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Synopsis

The Supreme Court on January 24, 2025, quashed entire criminal proceedings and the charge sheet filed against senior officials of a company in Bengaluru on a complaint by a woman employee after she was forced to resign from the post of technical system analyst on October 25, 2013.

A bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Prashant Kumar Mishra set aside the Karnataka High Court's order of July 31, 2019, which had refused to allow the plea filed by appellants Madhushree Datta and Badrinarayana Jaganathan, then working as senior officials at Juniper Networks India Private Limited, Bengaluru.

"After a thorough examination of the matter, including a review of the materials on record: viz, the complaint, the FIR, and charge sheet, we are of the view that none of the ingredients of Sections 323, 504, 506, and 509 of the IPC are present, even if they are taken at face value and accepted in their entirety. The complaint is bereft of even the basic facts, which are absolutely necessary for making out an offence," the bench said.

After noting discrepancies and variations, the court found, a deliberate attempt to reclassify the nature of the proceedings from non-cognizable to cognizable or to transform a civil dispute into a criminal matter, potentially aimed at pressurizing the appellants into settling the dispute with the complainant.

"As asserted by the appellants, there are certain facts that strongly suggest that the criminal proceedings were initiated by the complainant against the appellants with mala fide intentions, specifically to wreak vengeance, cause harm, or coerce a settlement," the court said.

The court also held that the presence of the second accused could not by any stretch of imagination be visualised, if one were to barely read the complaints - initial and subsequent – and treat the contents as true; yet, the complainant alleged acts against him which, according to her, amounted to criminal offence.

"We are reminded of the maxim res ipsa loquitur and leave the discussion at that," the bench observed.

The complainant claimed the first accused, who held the position of Human Resources Manager at the Company, demanded that she resign under threat of immediate dismissal. Furthermore, the first accused, allegedly instructed the complainant not to return to work and confiscated her personal belongings, including her laptop, bag, wallet, money, credit cards et cetera.

The complainant further claimed that the laptop contained proprietary intellectual property, specifically codes and other work, that she had personally created. In addition, the complainant alleged that the management ordered her removal from the premises, with security personnel escorting her out and reportedly engaging in behaviour amounting to physical harassment, assault and threatening with dire consequences.

A non-cognizable report was registered on October 26, 2013, on mental and physical harassment.

More than two months later, a first information report was lodged by the complainant accusing the company and the appellants of having committed offences punishable under sections 323, 504, 506, 509, 511 of the Indian Penal Code on same allegations.

The police filed the charge sheet naming the appellants as accused for the offences mentioned in the FIR.

After the counsel, the court recorded that none of the two complaints lodged by the complainant with any degree of clarity and certainty suggested the presence of the second accused at the time of the alleged occurrence.

Dealing with Section 323 IPC, the bench said there must be a voluntary act of causing hurt, i.e., bodily pain, disease, or infirmity, to another person. Therefore, it is essential that actual hurt is caused.

"Turning to the facts of the case, the complaint merely states that the complainant was forcibly ejected from the Company's office by security personnel, who allegedly attempted to assault, physically harass, and threaten her with dire consequences. Therefore, the complaint does not directly attribute any voluntary act of causing hurt to the complainant by any of the two accused," it said.

The court said while the actions of the security personnel could potentially constitute an offence of causing hurt, they were neither named in the complaint nor figured as accused in the chargesheet.

"We are of the considered opinion that the ingredients of offence under Section 323 of the IPC have not been made out, prima facie, either in the complaint or the charge sheet," the bench said.

With regard to Section 504 IPC, the bench said to establish its ingredients, it must be demonstrated, based on the available material, that there was intentional insult with the intent or knowledge that such insult would provoke either disturbance of the public peace or the commission of any other offence.

"The chargesheet states that the appellants used "filthy language" while scolding the complainant; however, no such allegation is made against the appellants in the complaint," the bench said, holding the ingredients of the offence were not satisfied.

The court pointed out that the term "filthy language," when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant's modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section 509 of the IPC.

"Had there been references to specific words used, contextual details, or any gestures—whether preceding, succeeding, or accompanying these words—that could demonstrate a criminal intent to insult the modesty, and it might have assisted the prosecution in establishing the case against the appellants," the bench said.

In light of the employer-employee relationship between the appellants and the complainant; the existing dispute between them relating to the employment; the absence of any references to specific words used, contextual details, or accompanying gestures—whether preceding or succeeding the alleged words—the failure to mention the use of any "filthy language" in the complaint; and the fact that this allegation is only found in the charge sheet: there are serious concerns regarding the claim of insulting modesty of the complainant by the appellants, the bench said.

"Considering the materials available on record, we are of the view that prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509 of the IPC have not been disclosed," the bench said.

In the present case, the court further pointed out that the complaint dif not specifically attribute any threats or intimidation to the second accused.

"Therefore, ingredients of Section 506 of the IPC, prima facie, are not made out against him. The argument that the first accused acted at the behest of the second accused is untenable, as Section 34 of the IPC, which imposes vicarious liability in criminal matters, has not been applied in this case", it said.

The ingredients of Section 506 of the IPC, prima facie, were not disclosed against the first accused too, the bench said, after noting the complainant alleged illegal termination, which constituted a civil dispute, rather than criminal intimidation.

After setting aside the high court's order and quashing the proceedings pending before ACMM, Bengaluru, the court clarified its findings or observations made would have no bearing on the pending reference between the parties before the labour court.

Case Title: Madhushree Datta Vs The State of Karnataka & Anr