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Synopsis

The Supreme Court on April 1, 2025, said that delay, by itself, is not a valid ground to scuttle the initiation of departmental proceedings.

A bench comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Augustine George Masih observed that if there is an unexplained and inordinate delay in initiating departmental proceedings, despite the alleged misconduct being within the knowledge of the department, the benefit must go to the employee.

"However, there may be cases where the department was not even aware of such irregularities or the misconduct, which is of such a nature that it is indicative, based on material considerations of factors other than merit, such as extraneous influences and gratifications. In such cases, such a delay, by itself would not be a valid ground to scuttle the initiation of the process of departmental proceedings," the bench said.

In this regard, the court made a reference to the decision of the apex court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs Bani Singh and Another (1990), wherein the court noted that there was no reason to interfere with the quashing as the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after 12 years of delay. 

The bench also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in P V Mahadevan Vs MD, TN Housing Board (2005), where it had been reiterated that continuing the departmental proceedings after an undue delay would be unjust, causing unnecessary mental distress and damaging the reputation of the employee for the mistakes committed by the department in initiating disciplinary proceedings.     

Court allowed an appeal filed by Amresh Srivastava challenging the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s division bench order dated April 30, 2019, which had revived disciplinary proceedings against him. The division bench had set aside a single judge’s order of April 26, 2017, that had quashed the charge sheet issued on April 29, 2011. The proceedings stemmed from allegations that, while serving as Tehsildar, Srivastava had illegally approved a land settlement in 1997 in favour of ineligible persons, in violation of the applicable rules.    

The counsel for the appellant argued that when an order is passed in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the appropriate statutory remedy should be pursued, unless the order was influenced by extraneous considerations and there is reasonable justification or material to support such a conclusion. He further contended that the inordinate, excessive, and unexplained delay of 14 years in the present case—without any finding of extraneous influence or misconduct—should bar the initiation of departmental proceedings.

The state counsel, on the contrary, said the appellant, while exercising his powers as a Tehsildar, was a Revenue Officer, and therefore a quasi-judicial officer was bound by the statute. 

The bench said the statutory mandate was required to be followed and given effect, which the appellant had failed to do. It noted that the appellant was expected, at the very least, to determine the eligibility of the person for the land settlement. The court held that the law did not give officers a licence to pass illegal orders in contravention of legal provisions, as such actions would indicate dishonesty. However, it also observed that the appellant was unable to justify the delay in issuing the charge sheet.

The court also noted he was unable to provide any material evidence suggesting extraneous considerations or influences that would place this case outside the protection afforded by the law as settled by the court.

Referring to Union of India and others vs K K Dhawan (1993), the bench pointed out that the top court enumerated instances, holding that mere technical violations or the fact that an order is wrong does not warrant disciplinary actions. It was further reiterated that each case depends on its facts, and absolute rules cannot be postulated. The instances were thus only a guide and not meant to be mandatorily adhere to without exception. 

"In the present case, we are of the considered view that the charges alleged against the Appellant in the charge sheet fall under the category of a wrongful order, which does not appear to have been influenced by extraneous factors or any form of gratification. It appears that the order has been passed in good faith, without any indication of dishonesty," the bench said.

The court noted the facts outlined in the show cause notice did not suggest any such impropriety. 

The power exercised by the Appellant in his capacity as a Tehsildar, while passing the Land Settlement Order, cannot be considered of a nature that would warrant disciplinary proceedings against him, it held.   

In K K Dhawan case, the bench pointed out that the apex court carved out the following situations where the government is not precluded from taking disciplinary actions for violation of the Code of Conduct: - 

(i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty; 

(ii) If there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty;  

(iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Government servant; 

(iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers; 

(v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party; 

(vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive however, small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago “though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great.”

Case Title: Amresh Srivastava Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors