‘Police, Courts Are First Filters’: SC on Chargesheets in Ongoing Civil Disputes

The Supreme Court on December 2, 2025 emphasised that when a civil dispute between parties is pending, both the police and the criminal courts must act with caution while filing a chargesheet and framing charges.

A bench of Justices N Kotiswar Singh and Manmohan said that in a society governed by the rule of law, the decision to file a chargesheet must rest on the investigating officer’s assessment of whether the evidence gathered provides a reasonable prospect of conviction.

“The police at the stage of filing of chargesheet and the criminal court at the stage of framing of charge must act as initial filters, ensuring that only cases with a strong suspicion should proceed to the formal trial stage to maintain the efficiency and integrity of the judicial system,’’ the bench observed.

Court noted that the tendency to file chargesheets even in matters where strong suspicion is absent clogs the judicial system, forcing judges, court staff, and prosecutors to spend time on trials that are likely to end in acquittal. This diverts scarce judicial resources from more serious cases and contributes significantly to the mounting backlog.

“Undoubtedly, there can be no analysis at the charge framing stage as to whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal, but the fundamental principle is that the State should not prosecute citizens without a reasonable prospect of conviction, as it compromises the right to a fair process,’’ the bench added.

Court was hearing an appeal filed by Tuhin Kumar Biswas alias Bumba against a January 30, 2024 judgment of the Calcutta High Court, which had dismissed his revision petition challenging the rejection of his discharge application in an FIR lodged on March 19, 2020 at Bidhannagar North police station.

The bench said that in this case, both the police and the trial court ought to have recognised that a civil dispute over the property was already pending, an injunction was in force, and the complainant had declined to give any judicial statement. In such circumstances, strong suspicion founded on legally tenable material was absent.

Complainant Mamta Agarwal, an alleged tenant of co-owner Amalendu Biswas, had claimed that when she, along with her friend and workmen, attempted to enter the property, the appellant-accused stopped and intimidated them. She alleged that he clicked her photographs and recorded videos without consent, thereby intruding upon her privacy and outraging her modesty.

A chargesheet was filed on August 16, 2020 for offences under Sections 341, 354C and 506 of the IPC.

Challenging the High Court’s decision, the appellant-accused argued that his father had already filed a title suit against his uncle Amalendu Biswas, who was attempting to dispossess them unlawfully. An injunction restraining alienation or creation of third-party rights was already in force when the FIR was filed. He also submitted that the complainant was not a tenant and had several criminal cases pending against her, including offences under Sections 302 and 307 of IPC.

He contended that merely objecting to the creation of third-party rights in violation of an injunction order could not attract Sections 341 or 506 of IPC. Regarding Section 354C, he pointed out that no photographs or seized material were placed on record to support the allegation of voyeurism.

The state, however, argued that sufficient material existed to make out a prima facie case.

Considering the record, the bench reiterated that while a strong suspicion is sufficient at the stage of discharge, such suspicion must be grounded in material capable of being translated into evidence at trial.

After examining the FIR and the chargesheet, court held that no offence under Section 354C was made out, as there was no allegation that the complainant was watched or captured while engaging in any “private act.” For criminal intimidation under Section 506, the bench noted that except for a bald allegation regarding photography, the record did not indicate any threat of injury.

The bench further observed that the complainant had no right to enter the property on the date of the alleged incident. Her induction as a tenant would itself have violated the subsisting injunction order. No material was placed on record to show she was ever a tenant, and notably, she had not even given a statement pursuant to her complaint.

“All that the appellant-accused did was to enforce what he bonafidely thought was his lawful right over the property in terms of the injunction order passed by the Trial Court,’’ court said.

It concluded that the allegations, at best, gave rise to a civil dispute concerning possession and ingress, not a criminal offence. The criminal proceedings under Sections 341, 354C and 506 of the IPC, therefore, could not be allowed to continue.

Case Title: Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba Vs The State of West Bengal

Judgment Date: December 2, 2025

Bench: Justices N Kotiswar Singh and Manmohan