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Synopsis

The Supreme Court has said orders passed by a civil court cannot be challenged in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and even a mere wrong decision is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.

A bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Prashant Kumar Mishra allowed an appeal filed by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and others against the Bombay High Court's July 19, 2022 judgment passed in a batch of writ petitions filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of proceedings for eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises pending before the Inquiry Officer.

"The impugned order entertaining writ petitions which were not maintainable in the form they were presented did not warrant the High Court to exercise jurisdiction by framing points for determination by the Inquiry Officer. For the reasons, the same is indefensible; it has to be and is, accordingly, set aside," the bench said.

The court opined e High Court in the present case exceeded the ambit of both, its writ and supervisory, jurisdiction insofar as it proceeded to frame points for determination in a summary proceeding, more so when the proceedings were at the embryonic stage of notice having been issued to the respondents.

"Having directed that the proceedings be conducted in consonance with the principles of natural justice, the High Court overstepped its limits and took unto itself a duty which the Act entrusts the statutory authority to exercise. The High Court could, at best, have moulded relief as deemed fit and proper, but in framing issues for the Inquiry Officer to determine, the High Court went far beyond its domain by substituting its own wisdom for that of the civil court," the bench said.

The appellant corporation assailed the impugned order on the ground that Chapter V-A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 being a complete code in itself, the High Court effectively granted a premium to the dilatory tactics being adopted by the respondents who were none else but unauthorised occupants of public premises.

The respondents were occupants and/or legal heirs of the original occupants who were allotted the subject premises on leave and license basis in the 1960s, owing to their employment with the appellants, court was informed.

Court noted that these appeals stemmed from the third round of litigation initiated by the respondents before the High Court and it was the second which reached the Supreme Court.

The proceedings, pertaining to the eviction of unauthorised occupants despite having commenced a decade and a half back, on January 28, 2009, to be precise, have not progressed much due to repeated forays made by the respondents questioning the jurisdiction of the Inquiry Officer to proceed against them, the bench pointed out.

The appellants contended that assuming that this judgment terminated the third round of litigation, without there being a review, the Inquiry Officer had to resume proceedings from the stage of inquiry allowing the parties to lead evidence.

Upon evidence being led by both parties, it would be for the Inquiry Officer to identify the contentious issues that arose for decision by him, and by assigning reasons in support of the conclusions reached qua such issues, he is required to submit a report for consideration by the Municipal Commissioner. Even before the stage for leading evidence having matured, the appellants alleged that the High Court had unnecessarily interfered and deflected the course of justice.

The respondents, on their part, contended that the approach of the High Court was one that sub-served justice with a view to secure the precious right to life of the respondents by narrowing down the controversy so that the proceedings could be taken to its logical conclusion as early as possible.

Examining the constitutional provisions invoked by the respondents before the High Court i.e. under Articles 226 and 227, the top court noted challenge was laid in the writ petitions to an order passed by the Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Mumbai, in appeals under section 105F of the Act. Such an order held the respondents’ appeals to be not maintainable. In their writ petition, the respondents sought, inter alia, a writ of certiorari to quash the orders passed by the Principal Civil Judge and that of the Inquiry Officer.

The bench pointed out that the appellate court order under challenge before the High Court was rendered by a civil court, and it is trite that orders passed by a civil court cannot be challenged in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

"Thus, the writ petition of the respondents seeking quashing of the decision of a civil court by issuing a writ of certiorari was not maintainable and ought to have been dismissed at the threshold with respect to its primary relief," the bench said.

The court noted the grounds of challenge before the High Court were a violation of principles of natural justice and that of institutional bias.

"It is not the respondents’ submission that they were not given an opportunity of being heard by the civil court. Such opportunity having been given, even if the conclusion arrived at by the civil court was erroneous, it could not be remedied by the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution," the bench said.

The court, thus, held that the petition of the respondents also failed to merit the exercise of the High Court’s supervisory powers and it should have been rejected.

With regard to the challenge laid to the order passed by the Inquiry Officer, the bench said it is well settled that decisions rendered by administrative authorities can be interfered with by high courts in exercise of Article 226 powers, however, sparingly.

Going through the Inquiry Officer's order, the court said, it was a reasoned order, supported by judicial decisions, answering distinctly each and every contention raised by the noticees.

"What seems to be apparent is the absence of any of the telling circumstances, which could have warranted interference by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226; thus, on this count too, the respondents’ writ petition was liable to be dismissed," the bench said.

The court also dealt with the points of determination framed by the High Court to hold that even in the absence of regulations being framed under section 105H of the Act, the proceedings for eviction can be continued by the Inquiry Officer by adhering to principles of natural justice.

"The said provision cannot be construed as placing an embargo on the Inquiry Officer to proceed until regulations were framed. Much of the utility in ensuring that public premises are made free of unauthorised occupants would be lost on such technical pleas based raised and examined on a provision of law which is not imperative in terms. All that is required is adherence to natural justice principles wherever applicable," the bench said.

The court finally directed the Inquiry Officer to allow both parties to lead evidence and raise whatever points were available in defence, except to the extent determined by judicial orders previously.

"Such officer would proceed to independently notice contentions and issues arising for his decision on the basis of evidence led and the defence raised by the respondents, and decide the claims in consonance with principles of natural justice. The Inquiry Officer is encouraged to proceed with expedition," the bench said.

Case Title: Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai And Others Vs Vivek V Gawde Etc