Section 33 Arbitration Act: Supreme Court Says Even Rejected Applications Defer Limitation Under Section 34

The Supreme Court has held that once an arbitral tribunal formally entertains an application under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the limitation period for filing a challenge to the arbitral award under Section 34 begins only after that application is decided.

A Bench of Justices P S Narasimha and Alok Aradhe clarified that, for the purpose of computing limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act, the relevant date is the date on which the tribunal disposes of the Section 33 application.

Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act allows parties to ask the arbitral tribunal to correct clerical, typographical or similar errors in an award, interpret a specific part of it, or make an additional award on claims that were raised but omitted. Section 34, on the other hand, provides the mechanism for challenging an arbitral award before a court, subject to a prescribed limitation period.

The Supreme Court further held that whether the Section 33 application is ultimately allowed or dismissed is irrelevant. What matters is that the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 33 was formally invoked and the proceedings remained pending before it.

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The Bench also emphasised that courts cannot read into the statute a restriction that the legislature has consciously not included.

The ruling came in an appeal filed by the National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) against a January 22, 2024 judgment of the Karnataka High Court's Dharwad Bench.

The high court had set aside an order of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bellary, which had condoned the delay in filing NHAI's applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

How did the dispute arise?

The dispute arose from the acquisition of land in Bellary district under the National Highways Act, 1956. A preliminary notification issued under Section 3A(1) included land belonging to respondent T Younis.

The competent authority passed an award on December 5, 2011 determining compensation under Section 3G(1) of the Act. Dissatisfied, NHAI invoked arbitration under Section 3G(5).

In February 2013, the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Arbitrator redetermined the market value of the acquired land. However, in March 2019, the Karnataka High Court set aside that arbitral award and remitted the matter to the arbitrator for fresh consideration.

Following fresh proceedings, the arbitrator passed a new award in 2022 granting benefits under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2), 28 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

NHAI then filed an application under Section 33(1)(a) of the Arbitration Act seeking correction of the award, contending that the grant of additional market value and interest under the Land Acquisition Act was legally unsustainable.

At the same time, the respondent filed an application under Section 33(4) seeking an additional award of 50% over and above the market value, claiming that this relief had been sought during the arbitration proceedings but was omitted from the final award.

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On July 4, 2022, the arbitrator dismissed both Section 33 applications. NHAI received the certified copy of that order on September 15, 2022, and filed applications under Section 34 on October 29, 2022 along with applications seeking condonation of delay.

The respondent objected, arguing that the Section 34 applications had been filed beyond the maximum condonable period of 120 days prescribed under Section 34(3).

While the Principal District and Sessions Judge condoned the delay, the high court later held that NHAI's application under Section 33(1)(a) was not maintainable as it sought substantive modification of the award rather than correction of clerical or typographical errors. Consequently, it ruled that the benefit of deferred limitation under Section 34(3) was unavailable.

Can even an unsuccessful Section 33 application extend limitation under Section 34?

Before the Supreme Court, NHAI argued that the high court had erred in refusing to exclude the period spent in deciding the Section 33 application while computing limitation under Section 34(3).

It contended that its application merely sought correction of errors in the award and that the issue had already been settled by previous Supreme Court decisions.

The respondent, however, argued that NHAI had effectively sought a review of the arbitral award under the guise of a Section 33 application. It submitted that only a maintainable application under Section 33 could postpone the commencement of limitation under Section 34(3). Since NHAI's application itself was not maintainable, the respondent argued, the time spent in its disposal could not be excluded.

The principal issue before the Supreme Court was whether limitation under Section 34(3) starts from the date of the original arbitral award or from the date on which the tribunal disposes of an application under Section 33.

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Court noted that Section 33 permits parties to seek correction, interpretation or an additional award within 30 days of receiving the arbitral award.

"From careful scrutiny of Section 34(3) of the Act, it is evident that where a request under Section 33 of the Act has been made, the limitation for filing an application under Section 34 of the Act shall be reckoned from the date on which such request is disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal," the Bench observed.

Court pointed out that the provision does not distinguish between applications that are ultimately allowed or dismissed. Nor does it state that only a maintainable application under Section 33 would defer limitation.

"Had the legislature intended to restrict the benefit only to the applications which were ultimately allowed or which were held to be maintainable, it would have expressly provided so," the Bench said.

Reiterating that courts cannot add words to a statute, Court held that once proceedings under Section 33 are initiated and entertained, parties cannot be compelled to file proceedings under Section 34 merely as a precaution while the Section 33 proceedings remain pending.

"Whether the application under Section 33 ultimately succeeds or fails, or whether the Arbitral Tribunal eventually finds that no correction or modification of the award is warranted, is not determinative for the purpose of Section 34(3). What is relevant is that whether the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 33 had been formally invoked and that such proceedings remained pending consideration before the tribunal," the Bench held.

Court further observed that the high court's interpretation would defeat the object of the Arbitration Act by forcing parties to simultaneously pursue proceedings under Sections 33 and 34, resulting in multiplicity of proceedings and procedural uncertainty.

At the same time, Court clarified that if applications under Section 33 are found to be sham, frivolous, mala fide, or filed solely to extend limitation under Section 34(3), courts are free to impose exemplary and punitive costs to prevent abuse of process.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court rejected the respondent's contention that NHAI's Section 34 applications were time-barred.

It set aside the Karnataka High Court's judgment and restored the Principal District and Sessions Judge's order condoning the delay. Court directed that NHAI's applications under Section 34 shall now be decided on their own merits in accordance with law.

Case Title: National Highway Authority of India Vs T Younis & Anr

Bench: Justices P S Narasimha and Alok Aradhe

Date of Judgment: June 02, 2026