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Synopsis

The Supreme Court has said that in Punjab, it is not mandatory for second appellate court to frame substantial question of law before it decides a case but it does not mean that the court can appreciate the facts as well as law in its second appeal jurisdiction as can be done by a first appellate court. 

A bench of Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Prashant Kumar Mishra allowed an appeal filed by Manish Aggarwal against the Punjab and Haryana High Court's judgment which set aside decree in a suit for specific performance granted in favour of him.

In the civil suit, all the issues were decided in favour of the plaintiff-appellant and against the defendants-respondents, and the suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff appellant. Thereafter, the first appeals were filed by the defendants-respondents, which were also dismissed. The defendants-respondents preferred second appeals before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act and the same was allowed by the impugned judgment, forcing the appellant-plaintiff to approach the apex court.

Before going into the merits of the case, the bench noted that in the State of Punjab, what is not applicable is Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act.  

"In other words, it is not necessary for the Second Appellate Court to formulate ‘substantial question of law’ before it decides a case. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the court can appreciate the facts as well as law in its second appeal jurisdiction as can be done by a first appellate court. Undoubtedly, the powers are not as limited as that of other courts in Second Appeal, where Section 100 CPC is applicable, but still, it goes with certain limitations," the bench said.

In the case, the appellant claimed he paid Rs 1.5 lakh to original defendants Kulwant Singh, Jaswant Singh and Ranjit Kaur on October 06, 2005 as initial amount to seal the deal for purchase of the suit property.

On October 26, 2005, an agreement to sell was executed between the appellant and respondent no 2 and Ranjit Kaur (now deceased) in relation to the suit property. Rs 30 Lakhs were given in cash at the time of execution of agreement to sell by the appellant. Rs 20 Lakhs were to be paid within 6 months, and the sale deed was to be executed 6 months after the payment of Rs 20 Lakhs. 

Thereafter, the appellant made several efforts to pay this sum of Rs 20 Lakhs as agreed, but defendants kept evading him. Finally, on June 23, 2006, the appellant went to the house of the defendants to give the amount of Rs 20 Lakhs and get their endorsement for the same on the agreement to sell. 

The appellant claimed that on the pretext of getting the endorsement of one of the defendants i.e. Ranjit Kaur on the original agreement to sell, the other defendant i.e. Jaswant Singh took the document inside the house and subsequently, what was returned to the appellant was a forged document purporting to be the original agreement to sell. The appellant immediately realised that what was handed over to him was not the original agreement to sell, and promptly filed FIR under Sections 420, 406, 467, 468, 471, 120-B of IPC against the defendants.  

Respondent Jaswant Singh and one Kuljit Singh were convicted under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B IPC. Their appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed. Now, their revision is pending before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the convicts are on bail.

In their written statement in the civil suit, the defendants respondents stated that they have sold the suit property to Sukhdev Singh on October 24, 2007.

Having noted the facts of the matter, the bench said the second appellate court, in this case has totally misdirected itself while appreciating its powers under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, which clearly states that it can reappreciate the facts and the evidence in case the findings of the trial court and the First Appellate Court are perverse. Nevertheless, the impugned judgment does not provide cogent reasons to show how the findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court are perverse and liable for interference by the High Court. 

The court opined depositions of the witnesses in favour of the plaintiff proving the veracity of the original agreement to sell were righty believed by the Trial Court, and affirmed by the first appellate Court. In addition, the Trial Court also took note of the criminal case against, inter alia, respondent no 2 and observed that the execution of the original agreement to sell also stands proved by the statement given under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code of co-accused Kuljit Singh, who was the broker in the deal between the parties herein. 

The High Court in the impugned judgment reversed the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court on the ground that both the lower courts erred in relying on the Section 313 CrPC statement of said co-accused Kuljit Singh since it did not satisfy the requirements of Section 33 of the Evidence Act. 

"In doing so, the High Court totally ignored the fact that the original agreement to sell stood proved before the Trial Court even without reliance being placed on said Section 313 CrPC statement. The Section 313 CrPC statement was only an additional finding in favour of the appellant by the Trial Court. In other words, the High Court may have been correct in holding that a Section 313 CrPC statement does not satisfy the requirements of Section 33 of the Evidence Act, but in any case, the execution of agreement to sell stood proved even without considering the Section 313 CrPC statement, and hence the appellant’s suit for specific performance was rightly decreed by the Trial Court," the bench said.

The court set aside the High Court's judgment. It held the High Court erred in setting aside findings of the Trial Court and the first appellate court to the extent that they relate to decreeing the suit for specific performance in favour of the appellant.

Case Title: Manish Aggarwal Vs Sukhdev Singh & Ors