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Synopsis

The Supreme Court recently set aside a high court order passed in a second appeal that held that a suit for mere injunction is illegal in the absence of a prayer for declaration by the plaintiff.

A bench of Justices Pankaj Mithal and S. V. N. Bhatti allowed the appeal by Ayyavu, who had filed the suit seeking the relief of perpetual injunction and mandatory injunction to allow the plaintiff to remove the granite construction allegedly put up by the respondents/defendants and for other reliefs.

The plaintiff's case was that one Mariyammal, daughter of Anthoni Nadachi, was the owner of the plaint schedule. Through a registered sale deed, the plaintiff purchased the plaint schedule property and, with the permission of the Gram Panchayat, constructed a residential building.

Respondent nos. 1 to 3 allegedly interfered with the plaintiff’s peaceful occupation and enjoyment of a portion of the plaint schedule, which was an old well. Further, respondent nos. 1 to 3 put up a compound wall separating the western boundary of the plaint schedule from the portion identified as the old well. The plaintiff, therefore, resting the case on the sale deed of August 23, 1988, filed the suit for reliefs.

The defendants contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim ownership of the disputed portion of the plaint schedule. Moreover, the portion marked as an old well stood outside the schedules covered by the sale deed.

The disputed portion continued to remain with Mariyammal, and on August 6, 1998, she executed a settlement deed in favor of the Governor of Tamil Nadu for an extent of 1¼ cents, which included the disputed well.

By passing a resolution on August 13, 1996, development work was undertaken, and the plaintiff, without any right, obstructed the work carried out by the defendants.

The fifth defendant/the Panchayat claimed that the disputed 1¼ cents stood vested in the Gram Panchayat through a settlement deed executed by Mariyammal. Therefore, the prayer for injunction was unavailable.

By the judgment and decree dated April 29, 2004, the suit was dismissed. The trial court primarily considered the total extent of land purchased by Mariyammal, i.e., 23 cents, and noted that she had sold 21 cents to the plaintiff. Consequently, the disputed well, covering 1¼ cents, fell outside the deed on which the plaintiff based the case. Therefore, the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case.

The first appellate court, however, allowed the appeal. It found that the fifth defendant claimed vesting of the disputed property under a settlement. According to the first appellate court, Exhibit-B8 bore the signatures of 31 persons. Firstly, Exhibit-B8 was not a registered document, and secondly, no proper explanation was given for why 31 persons had signed it. Exhibit-B8 was not proved by the fifth defendant in the manner known to law.

Furthermore, the acceptance of title and possession under a settlement deed did not satisfy the requirements of law. Exhibits B1 to B4, being anterior to Exhibit-B8, did not have probative value in establishing possession or ownership claimed by the fifth defendant. The appellate court relied on and referred to the Commissioner’s Report of December 16, 2003, as well as the boundaries mentioned in the sale deed of August 23, 1988, and allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved by this judgment, defendants 1 to 3 approached the high court, which noted that the total extent of land was 23 cents, while the plaintiff had purchased only 21 cents. This discrepancy, the high court held, was not substantiated through documentary evidence by the plaintiff. The defendants disputed the plaintiff's title. In this light, the high court held that a suit for mere injunction was illegal in the absence of a prayer for declaration.

Before the apex court, the plaintiff contended that the lesser extent was due to a portion of the land originally purchased by Mariyammal being affected by road widening. The Commissioner’s Report clearly identified the property as measuring 20.5 cents. The plaintiff's continuous possession could not have been disbelieved by the high court in the impugned judgment. It was also argued that the defendants, in the absence of a legal and valid document, could not resist the plaintiff's claim. The high court had reappreciated the findings of fact and erroneously allowed the appeal.

After considering the contentions and perusing the record, the bench observed that both the plaintiff and the defendants rested their case through Mariyammal.

The court noted that it was the plaintiff’s case that Mariyammal had sold 21 cents within the boundaries described in the sale deed. As seen from the Commissioner’s Report, one quarter of a cent was the disputed property.

"The high court failed to appreciate that to deny enjoyment or actual possession, the boundaries in the sale deed play an important role. The sale deed does not reflect that Mariyammal retained a portion after selling 21 cents to the plaintiff," the bench said.

The defendants claimed that under a settlement deed, the disputed property stood vested in the Gram Panchayat.

"The fallacy noted by the high court in the said contention is that the series of Exhibits B1 to B8 cannot, in the eyes of law, be treated as lawfully conveying anything in favor of the Gram Panchayat, much less the disputed extent that stood vested in the Gram Panchayat. The high court ought to have accepted the plaintiff's case by appreciating the exhibits marked by both parties, who claimed through Mariyammal, and the description of the schedule property in Exhibit-A1 by juxtaposing the same with the Commissioner’s Report and the plan drawn to sketch," the bench said.

Further, the court pointed out that the framing of the suit was not an issue before the trial court or the first appellate court.

"Non-suiting the plaintiff on that ground is unsustainable. Having appreciated the Commissioner’s Report and juxtaposed the same with the findings of the first appellate court, we are of the view that the high court committed an error in deciding the findings of fact, which do not suffer from perversity or misreading of evidence under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908," the bench said.

The court allowed the civil appeal and set aside the high court's 2010 judgment in the second appeal.

Case Title: Ayyavu Vs Prabha And Others