Registrar General Can't Initiate Disciplinary Action Against Judicial Officers: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has held that the registrar general of a high court has no authority under the Constitution or the statutory service rules to suo motu initiate disciplinary proceedings against a judicial officer.

Such action can only be taken on behalf of the chief justice or a committee of judges authorised by the chief justice, Court said.

A Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi said the power under Article 235 of the Constitution is vested exclusively in the "high court", meaning the chief justice and the companion judges, and cannot be exercised independently by the registrar general.

Article 235 of the Constitution vests the high court with control over the subordinate judiciary, including matters such as postings, promotions, leave and disciplinary control, which must be exercised in accordance with the applicable service rules.

The judgment came while dismissing an appeal filed by the High Court of Uttarakhand against a division bench judgment of January 6, 2026, that had quashed disciplinary proceedings against judicial officer Deepali Sharma and directed her reinstatement.

The appeal arose because two different wings of the high court had acted in different capacities. While the disciplinary proceedings against Sharma were initiated on the administrative side of the high court, a division bench hearing her writ petition later set aside those proceedings. Aggrieved by that decision, the high court, acting through its administrative side, approached the Supreme Court.

The high court argued before the Supreme Court that the case involved gross misconduct by the judicial officer. According to its counsel, Sharma had allegedly victimised a minor girl employed as a domestic help, who was later rescued with more than 20 injuries on her body.

At the outset, the Supreme Court observed that if such allegations are proved in a departmental inquiry conducted in accordance with law and the prescribed procedure, there can be no exception to the imposition of a major penalty.

However, the Bench said the real issue before it was whether the departmental inquiry itself had been initiated in accordance with law, particularly in light of the findings recorded by the high court.

Court clarified that it was not required to examine the nature of the allegations, the evidence led against Sharma, or whether the punishment imposed on her was justified.

Instead, the Bench said what it found "shocking" was that the inquiry proceedings had been initiated at the instance of the registrar general. It noted that the registrar general was neither examined during the proceedings nor was any primary material produced to show that he had obtained an order from the chief Justice or a disciplinary committee of judges constituted by the chief Justice.

The Bench said the crucial question was whether, in the face of such a serious procedural defect, Sharma could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings at all.

What did the Supreme Court say about Article 235?

Answering the question, Court held that the disciplinary power under Article 235 is expressly vested in the high court, meaning the chief Justice and the companion judges.

"Unless the disciplinary action is approved by the chief justice of the high court or the committee comprising Judges, constituted by him as his delegates, the purported disciplinary action, for all intents and purposes, shall be void ab initio," the Bench held.

Reiterating the constitutional position, Court said the registrar general has absolutely no authority, either under the constitutional scheme or the statutory rules governing the service conditions of judicial officers, to suo motu initiate disciplinary proceedings. The registrar general can only act on behalf of the chief Justice and the judges of the high court.

The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the very foundation of the disciplinary action against Sharma was non-existent in law.

In view of this conclusion, the Bench said it was unnecessary to examine the high court's findings on facts or decide the legal question of whether the high court, while exercising judicial review, had acted like an appellate authority over the findings of the inquiry officer that had been approved by the full court.

Court also noted that Sharma, who was appointed as a judicial officer in 2008, had already been reinstated pursuant to the high court's judgment.

Taking into account the overall circumstances, particularly Sharma's consistent stand that she had been harassed by some senior judicial officers, the Bench declined to interfere with the operative part of the high court's judgment setting aside the disciplinary action and directing her reinstatement.

Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court clarified that it was upholding the reinstatement solely on the legal issue relating to the validity of the disciplinary proceedings, and not on the merits of the allegations against Sharma.

Case Title: High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital Vs Deepali Sharma & Anr

Bench: CJI Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi

Date of Judgment: May 18, 2026