‘Vindictive Litigation Strains Courts’: SC Quashes Cheating Case

The Supreme Court on November 24, 2025 said that criminal law ought not to become a platform for initiating vindictive proceedings to settle personal scores and vendettas, as it quashed criminal proceedings for cheating and criminal breach of trust initiated by a man against his brother in a dispute concerning a partnership firm.

A bench of Justices B V Nagarathna and R Mahadevan allowed the appeal filed by Inder Chand Bagri against the Gauhati High Court's order of February 13, 2018, which had refused to quash proceedings under Sections 406, 420, and 120B of the IPC. These proceedings arose out of a complaint dated September 19, 2013 filed before the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, Gauhati, by his brother, Jagadish Prasad Bagri.

Court relied on Vishal Noble Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh (2024), where it was observed that in recent years, the machinery of criminal justice has been misused by certain persons for their vested interests and oblique motives. Courts therefore need to remain vigilant against such tendencies and ensure that acts adversely impacting societal harmony are nipped in the bud.

“We say so for the reason that while the complainant–respondent No.1 has made grave allegations against the appellant herein, he has failed to justify the same before this court. Such actions would create significant divisions and distrust among people, while also placing an unnecessary strain on the judicial system, particularly criminal courts,” the bench said.

The partnership firm in question was formed by the brothers in 1976 for constructing godowns and warehouses and was dissolved in 1997. The complainant, however, objected to the appellant’s decision to sell a property to his nephew Ajit Kumar. He filed both a title suit and a separate criminal complaint against his brother and nephew. After summons were issued, the appellant approached the High Court, which quashed the case against the nephew but refused to grant relief to the appellant, holding there was a prima facie case against him.

Considering the facts and circumstances, the Supreme Court found that the complainant had failed to establish the basic ingredients of the offence under Section 420 of the IPC.

“We fail to understand how the allegations against the appellant-accused herein could be brought within the scope and ambit of the section. On a bare perusal of the complaint, we do not find that the offence of cheating as defined under Section 420 of the IPC is made out at all, nor do we find any cheating or dishonest inducement to deliver any property or valuable security involved in the instant case,” the bench observed.

Court emphasised that for establishing the offence of cheating, the complainant had to show that the accused had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making a promise or representation related to the partnership agreement.

“Such culpable intention at the very outset cannot be presumed but has to be made out with cogent facts. In the present case, there is a clear absence of material on record to attribute any dishonest or fraudulent intention to the appellant-accused,” the bench said.

Mere allegations that the appellant dishonestly induced the complainant to part with partnership property and subsequently sold it to a third party do not satisfy the test of dishonest inducement under Section 420 of the IPC, court added.

“We again fail to see how an offence of criminal breach of trust can be made out,” the bench said.

The court explained that for cheating, criminal intention must exist at the time of making a false or misleading representation. For criminal breach of trust, proof of entrustment alone is sufficient. In the former, the offender induces a person to deliver property; in the latter, the offender misappropriates property already entrusted to him. Because these offences are antithetical, they cannot coexist on the same set of facts, the bench said.

Court held that no mens rea could be attributed to the appellant, making the prosecution’s allegations unsustainable.

“We are of the firm opinion that continuing the criminal proceedings against the appellant would cause undue harassment to him, because as observed hereinabove, no prima facie case under Sections 406 or 420 of the IPC is made out,” the bench said.

Finding that none of the offences alleged was made out and that the accusations were motivated by mala fide intent, court set aside the High Court’s order and quashed the proceedings.

Case Title: Inder Chand Bagri Vs Jagdish Prasad Bagri & Another

Judgment Date: November 24, 2025

Bench: Justices B V Nagarathna and R Mahadevan