Section 498A: Supreme Court Extends Cruelty Protection to Live-In Relationships ‘In Nature of Marriage’

Supreme Court ruling extending Section 498A IPC protection to live-in relationships in the nature of marriage.
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Supreme Court extends Section 498A protection to eligible live-in relationships.

The Supreme Court held that Section 498A IPC covers live-in relationships "in the nature of marriage", ruling that denying such women protection against cruelty violates Article 14 of the Constitution while limiting the ruling to Section 498A alone.

The Supreme Court has held that Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code [now Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)], which deals with cruelty and dowry harassment by a husband or his relatives, can also apply to couples in a live-in relationship where the relationship qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage”.

A Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N Kotiswar Singh held that Section 498A would apply to “live-in relationships” that qualify as “relationships in the nature of marriage”, where the intent to marry is established as an intrinsic part of the relationship.

The Bench clarified that the “live-in relationships” protected under Section 498A are those between two consenting adults.

Court, however, made it clear that the proposition of law laid down by it is limited to Section 498A IPC and that the extended interpretation would not affect any other provision.

Why did the Supreme Court extend Section 498A protection to live-in relationships?

Court held that the distinction between a relationship in the nature of marriage and a marriage, insofar as protection against cruelty is concerned, does not satisfy Article 14 of the Constitution.

“When the objective of the Section 498A was to provide coverage to those cases where harassment by husband or in-laws through wilful conduct causing mental or physical injury or driving the woman to suicide, then to say that such harassment can only be caused when they are married and not before that, in our considered view, would be a case of over simplification,” the Bench said.

Court observed that “live-in relationships” are today, more or less, a reality, primarily in urban areas, and the law must adapt itself to serve those who choose this form of relationship.

The Bench noted that in earlier times, marriage was perceived as the only method by which two individuals could live together for a lifetime, while living together without marriage was considered taboo. Marriage was considered sacrosanct, but this has changed with evolving societal standards.

“Living together, prior to marriage, is not unheard of or unacceptable anymore,” the Bench said.

Court said the law is a living organism and must respond to changes in society.

What did the Supreme Court say about Section 498A and “husband”?

Court examined whether Section 498A could be interpreted to include a man in a “live-in relationship”, although the provision specifically uses the word “husband”.

The Bench rejected the contention that since Section 498A is a penal provision, it must be interpreted strictly and confined only to a husband married to a woman in the traditional sense.

“The interpretation given to this penal provision must be an interpretation which keeps in view the reformative objective, or else its mandate will be defeated,” the Bench said.

Court held that the word “husband” must receive a purposive interpretation in the context of a “relationship in the nature of marriage”, keeping in view the reformative, corrective and socially beneficial intent of Section 498A.

It held that a woman in such a relationship would also be entitled to the protection provided under Section 498A.

What safeguards apply before arrest in such cases?

The Supreme Court also directed that the safeguards against arrest laid down in Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar (2014) must be strictly followed.

“No person in a relationship in the nature of marriage having been accused of committing cruelty against a woman, being either the live-in partner ‘in the nature of marriage’ or his relative, shall be arrested without preliminary enquiries,” the Bench said.

Why did the Court reject the argument that the Domestic Violence Act was enough?

The court rejected the argument that women in live-in relationships already had adequate protection under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

It noted that although the DV Act provides a wide ambit of protection against domestic violence, its overall nature is to provide remedies under civil law, except for Section 31, which provides for punishment in case of violation of a protection order.

The Bench said civil and criminal law have different consequences, with criminal law carrying the force of criminal deterrence.

“As such, to say that the DV Act provides for adequate protection to women in ‘relationships in the nature of marriage’ would be a misstatement of law,” Court said.

What did the court say about changing social norms?

Court observed that living together before marriage is no longer unheard of or unacceptable, particularly in urban areas.

It said that when two people begin a relationship, they may do so with the best of intentions, but some relationships may subsequently become abusive and the law must provide protection in such situations.

The distinction between a married relationship and a “live-in relationship in the nature of marriage”, insofar as Section 498A protection is concerned, has no rational nexus with the objective of preventing domestic violence and is therefore offensive to Article 14, the Bench held.

Court said that if a woman is in a domestic setup even prior to marriage, the protection available to a married woman should also extend to her where the relationship qualifies as one “in the nature of marriage”.

“Cruelty, any which way, does not check at the door, whether the house it enters is that of a married woman or not. Once it enters, its propensity to destroy is aggravated,” the Bench said.

What was the case before the Supreme Court?

The judgment came while dismissing an appeal filed by Dr Lokesh B H and others against the Karnataka High Court's judgment declining to quash proceedings against them under Section 498A IPC.

The accused-appellant had contended that the woman who lodged the complaint was not married to him and, therefore, Section 498A could not apply.

Senior advocate Anand Sanjay M Nuli, appearing for the appellant, submitted that Section 498A, being a penal provision, had to be strictly construed to include only a husband, meaning a man in a valid and lawful marriage.

He argued that such an interpretation would not leave the woman without a remedy, as other provisions of the IPC and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 could apply.

The Union government supported the appellant's case. It submitted that parliamentary debates relating to the DV Act had specifically recorded that, before the enactment of the DV Act, other remedies available to women, including Section 498A IPC, specifically catered to married women.

The Centre also argued that living together for however long does not constitute marriage under the statutory regime and that a second marriage which is void does not confer the status of wife on the second woman.

If the law suffers from any inadequacy, the Centre submitted, it was for Parliament to remedy it.

The counsel for the respondent woman, on the other hand, submitted that the word “husband” should be given a purposive construction and that Section 498A should also apply to void or voidable marriages.

The State of Karnataka supported the respondent woman and urged the Court to dismiss the appeal.

Amicus curiae Nina R Nariman also supported the application of Section 498A to live-in relationships that qualified as “relationships in the nature of marriage”. She argued that legislation with socially reformative objectives should receive a purposive interpretation.

Supreme Court refuses to quash 498A proceedings

In the present case, the Bench noted that the appellant had suppressed his prior marriage and that he, along with his family members, had allegedly harassed the respondent woman for dowry and caused physical injury to her, including burns on her leg.

“Whether or not this actually happened is a matter of trial. When the allegations are taken at face value, it cannot be said that they do not prima facie constitute an offence,” the Bench said.

Court therefore held that it would not be appropriate to intervene and quash the proceedings initiated by the woman.

Case Title: Dr Lokesh B H & Ors Vs State of Karnataka & Anr

Bench: Justices Sanjay Karol and N Kotiswar Singh

Date of Judgment: August 3, 2024

Click here to download judgment

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