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Synopsis

The Supreme Court on December 6, 2024 said that an intention to cause such injuries that are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to result in death qualifies as murder, and even if ingredients other than intention to cause murder are proved, mere knowledge of the result of fatal actions is enough to ascribe culpability to the accused person.

A bench comprising Justices Vikram Nath and Prasanna B. Varale upheld the life sentence of Kunhimuhammed alias Kunheethu, a sympathizer of the Indian Union of Muslim League (IUML), for the murder of Subrahmannian on April 11, 2006. The incident occurred a day after clashes broke out between supporters of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Left Democratic Front (LDF) over a dispute related to their election symbols.

During the altercation, the accused persons attacked the victim with a tamarind stick. However, the victim managed to seize the stick and retaliated. In response, Kunhimuhammed drew a knife and stabbed Subrahmannian in the chest, the back of the head, and the left shoulder, resulting in his death. In the case of the two co-accused, one was granted the benefit of the doubt by the Supreme Court in 2019, while the sentence of another was reduced from six years to three years under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code.

The top court dismissed Kunhimuhammed's (the present appellant) plea for leniency, rejecting arguments based on spontaneity, lack of premeditation, self-defence, and old age. The appeal challenged the Kerala High Court's September 18, 2018, judgment, which had upheld the trial court's conviction under Sections 302, 324, and 326 of the Indian Penal Code.

"When the minimum sentence itself is life imprisonment, then grounds like parity, leniency, old age, health concerns, etc shall not be of any aid to the accused while seeking reduction of sentence. Therefore, the appellant herein has been granted the minimum sentence for committing the offence of murder," the bench said.

The appellant's counsel contended that the incident stemmed from a scuffle between two rival factions, asserting that the stabbing and subsequent death of the victim were not premeditated but occurred spontaneously in the heat of the moment. The counsel argued that the act lacked deliberate intent to commit murder and was an unfortunate consequence of an escalating confrontation.

Dealing with the matter, court observed that the appellant's primary defence hinged on the claim of an absence of intent to commit murder.

"However, intent can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the act, including the nature and location of the injuries inflicted, the weapon used, and the actions of the appellant during the incident. The injuries were concentrated on the vital parts of the deceased’s body, such as the chest and ribs, which house critical organs like the heart and lungs. The deliberate targeting of these areas indicates a clear intent to cause harm that could lead to death," the court said.

It observed that the deliberate stabbing of vital body parts, combined with the force applied, demonstrated the appellant's awareness of the likely fatal consequences of his actions.

"Under the provisions of Section 300 IPC, an intention to cause such injuries that are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death qualifies as murder, and even if ingredients other than intention to cause murder are proved, mere knowledge of the result of fatal actions is enough to ascribe culpability to the accused person," the bench said.

While the attack may not have been planned in advance, intent can emerge in the heat of the moment, particularly during a violent confrontation. The appellant’s decision to use a lethal weapon and the precise targeting of the victim’s vital organs are sufficient to establish the requisite intent for murder or at least knowledge of the possible consequences of one’s actions and to hold the appellant liable for death of the deceased as per clause 3 of Section 300, IPC, the bench added.

With regard to the appellant's plea for private defence, the bench said the number of injuries on the accused side by itself were not sufficient to establish right of private defense as an overall view of the case had to be taken to check whether a case for private defence was made out from the evidence on record.

The bench held that the courts below had rightly concluded that the appellant’s perception of danger was neither reasonable nor proportional to the force he employed in response.

"His role in bringing about the altercation cannot be overlooked. The appellant cannot benefit from the exception when he was instrumental in creating the circumstances that led to the confrontation," the bench said.

The court pointed out that the injuries inflicted on the deceased were severe and intentional, including a fatal wound to the heart.

"The appellant’s actions cannot be justified as a defensive response to the minor injuries he sustained. Thus, the plea of exceeding the right of private defense under Exception 2 to Section 300, IPC, is not applicable to the appellant’s case. The courts below have rightly rejected this argument, holding that the appellant was not under any imminent peril and that his actions were deliberate and excessive", the bench said.

With regard to the appellant's claim for parity with two other accused, the bench said the doctrine of parity ensures fairness in sentencing when co-accused persons are similarly situated and share the same level of culpability. However, parity is not an automatic entitlement; the role, intent, and actions of each accused must be individually assessed to determine their degree of involvement in the crime.

It said that the evidence presented during the trial clearly established that the appellant played a distinct and more culpable role in the incident. While the co-accused were armed with sticks and caused non-fatal injuries to the victims, the appellant alone was armed with a knife and used it to inflict fatal injuries on the deceased, it noted.

The court said, "The appellant’s actions were not only more severe but also demonstrated a clear intent to cause death. The fatal injuries inflicted on the deceased, as detailed in the post-mortem report, leave no room for doubt about the appellant – accused no. 1’s culpability. The courts below have correctly observed that the appellant’s role in the crime is incomparable to that of his co-accused," the bench said.

With regard to the plea for old age and deteriorating health, the bench said that these factors alone cannot absolve or mitigate the responsibility for a crime of such magnitude.

"A murder committed with the intent to target vital organs, particularly in a group setting, reflects a level of intent and cruelty that demands an appropriate punitive response. To reduce the sentence in such a case would risk undermining the seriousness of the crime and the sanctity of life itself, principles that the judicial system is duty-bound to uphold," the bench said.

The court said that the offence occurred in a context of political rivalry, a factor that exacerbated its gravity.

"Crimes rooted in such motives often have far-reaching consequences beyond the immediate loss of life, contributing to social unrest and weakening public confidence in the rule of law. The Court must therefore ensure that its decisions reinforce the principle of accountability and deter the recurrence of such violent acts, particularly those that disrupt public order," the bench said.

Although the court acknowledged the appellant’s advanced age of 67 years and medical condition, it said these factors could not outweigh the need for justice and the rule of law.

"While we empathise with the appellant’s personal circumstances, we find no compelling justification to interfere with the sentence imposed by the lower court. The nature of the offence, its deliberate execution, and its societal implications necessitate that the punishment reflects the seriousness of the crime," the bench said.

It said that once conviction under Section 302 of IPC is confirmed by all the courts, then the minimum sentence is imprisonment for life, as provided under the provision itself.

"Thus, no ground or reason for granting a lesser sentence arises. When the minimum sentence itself is life imprisonment," the bench said, rejecting the appellant's request for reduction in sentence as without merit.

Case Title: Kunhimuhammed @ Kunheethu Vs The State of Kerala