[Flow, context need rework] 'Petitioners repeatedly changed stands; manoeuvred position to suit their advantage,' SC sets aside Ktka HC's judgment on land compensation

The Supreme Court has set aside the Karnataka High Court's 2019 judgments directing HMT Ltd to vacate over four guntas of land in Bengaluru North or the Union government's defence department along with the company to pay current guidance value of land or rental compensation since 1973 with interest.

A bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Sanjay Kumar allowed the appeals filed by the Union government and the HMT Ltd after noting several disputed questions of fact were involved in the matter, which could not have been adjudicated by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

In the case, the bench noted respondents, writ petitioners Smt Rukmini and others repeatedly changed their stands and manoeuvred their position to suit their advantage.

"HMT Ltd and the Union of India were initially handicapped and were unable to ascertain the facts and locate files, evidence and material. The Union of India was unable to produce the record relating to the release of Ac 4-22 Guntas in the year 1953. At one point, the Union of India even supported the respondents/writ petitioners and changed its stance only after relevant facts came to light. HMT Ltd was, however, able to cull out material to dent the oscillating and innovative stands of the respondents/ writ petitioners," the bench said.

The court said, however, the irrefutable fact remains that the respondents/writ petitioners slept over the matter for decades together which, in itself, indicated lack of merit. They should have, therefore, been prevented from raising issues that were stale and forgotten.

The bench pointed out the most noteworthy was the glaring fact that the respondents/writ petitioners did not disclose any of the very relevant facts in their writ petition.

It pointed out no mention was made in the writ petition of the sale by Putta Narasamma in favour of Mohd Ghouse or the fact that the land sold was the extent of land released by the Ministry of Defence out of the requisitioned original extent of Ac 10-35 Guntas.

It is also pertinent to note that the respondents/writ petitioners themselves had filed Arbitration Case before the Arbitral Tribunal in Bangalore. This arbitration pertained to enhancement of compensation for the extent of Ac. 5-38 Guntas acquired by the Ministry of Defence, the bench said.

Smt Rukmini, respondent No 1/writ petitioner No 1, appeared as PW1 before the Arbitral Tribunal and stated that the lands in Survey Nos. 21 and 22 of Jarakabande Kaval Village were requisitioned by the Defence of India in the year 1941 and were subsequently acquired to the extent of Ac 5-38 Guntas. She further stated that the remaining land was sold by the claimants’ grandmother to one Mohd Ghouse.

Therefore, it is clear that the respondents/writ petitioners were well aware of the sale by Putta Narasamma in favour of Mohd Ghouse but deliberately chose to suppress not only the sale but also the crucial fact that the land so sold was that returned by the Ministry of Defence in 1953, the bench noted.

Though the division bench was apprised of the sale in favour of Mohd Ghouse, the fact that this sale pertained to the returned land was not within its knowledge, as is clear from the impugned judgment, the bench said.

The court said the reason for the willful suppression of this most relevant fact is not far to gather. Once the Ministry of Defence returned an extent of Ac 4-22 Guntas in the year 1953; acquired Ac 0-27 Guntas in 1954; and then acquired the extent of Ac 5-38 Guntas under the provisions of the Act of 1952, adding up to Ac 11.07 Guntas, in excess of the total extent of the requisitioned land, the question of Ac 4-22 Guntas still being with the Union of India and its Defence department did not arise, the court noted.

The bench noted the respondents/writ petitioners cleverly withheld these details so as to maintain their claim against the Union of India and its Defence department, the original respondents in the writ petition.

"The litigation however took a different turn with the impleadment of HMT Ltd, but it appears that no steps were taken to amend the prayer in the writ petition which remained focused only on the original respondents therein. The case then proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the land acquired for HMT Ltd's benefit was from the balance area of land left with Putta Narasamma, after the requisitioning of Ac 10-35 Guntas," the bench said.

In any event, once that mistaken assumption falls to the ground in the light of the fact that Putta Narasamma sold the returned extent of Ac 4-22 Guntas to Mohd Ghouse and it was that extent of land which was acquired by the Government of Mysore for the benefit of HMT Ltd’s expansion in Jalahalli, the case of the respondents/writ petitioners also falls to the ground, the bench said.

Referring to K D Sharma Vs Steel Authority of India Limited and others (2008), the bench said this court observed that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and the prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice.

It was further held that if there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the court, his petition should be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim.

The court said the principle would apply to the case on hand, given the clear lack of bonafides on the part of the respondents/writ petitioners, which is demonstrable from their deliberate suppression of relevant particulars, which were adverse to the claim that they sought to project in their writ petition.

"The filing of the writ petition was, therefore, nothing short of an abuse of process and did not warrant examination on merits. They were liable to be non-suited on this short ground," the bench said.

That apart, the bench pointed out, even as per the respondents/writ petitioners’ own reckoning and as per their writ averments, their cause of action arose in the year 1973, when the Union of India and the Defence department allegedly stopped paying rental compensation. However, it was only in the year 2006 that they chose to file a writ petition.

The court also said a writ petition should be preferred within reasonable time, the reasonableness of which would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case and the relief prayed for.

The bench cited Syed Maqbool Ali Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2011) that an aggrieved person should approach the High Court diligently as delay in filing a writ petition can result in prejudice, as parties’ position and status may change.

In State of Maharashtra Vs Digambar (1995), a three-judge bench of this court had observed that the grant of relief by a Constitutional Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, without considering blameworthy conduct, such as delay and laches, would be unsustainable even if such relief was granted for the alleged deprivation of a legal right.

The respondents/writ petitioners sought to place reliance on some internal correspondence of the Ministry of Defence, Union of India, and the survey maps drawn up pursuant to the orders of the High Court.

The bench, however, said, "We are of the opinion that these documents do not merit consideration. Such orders were passed in ignorance of the full facts of the case and the patent lack of bonafides on the part of the respondents/writ petitioners. Further, the correspondence now produced would necessarily have to be examined in the context of its genesis and foundation and cannot be relied upon, at this stage, without proper proof".

The court found several disputed questions of fact came up, which could not have been adjudicated by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The bench thus held the writ petition, filed by the respondents/writ petitioners, ought not to have been entertained.

The bench said the judgment of September 05, 2019 and the order of September 13, 2019 passed by the division bench of the High Court of Karnataka, Bengaluru, allowing the said writ petition, therefore, cannot be sustained on grounds more than one.

The court dismissed the petition in its entirety, observing "Though eminently deserving, we refrain from mulcting the respondents/writ petitioners with punitive and exemplary costs."