Obtaining Court's Leave Mandatory Pre-Condition To Institute Suit Against Public Charities: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has held that obtaining leave of the court is a mandatory pre-condition to instituting a suit under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), and that a civil court cannot pass protective or preservatory interim orders while an application seeking such leave is pending.

Section 92 of the CPC governs suits relating to public charities and religious or charitable trusts to prevent mismanagement and protect public interest.

A Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Manmohan clarified that the court cannot use its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to bypass the statutory requirement of obtaining leave before a suit concerning a public charitable or religious trust can be instituted.

Section 151 of the CPC preserves the inherent powers of a civil court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court.

What was the dispute before the Supreme Court?

The judgment came in an appeal filed by S Panchalingu and others claiming an interest in People's Education Trust. They filed a plaint under Section 92 of the CPC along with an application seeking leave to institute the suit concerning the Trust.

While the application for leave was pending, the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, passed an order on May 2, 2025 under Order XL Rule 1(a) of the CPC, constituting an ad hoc committee comprising the existing trustees to manage the day-to-day affairs of the trust pending further directions. The appellants argued that such a protective measure could be passed even before leave was granted.

The Karnataka High Court, in its June 25, 2025 judgment, set aside this order. It reaffirmed its earlier view that a suit under Section 92 remains “stillborn” in the absence of leave and that the court lacks jurisdiction to pass interlocutory orders while the application seeking leave is pending.

Challenging this decision, Panchalingu and others approached the Supreme Court arguing that once a court is seized of a plaint under Section 92 along with an application seeking leave, it cannot remain a “mute spectator” until the leave application is decided.

They contended that the court retained the power to appoint a receiver under Section 94 read with Order XL Rule 1 and could also exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC. The appointment of a receiver, they argued, was protective and preservatory in nature.

The respondents, however, submitted that no substantive proceeding comes into existence until leave is granted and that the court cannot adjudicate rights or pass interim orders during the pendency of the leave application.

Why is leave mandatory under Section 92 CPC?

The Supreme Court noted that Section 92 was amended in 1976 to replace the requirement of administrative consent from the Advocate-General with the mandatory requirement of obtaining the court's leave before a suit is instituted by two or more persons.

“The threshold of scrutiny was thereby shifted from the executive to the judiciary. Consequently, the obtaining of leave of the court is a mandatory pre-condition to the institution of a suit against public charities,” the Bench said.

Court explained that Section 92 deals with a special form of representative suit. Such proceedings are instituted not to vindicate private rights but on behalf of public beneficiaries and in the larger public interest.

For a suit under Section 92 to be maintainable, the trust must have been created for a public charitable or religious purpose; there must be a breach of trust or a necessity for directions concerning the administration of the trust; and the relief sought must fall within those specified under Section 92(1).

The provision allows two or more persons interested in such a trust to institute a suit without joining all beneficiaries. At the same time, the requirement of prior leave protects public trusts and trustees from vexatious litigation and prevents the wastage of resources meant for charitable or religious purposes.

Court described Section 92 as both a “protective shield” and a “remedial sword”, balancing protection of public trust property with the need for judicial intervention where necessary.

Can a court pass interim orders before granting leave?

The Supreme Court answered this in the negative.

It held that proceedings under Section 92 are substantial proceedings in the nature of a suit, but a suit is not validly instituted until leave is granted. Therefore, before leave is granted, there is no pending proceeding in which interlocutory applications can be entertained.

“The grant of leave under Section 92 is an essential and mandatory pre-condition, in the absence of which there exists no pending proceeding in which interlocutory applications can be entertained,” the Bench said.

Court rejected the argument that Section 151 CPC, which preserves the inherent powers of civil courts, could be used to overcome this requirement.

It said inherent powers are complementary to the express provisions of the CPC and cannot be exercised in conflict with them. Where a statute prescribes a specific requirement such as leave under Section 92, inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to circumvent it.

Similarly, Section 141 CPC, which makes the procedure under the Code applicable to miscellaneous proceedings, cannot be invoked to override the substantive safeguards under Section 92 or confer jurisdiction where none exists.

Why could a receiver not be appointed before leave?

The Supreme Court specifically held that a receiver cannot be appointed under Order XL Rule 1 before leave under Section 92 has been granted.

The power to appoint a receiver, it said, is contingent upon the existence of a validly instituted suit. Since a Section 92 suit is not instituted until leave is granted, appointment of a receiver during the pendency of the leave application is not maintainable.

The Bench also rejected the appellants' submission that appointment of a receiver should be treated differently because it is protective and preservatory rather than adjudicatory.

“A court which lacks jurisdiction cannot assume jurisdiction merely on the basis of how the relief sought is characterised,” the Bench said.

Court further observed that appointment of a receiver in respect of a public trust cannot be regarded as merely preservatory. Such an appointment is intrusive and can dislodge the existing management of the trust. If leave is ultimately refused, the interim appointment could prejudice the management of the trust.

What about urgent relief?

The Supreme Court, however, recognised that circumstances may arise where urgent interim measures are necessary to safeguard the property of a public charity.

It said notice to the proposed defendants should ordinarily precede the grant of leave. However, where the facts disclose compelling urgency, notice may be dispensed with, provided the court records reasons in writing.

“However, for compelling reasons to be recorded in writing like where facts disclose the necessity of urgent relief, notice prior to the grant of leave may be dispensed with,” the Bench said.

Court clarified that a suit instituted pursuant to leave granted without notice would not, on that ground alone, become invalid or non-maintainable. The defendants would remain entitled to seek revocation of the leave, which would then have to be adjudicated on merits and in accordance with law.

The Supreme Court ultimately held that a civil court seized of a plaint under Section 92 along with an application seeking leave cannot pass protective or preservatory interim orders while the leave application is pending.

It dismissed the appeal.

Case Title: S Panchalingu & Ors Vs People's Education Trust (R) And Others Etc

Bench: Justices Manoj Misra and Manmohan

Date of Judgment: September 18, 2026