been waiting for the ld. Public Prosecutor since the first call, sought adjournment due to the pendency of other matter in some other court, but the delay cannot be attributed solely to the applicant.

10.9) The next entry in the table as mentioned by the prosecution is dated 31.05.2023. The matter was adjourned on the request of ld. counsel for the accused.

10.10) The next entry as shown by the prosecution is dated 15.12.2022. The matter was adjourned on the request of ld. counsel for the accused on the ground that he wanted to challenge some order of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India.

10.11) The next entry as given by the prosecution is regarding the order dated 14.11.2022, which shows that on an application for adjournment moved on behalf of the applicant, the matter was adjourned for framing of

charge.

10.12) The next entry is regarding the proceedings of the court dated 08.09.2022, showing that the matter was adjourned for arguments on the point of charge as ld. counsel for the applicant did not appear.

10.13) The last entry in the table is dated 03.06.2022, showing that the adjournment was taken by the ld. counsel for the applicant only.

11) Thus, the delay as can be attributed to the applicant is for 241 days and if this period is deducted from the total period of detention of the applicant, his period of custody comes to 55 months i.e. more than four and half years.

12) Now, comes the question if the applicant is entitled for the relief as sought by him under section 436-A Cr.P.C, as he has already undergone detention for more than half of the period of the sentence as provided for the offence allegedly committed by him.

13) The relevant provision clearly provides that under these circumstances, the court shall release the applicant on bail and if the court orders for his continue detention, the reasons for the same have to be recorded by the court. So, the general rule is to release the applicant on bail and his continued detention is an exception.

14) The prosecution is pressing for the continued detention of the applicant, giving reasons that the act of the applicant is very serious in nature as beside the offence of money laundering in the case in hand, the

applicant has involved himself in multiple FIRs for commission of different offences including the offences under section 302/307 IPC and he is also responsible for funding and causing communal riots in different areas of Delhi, which caused death of large number of innocent people and damage to the public property.

15) In support of his arguments, the prosecution has relied upon many a judgments including Vijay Madan Lal Chaudhary Vs. Union of India. Giving reference to the said judgment, Ld. Special Public Prosecutor contended that the economic offence as committed by the applicant fueled the communal riots in Delhi and constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach while considering the bail.

15.1) The Ld. SPP submitted that para no.416 of the said judgment clarifies that the court may still deny the relief to an accused under Section 436A where the trial was delayed at the instance of accused himself.

15.2) The court has already recorded that the delay on the part of the applicant is approximately for 241 days and the applicant has already undergone more than half of the period of the detention as provided for the offence and as such, the submission of Ld. SPP will not benefit the prosecution. Rather, in the same para the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that the Union of India has recognized right to speedy trial and access to justice as fundamental right and it would not be appropriate to deny the relief of Section 436A of the Code, which is a wholesum provision beneficial to an accused. Further, in the very next para i.e. in para no. 417, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has again made it clear that if the trial cannot proceed even after the accused has undergone one half of the maximum

period of imprisonment provided by law, there is no reason to deny him this lesser relief of considering his prayer for release him on bail or bond as the case may be, with appropriate conditions, including, to secure his presence during the trial. Para 419 of the judgment makes it clear that the relief under section 436A of the Code cannot be granted mechanically and it is still within the discretion of the court, unlike the default bail under section 167 of the Code, but to deny the relief to an accused the court is required to consider the relief on case to case basis. It is however further observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if the court continues the detention of an accused for longer than one half of the period, reasons have to be recorded in writing for the same. Thus, when the court has to give reasons for continued detention of an accused, the same would fall in an exception and the general rule would be that the accused has to be granted bail.

16) Relying upon another ruling *Gautam Kundu Vs. Enforcement Directorate*, the Ld. SPP referred para no.18 and 22 of the same and submitted that for reasons to be noted, the court is very well empowered to continue detention of the applicant in jail, instead of releasing him on bail and the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta rightly observed that considering the involvement of the petitioner in a grave economic crime having serious social ramification and in larger interest of the society, the trial court must turn down the prayer of the petitioner under Section 436-A Cr.P.C.

16.1) No doubt the court is empowered to order continued detention of the applicant but the same has to be justified and with reasons.

17) Giving reference of another judgment i.e. *State of Bihar and*

Anr. vs. Amit Kumar @ Bachcha Rai, the Ld. SPP submitted that para 8 of the said judgment makes it clear that bail to an accused cannot be granted mechanically. The observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments as mentioned earlier, makes it clear that under the provision of Section 436-A of the Code, the court has to grant bail to an accused in routine and if the court denies the same, only in that condition the court must give reasons.

18) The prosecution has again relied upon Ajay Ajit Peter Kerkar Vs. Directorate of Enforcement and Anr. and particularly referred para no.7 of the same, which rules that in view of Section 436A, the right of an accused to be enlarged on bail after undergoing detention for a period exceeding one half of the minimum period of imprisonment is not an absolute right and the court may still deny the same on the grounds, such as delay of trial at the instance of the accused himself.

18.1) The court has already observed that in the case in hand, the delay on the part of the applicant is approximately for 241 days and excluding this delay, the applicant has already undergone more than four and half years of imprisonment.

19) The prosecution has given some more judgments but the judgments already discussed, cover more or less all the aspects of the case, which the prosecution has explained.

20) As far as the contentions on behalf of the applicant are concerned, the ld. counsel for the applicant submitted that the case of the applicant clearly meet out requirement of section 436-A Cr.P.C. and the

applicant deserves the desired relief. It is further submitted that the final outcome in the present case will depend upon the result in the case pertaining to the predicate offence, where even the charges have not been framed. Ld. counsel further submitted that after framing of charge in the case regarding predicate offences i.e. FIR no. 59/2020, the evidence will take many many years as there are hundreds of witnesses and only after the outcome of that case, the court can conclude the proceedings in the present case and as such there is no purpose to keep the applicant under detention, when he has undergone detention of half of the sentence as prescribed under the relevant provision and meet out the condition as given under the relevant provision.

20.1) In this regard ld. counsel has relied upon Arun Muthu vs. Directorate of Enforcement passed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Bail Application 1821/2024 on 20.02.2025. As pointed out by ld. counsel for the applicant, in para no.15 of the referred judgment, giving reference to V. Senthil Balaji vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, the Hon'ble High Court noted that since the existence of a scheduled offence is the sine qua non for alleging existence of proceeds of crime, the said existence of proceeds of crime at the time of trial of offence under section 3 of PMLA can be proved only if the scheduled offence is established in the prosecution of the said offence and as such the trial in the case under PMLA cannot be finally decided unless a trial of scheduled offence concludes.

20.2) Ld. counsel for the applicant contended that in the case regarding the scheduled offences i.e. FIR no. 59/2020 even the charges have not been framed and there are more than 800 witnesses and it will take a very long time to examine them and conclude the trial and after conclusion

of trial in that matter, the fate of the present case will be decided and as such further detention of the applicant in the present matter is not at all necessary and the applicant must be given benefit.

20.3) Thus, while deciding the present application, the court has to keep in mind the submissions of the ld. counsel regarding the proceedings and anticipated period of conclusion of trial in the case containing the predecate offences.

21) Ld. counsel for the applicant also relied upon V. Senthil Balaji, which has already been discussed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case as mentioned in the preceding para.

22) Ld. counsel has further relied upon Vijay Madan Lal Choudhary on which the prosecution has also relied upon, and many other judgments in order to show that the applicant deserves the desired relief but all the judgments as referred by ld. counsel need not be discussed.

23) Ld. counsel for the applicant further referred the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi passed in CrI. A. 215/2024 on 25.05.2024 in Sharjeel Imam vs. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr.

23.1) In the mentioned judgment, the appellant was Sharjeel Imam, who is an accused in the case FIR No.22/20 registered for the offences under Section 124A/153A/153B/505(2) IPC and under section 13 of UAPA and the said case is pending in this court only. It is pertinent to mention that the accused Sharjeel Imam and the applicant in the present matter are accused in the case FIR no. 59/2020, in which the applicant has committed the

predicate offences.

23.2) In the above mentioned case i.e. FIR no.22/20 vide order dated 17.02.2024, this court declined the relief to the accused Sharjeel Imam u/s 436-A Cr.P.C. and the said order was challenged by the accused before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and the Hon'ble High Court allowed the appeal of the accused and granted bail to him and gave certain observations against the order of this court.

23.3) Although, the court has discussed many a judgments as given by both the parties, this judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi as mentioned hereinbefore becomes the most important judgment as the same has been given in the appeal arose out of the order of this court and on the same question of law.

23.4) Now, it would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant paras of the above mentioned judgment as under :

“9. Though, the appellant had, unquestionably, undergone half of the maximum sentence, learned Trial Court declined to enlarge him on bail holding that the facts of the present case were not normal and thus considering the severity of the allegations, no relief was granted to him.

19. If any accused chooses to avail legal remedy and that too in terms of specific judicial pronouncement, he cannot be blamed for causing delay in the matter. Since he continued to be in detention, he was, even otherwise, not going to dig out any advantage at all, by exploring such other possible legal avenues.

22. Be that as it may, we have to be mindful of the objective behind incorporating Section 436-A Cr.P.C. This benevolent provision has been introduced by Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act 2005 with the idea that no undertrial prisoner is detained in jail beyond half of the maximum sentence provided for such offences. Undoubtedly, as per proviso, Court can order further detention but the reasons have to be rational and logical, else the very purpose of introducing the provision would stand defeated.



23. Learned Trial Court got swayed by the enormity of the allegations, observing that he had made inflammatory speeches which resulted in riots, the bail was declined.

24. We have already observed in Abdul Subhan Qureshi Vs. State (NCT OF DELHI): 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3485 that mere fact that the allegations against the appellant were serious in nature, cannot be taken as a ground for declining such relief provided under Section 436-A Cr.P.C. If any such accused has merely attempted to avail legal remedies, it cannot be taken as an adverse conduct, disintitling him seeking release.

25. In the case in hand, we do not find any justifiable reason which could have compelled the Court from not granting the relief. We may also make CRL.A. 215/2024 7 of 8 reference to Ajay Ajit Peter Kerkar Vs. Directorate of Enforcement & Anr. CRL. Appeal Nos. 2601-2602 of 2024 (DOD: 16.05.2024) (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) Nos. 6090-6091 of 2024). In that case, trial had not started and even charges had not been framed and the learned Trial Court denied the relief owing to the ground that trial had been delayed at the instance of the accused. It was noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that there was no reason or occasion for the said accused to cause delay in the trial as even the charges had not been framed and finding that there was no other adverse circumstances against the accused, benefit under Section 436-A Cr.P.C. was passed on to the accused.

23.5) Thus, when the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has already dealt with the similar matter and given the observation that there was no justifiable reason with this court which could have compelled the court from granting the relief to the accused, this court has to follow the ruling of the Hon'ble High Court and in no way can form any other opinion.

24) Keeping in view the provision under section 436-A Cr.P.C., all the facts and circumstances as discussed above, the rulings as given by both the parties and specially the ruling as mentioned in the preceding para, the court concludes that as the applicant has undergone detention of more than

one half of the period of imprisonment, as provided for the offence allegedly committed by him, he is entitled for bail. Accordingly, the applicant Tahir Hussain is granted bail on furnishing a personal bond of Rs.50,000/- with two sureties in the like amount, subject to the following conditions :

- (i) The applicant shall not leave the territorial jurisdiction of Delhi/NCR without permission of this court.
- (ii) The applicant shall not involve himself in similar kind of criminal activities.
- (iii) The applicant shall not contact and influence the witnesses of the case.
- (iv) The applicant shall attend the court on each and every date of hearing.
- (v) The applicant and the sureties will inform the court immediately as soon as their residential address is changed.
- (vi) The applicant shall not make any statement on social media regarding the cases as pending against him.

Order dasti.

Announced in the open Court

today i.e. 29<sup>th</sup> March, 2025

(Sameer Bajpai)  
Addl. Sessions Judge-03  
Shahdara District, Karkardooma Courts,  
Dated : 29.03.2025