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The Supreme Court said that the proposition that a petition under Article 226 must be rejected solely because it cannot be decided without determining the disputed question of fact is not warranted by any provision of law or any decision of it
The Supreme Court has said that, normally, disputed questions of fact are not investigated or adjudicated by a writ court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, the mere existence of a disputed question of fact does not, by itself, take away the jurisdiction of the writ court in granting appropriate relief to the petitioner.
A bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan stated that in cases where the court is satisfied that the facts are disputed by the State or a party merely to create grounds for the rejection of the writ petition, it is the duty of the writ court to reject such a contention, investigate the disputed facts, and record its findings if required in the interest of justice.
"There is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to indicate that the High Court in the proceedings is debarred from holding such an inquiry. The proposition that a petition under Article 226 must be rejected simply on the ground that it cannot be decided without determining the disputed question of fact is not warranted by any provisions of law nor by any decision of this Court," the bench said.
The court pointed out that a rigid application of such a proposition or treating it as an inflexible rule of law or discretion would render the provisions of Article 226 wholly illusory and ineffective.
The bench was dealing with appeals filed by AP Electrical Equipment Corporation against the high court's division bench judgment of January 3, 2022, which set aside the single judge's decision in a writ petition filed by the appellant. The matter related to the acquisition of the appellant's land by the Andhra Pradesh government under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.
The appellant claimed that the Competent Authority purportedly issued a notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act in 2008, directing it to surrender the excess land within 30 days. The Enquiry Officer subsequently claimed to have taken possession of the surplus land on February 8, 2008, covering 46,538.43 square meters in Ranga Reddy District.
Examining the issue, the bench observed that a common argument used by the State in such cases is that whether the actual physical possession of the disputed land has been taken over is a seriously disputed question of fact, which the high court should not adjudicate in its writ jurisdiction.
"As a principle of law, there need not be any debate on such a proposition, but by merely submitting that it is a seriously disputed question of fact, the same, by itself, will not become a question of fact," the bench said.
The court further stated that if the materials on record falsify the State Government's case, such materials should not be overlooked or ignored by the court on the principle that the issue of actual physical possession is a disputed question of fact.
Referring to the legal provisions, the bench noted that the mere vesting of land under subsection (3) of Section 10 does not confer any right on the State Government to have de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of the land before March 18, 1999. The State must establish that such a voluntary surrender occurred.
Discussing the effect of the Repeal Act, 1999, the court stated that if the landowner remains in physical possession, then, irrespective of the land being declared surplus or an entry being made in favor of the State in revenue records, the landowner will not be divested of their rights.
Even if compensation has been received, that alone does not disqualify the landowner from claiming the benefit, provided compensation is refunded and the landowner is in actual physical possession. The payment of compensation is not necessarily linked to the taking of actual possession, as compensation becomes payable upon vesting of the land, which can occur without taking physical possession, the court said.
The bench referred to the proposition that mere paper possession is insufficient to vest land in the State, as explained in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana (2012).
The bench also emphasized that if two decisions of the Supreme Court appear inconsistent with each other, the high courts should not arbitrarily follow one while overlooking the other but should reconcile and respect both. The proper approach is to follow the decision whose facts align more closely with the case at hand.
In this case, the bench noted that the single judge, after meticulously examining the entire record, found several deficiencies in the procedure adopted by the State. However, the division bench appeared to address these deficiencies by giving the benefit of the doubt to the State at every possible stage.
The court took exception to the division bench's use of the expression "shockingly the learned Single Judge" in its judgment.
"We fail to understand what is so shocking in the judgment of the Single Judge that the Division Bench had to interfere in a writ appeal. Was the Division Bench deciding a criminal appeal against the judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned Single Judge? The Division Bench was quite aware that it was deciding an intra court appeal," the bench said.
The court clarified that an intra-court appeal is not a statutory appeal from an inferior to a superior court. Instead, it is an appeal from one coordinate bench to another within the same high court. Due to this, a writ cannot be issued by one high court bench to another, nor can the high court issue a writ to itself.
"Thus, unlikely an appeal, in general, an intra court appeal is an appeal on principle and that is why, unlike an appeal, in an ordinary sense, such as a criminal appeal, where the whole evidence on record is examined afresh by the appellate court, what is really examined, in an intra court appeal, is the legality and validity of a judgment and/or order of the single judge and it can be set aside or should be set aside only when there is a patent error on the face of the record or the judgment is against the established or settled principles of law. If two views are possible and a view, which is reasonable and logical has been adopted by a single judge, the other view howsoever appealing may be to the division bench, it is the view adopted by the Single Judge, which should, normally, by allowed to prevail," the bench said.
Addressing the facts of the case, the bench noted that the appellant pointed out that not only was the factory still operational on the subject land, but multi-storied residential buildings had also been constructed. Additionally, the entire land was enclosed by a boundary wall with a security guard posted at the gate.
"When State Authorities try to take law in their own hands by hook or crook and rely on bogus paper panchnamas for the purpose of asserting that actual physical possession was taken over before the date of the repeal, then it is imperative that the signature of the landowner must be obtained in the panchnama so as to attach sanctity and authenticity to such exercise of taking over of actual possession. Affidavits of the panchas would also attach great sanctity to the same," the bench said.
In this case, the bench found that the State had not presented true and correct facts in all respects.
"Both of us (J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, J.J.) have worked as judges in our respective High Courts. We had the occasion to decide many matters exactly of the present type. Our experience so far has been that out of ten matters in nine matters it was apparent that the cases were one of paper possession. The present case is also one of paper possession," court said.
The court noted that the single judge was constrained to observe that some documents appeared to be ante-dated, with elements of fabricated evidence.
"All this has been dismissed by the Division Bench saying that they could be clerical errors or arithmetical errors," the bench noted.
The court held that the issue regarding the actual physical possession of excess land under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the Act, 1976, is a mixed question of law and fact, rather than a mere question of fact.
"Mixed question of law and fact refers to a question which depends on both law and fact for its solution. In resolving a mixed question of law and fact, a reviewing court must adjudicate the facts of the case and decide relevant legal issues at the same time," the court said.
Thus, the court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned judgment.
"In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the division bench of the High Court committed an egregious error in interfering with a very well considered and well-reasoned judgment rendered by the single judge of the High Court. There was no good reason for the division bench to interfere with the judgment rendered by the single judge," the bench concluded.
Case Title: M/s AP Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tehsildar & Ors. etc
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