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Synopsis

The Supreme Court, on January 2, 2025, said that in order to invoke the charge under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, the offence has to be committed against a woman; criminal force has to be applied against her; and such application of force has to be with the intent to outrage her modesty.

A bench of Justices C T Ravikumar (since retired) and Sanjay Karol allowed a plea filed by Naresh Aneja against the Allahabad High Court's order, which had rejected his plea to quash the FIR and proceedings initiated against him for the offences under Sections 353 and 506 of the IPC.

The FIR in the case was lodged on September 4, 2019, based on a direction issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gautambudh Nagar.

The appellant and the complainant were directors in a joint concern named ‘M/s LAJ-IDS Exports Pvt Ltd’. There had been allegations and counter-allegations regarding the mishandling of the company’s finances. The complainant accused the appellant and his brother of indulging in inappropriate behaviour in the workplace and also alleged threats of murder.

A charge sheet was also filed for the same offences based on the statement recorded by the complainant.

The appellant had approached the High Court seeking to quash the charge sheet and the order taking cognizance in the case. The High Court had refused the plea, observing that only malicious or mala fide institution of proceedings warranted interference by way of the inherent powers. It had also noted that there were disputed questions of facts that the High Court could not examine, nor could it undertake a “microscopic examination of facts and evidence to thwart the prosecution case.”

While examining the challenge to the High Court's order, the bench said it was well settled that when considering an application under Section 482 CrPC, the court could not conduct a mini-trial but instead had to be satisfied that prima facie the offences as alleged were made out.

"To put it differently, it is to be seen, without undertaking a minute examination of the record, that there is some substance in the allegations made which could meet the threshold of statutory language," the bench said.

Referring to Section 354 IPC, the bench noted that its bare perusal revealed that for it to apply, the offence must be committed against a woman; criminal force must be applied against her; and such application of force must be with the intent to outrage her modesty.

Citing Rupan Deol Bajaj vs K P S Gill (1995) and other cases, the bench observed that though modesty has not been defined, its meaning has to be considered in the present context.

"Turning to the facts of the instant case, keeping in view the contents of the FIR, the statement in the final report of the investigating officer, and the statement u/s 164 CrPC of the complainant, we are of the view that even prima facie the ingredients are not met," the bench said.

The court noted that the record was silent with respect to the use of any force, apart from bald assertions of mental and physical discomfort caused to the complainant by the appellant.

"It is well settled that for mens rea to be established, something better than vague statements must be produced before the court. As evidenced by the annexures, i.e., the FIR, the preliminary investigation report as also the concluding portion of the chargesheet, no direct allegation nor any evidence in support thereof can be found attributing intent to the appellant. It cannot be said, then, that a case u/s 354 IPC is made out against the appellant," the bench said.

For an offence of criminal intimidation to be prima facie established, the bench observed that the intention should be clearly visible, and the same has to be established by evidence on record.

"Granted that at this stage, evidence on record is not the standard to be applied since the trial is underway, but at least the results of the investigation and the material gathered thereunder, which is on record, should disclose somewhat of an offence. The FIR, interim investigation report and the chargesheet do not disclose any offence having been committed by the appellant herein," the bench said.

For an offence under Section 503 to be established, the court pointed out that it must be shown that: (1) Threatening a person with any injury; (i) to his person, reputation or property; or (ii) to the person, or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested. (2) Such threat must be intentional; (i) to cause alarm to that person; or (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or (iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat.

"A mere statement without intention would not attract the offence," the bench said.

The counsel on the opposite side referred to statements under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC, contending that when read collectively, those did indeed disclose an offence having been committed by the appellant.

"We find it difficult to accept the submission on behalf of the complainant. The position of law in regard to the admissibility of these statements is settled," the bench said.

Even after examining the statements under Section 164 (handed over in sealed cover), the bench said, "Our conclusion that no prima facie offence is made out on the part of the appellant, does not change."

The court thus held that the sum total of the circumstances, submissions, and documents on record did not point to the appellant (Naresh Aneja) having committed any offence against the complainant.

The court accordingly set aside the High Court's judgment and quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellant. The bench, however, clarified that it had not expressed any view about another accused, R K Aneja, against whom the law would continue on its course.

Case Title: Naresh Aneja @ Naresh Kumar Aneja Vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr