'Courts Must Distinguish Deception From Regret In Consensual Relationships': Supreme Court Discharges Man In Rape, Cheating Case

The mere fact that a consensual relationship turns sour cannot retrospectively convert earlier consensual sexual acts into rape, the Supreme Court held. It emphasised the need to distinguish between cases where consent was absent from the beginning because of deception and those where a person regrets past sexual decisions following the breakdown of a relationship.

"We wish to note a worrying trend in recent years wherein consensual relationships that have come to an end are retrospectively combed with a fine tooth so as to identify what can post-facto be construed as violence and sexual assault," a Bench of Justices B V Nagarathna and R Mahadevan observed.

The Bench said courts must distinguish between a relationship built entirely on deceit and falsehood from one in which a person experiences regret over having consented to sexual acts because the relationship subsequently ended.

It emphasised that although such regret may be unfortunate, it cannot, by itself, turn a consensual relationship into a criminal offence and set the criminal justice system in motion in a manner that deprives the accused of his liberty and reputation.

"In fact, such an approach denudes the man of any agency entirely, as the mere factum of being in a consensual relationship at one point would bind him to it entirely for fear of being accused of rape at a subsequent point of time," the Bench said.

Court made these observations while allowing a man's appeal against the Kerala High Court's decision refusing to discharge him in a rape and cheating case.

Alleged Rape And Cheating

In the present case, the complainant, a divorced woman, claimed that she came in contact with the appellant, Santhosh Kumar N P, and gradually developed a relationship with him.

She alleged that the appellant represented himself as a bachelor, although he was already married and had two children, and offered to marry her.

In 1996, the two travelled to Mysuru, where they allegedly married at a temple. They subsequently lived together as a couple until 2003. Believing that a valid marriage subsisted between them, the woman consented to sexual acts with the appellant on several occasions.

Court, however, found that the materials on record did not support an inference of rape. It noted that the relationship was between two consenting adults and that the sexual acts were not forced.

The appellant had merely decided, for reasons best known to him, to withdraw from the relationship, which the woman claimed was in the nature of a marital relationship.

The Bench observed that the repeated sexual acts were part of an ongoing relationship and could not be artificially separated from it to attract Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC [Section 64(2)(m) of the BNS].

The Bench also questioned whether a man could be denied the right to withdraw from a relationship and whether such a decision could, by itself, amount to deceit or fraud.

It answered both questions in the negative, observing that physical intimacy during a functioning relationship cannot retrospectively be branded as rape merely because the relationship subsequently soured.

"This court has time and again witnessed the disturbing trend where failed relationships are being converted into criminal cases. Rape, being a heinous offence, must be reserved for situations where there is real sexual violence, coercion, or manipulation of consent," the Bench said.

It added that converting every consensual relationship that ends badly into an accusation of rape dilutes the gravity of the offence and subjects the accused to irreparable stigma, harassment and injustice.

"The abuse of the criminal justice process in such cases is a matter of serious concern and must be condemned. Hence, courts would have to view the entire relationship holistically rather than from the perspective of its end," the Bench observed.

Court clarified that genuine cases involving sexual assault and violence must be pursued vigorously. However, the criminal justice system must not become a tool of vengeance when relationships fail.

It further observed that the legislature never intended to retrospectively criminalise consensual sexual acts between adults merely because a mutually affectionate relationship came to an end.

"It is unfortunate that despite judicial deprecation, this trend is increasing, and it is a matter of concern for the courts as often settlement of disputes comes with huge monetary considerations to be borne by the male accused," the Bench said.

Court also took note of the fact that the woman continued cohabiting with the appellant even after learning about his earlier marriage and the existence of his two children.

It observed that, in these circumstances, she could not have continued living with him on the assumption that she was his legally wedded wife.

The mere performance of certain rituals at a temple could not, by itself, have created an assumption of a lawful marriage, particularly after she had learnt about his previous marriage, Court noted.

The woman had admitted that she came to know about the appellant's earlier marriage within six months of beginning their cohabitation in 1996. Despite this, she made no attempt to withdraw from his company.

"This conduct is highly suggestive of the consensual nature of the relationship and that it was not in the nature of any legally recognised marriage," the Bench said.

Court also noted that documents relating to IVF treatment, joint bank accounts and other materials relied upon by the woman did not establish the existence of a marriage. Instead, they indicated a long-standing personal relationship.

"The relationship between the appellant and the woman was more akin to a domestic relationship, possibly in the nature of a marriage, as opposed to a real marriage in the eyes of law," the Bench observed.

Court further noted that the relationship ended in 2003. Five years later, in 2008, the woman initiated proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act. After those proceedings were dismissed, she attempted to lodge two nearly identical complaints against the appellant. The second complaint eventually resulted in the registration of an FIR in 2011 and the subsequent criminal proceedings.

The Bench observed that courts are not entrusted with the task of passing moral judgments on individuals' choices, autonomy and agency.

It noted that adults, whether men or women, are free to make decisions that may be wise or unwise, prudent or reckless, and considerate or callous. Such decisions may have undesirable or deeply hurtful consequences, but that does not automatically transform them into criminal offences warranting State intervention.

"Criminal law cannot be used as munitions to settle personal scores, exact revenge or coerce an individual to act in any particular way," the Bench said.

Court ultimately found that the ingredients of offences under Sections 376, 420, 493, 494 and 495 of the IPC [Sections 64, 318(4), 81, 82(1) and 82(2) of the BNS, respectively] were not established.

"Prima facie, we hold that no case is made out against the appellant of having committed the said offences. In our view, the high court erred in concluding that there was sufficient material to make out a prima facie case against the appellant and therefore, proceeded to dismiss the petitions filed against the order of the Trial Court on a completely misconceived basis," the Bench said.

Court held that both the trial court and the high court ought to have discharged the appellant instead of directing him to face trial.

Accordingly, it allowed the appeal and set aside the Kerala High Court's judgment dated May 21, 2025.

Case Title: Santhosh Kumar N P Vs State SHO Kadipur Police, Tellicherry, Kannur

Bench: Justices B V Nagarathna and R Mahadevan

Date of Judgment: October 30, 2026