Survival After Fatal Assault No Ground to Dilute Murder Charge: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court on September 12, 2025, dismissed an appeal filed by a man against the Chhattisgarh High Court's 2024 judgment, which had partly allowed his plea by altering his conviction and that of three co-accused from the offence of murder to attempt to murder. The change was made on the ground that the victim had died nine months after the incident in 2022.

A bench of Justices J B Pardiwala and R Mahadevan held that the High Court committed a serious error in bringing the case within the ambit of attempt to commit murder punishable under Section 307 of the IPC, merely because the victim survived for almost nine months after the assault and eventually died due to pneumonia and other complications during treatment, rather than immediately from the injuries.

"The injuries suffered by the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and would come under clause “Thirdly” of Section 300 of the IPC. The deceased ultimately died having not recovered from the injuries. The presence of the supervening cause in the circumstances will not, in our view, alter the culpability,'' the bench said.

In the case in hand, the court pointed out, there had been no such considerable change of circumstances as to snap the chain of causation.

The bench opined that it would have been quite a different matter if the original injuries had healed meanwhile or ceased to be dangerous to life and the fatal complications had set in unexpectedly. If that would have been so, the appellant herein would then at any rate be entitled to the benefit of doubt as to the cause of death, the bench said.

"We are taken by surprise as to on what basis the High Court has recorded a finding that the deceased succumbed to the injuries suffered by him due to lack of proper treatment. There is absolutely no evidence in this regard. Not a single suggestion in this regard was put by the defence counsel in the cross examination of the doctors. Even otherwise this aspect is wholly irrelevant in view of Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC,'' the bench said.

The bench explained that where death is delayed due to later complications or developments, the courts should consider the nature of the injury, complications or the attending circumstances.

It pointed out that if the complications or developments are the natural, probable, or necessary consequence of the injury, and if it is reasonably contemplated as its result, the injury could be said to have caused death.

If, on the other hand, the chain of consequences is broken, or if there is unexpected complication causing new mischief, the relation of cause and effect is not established, or the causal connection is too remote then the injury cannot be said to have caused death. If the original injury itself is of a fatal nature, it makes no difference that death is actually caused by a complication naturally flowing from the injury and not the injury itself, since causal connection is proximate, court added.

In the case, court held as erroneous the High Court's finding that since the deceased died about nine months after the date of the incident due to lack of proper treatment, the case was not one of murder.

"On one hand, the High Court believes that the cause of death was due to injuries suffered by the deceased, and on the other hand, takes the view that as he died after nine months due to lack of proper treatment the offence would fall within Section 307 of the IPC,'' the bench said.

Disagreeing with the views expressed by the High Court, the court undertook an academic exercise in the case, since no appeal against acquittal was filed at the instance of the State.

"We should not ignore or overlook the gross error committed by the High Court,'' the bench said.

As per the case, the appellant herein along with three other co-accused trespassed into the house of the deceased and dragged him upto the terrace of the house and flung him down. After this, the appellant and other co accused assaulted him with sticks and fisticuffs. The injured was shifted to the hospital in a very critical condition. Dying declaration of the deceased was recorded in which he named the appellant herein and the other co-accused.

The trial court had convicted the four accused including the appellant herein, Maniklal Sahu for the murder and awarded them life imprisonment. The High Court altered their conviction of the attempt to murder only and sentenced them to seven years imprisonment.

On the appeal by Sahu against the High Court's judgment, the apex court found, all the three medical experts examined by the prosecution were clear in their oral testimony that the deceased died during treatment on November 08, 2022 due to septic shock with bilateral pneumonia, post traumatic spinal cord injury with paraplegia and infected bedsores leading to hepatic dysfunction. The ocular version of the eyewitnesses corroborated with medical evidence on record. Threrefore, court dismissed the appeal.

In its conclusion, the court highlighted a few broad principles that the courts must keep in mind:

a. If it is proved that the injury was fatal and the intention was to cause death, though the death occurred after several days of septicaemia or other complications having supervened, yet it is undoubtedly a murder as it falls within the first limb of Section 300 of the IPC.

b. If it is proved that the injuries by themselves were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and if it is established that those injuries were the intended injuries, though the death might have occurred after septicaemia or other complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would squarely fall under the third limb of Section 300 of the IPC and the accused is therefore liable to be punished under Section 302 of the IPC.

c. If it is proved that the injuries were imminently dangerous to life, though the death had occurred after septicaemia or other complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would squarely fall under the fourth limb of Section 300 of the IPC, provided, the other requirements like knowledge on the part of the accused, etc are satisfied and so the accused would be liable to be punished under Section 302 of the IPC. Here also, the primary cause of the death is the injuries and septicaemia.

d. In judging whether the injuries inflicted were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the possibility that skilful and efficient medical treatment might prevent the fatal result is wholly irrelevant.

e. If the supervening causes are attributable to the injuries caused, then the person inflicting the injuries is liable for causing death, even if death was not the direct result of the injuries.

f. Broadly speaking, the courts would have to undertake the exercise to distinguish between two types of cases; first, where the intervening cause of death, like peritonitis, is only a remote and a rather improbable consequence of the injury; then it can be said that the injury is one which may, in particular circumstances, result in death, but which may not in ordinary course of nature be likely to lead to it. Secondly, where the complication which is the intervening cause of death is itself a practically inevitable sequence to the injury. In that event, the probability is very high indeed, amounting to practical certainty i.e., death is a result in due course of natural events. A deep abdominal thrust with a knife followed by injury to the internal organs is practically certain to result in acute peritonitis causing death. It is clearly a case of murder under Section 302 and not merely of culpable homicide.

g. Even when the medical evidence does not say that any one of the injuries on the body of the deceased was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, yet it is open to the court to look into the nature of the injuries found on the body of the deceased and infer from them that the assailants intended to cause death of the deceased. If none of the injuries alone were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased, cumulatively, they may be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause his death.

h. What the courts must see is whether the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or to cause such bodily injuries as the accused knew to be likely to cause death although death was ultimately due to supervention of some other cause. An intervening cause or complication is by itself not of such significance. What is significant is whether death was only a remote possibility, or is one which would have occurred in due course.

Case Title: Maniklal Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Judgment Date: September 12, 2025

Bench: Justices J B Pardiwala and R Mahadevan