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Synopsis

The Supreme Court recently discharged two men—an interior decorator and a store manager of a shop—in a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder of two employees, who got electrocuted while fixing a signboard as part of decoration on the front side of the shop on September 27, 2013, in Pune, finding no prima facie evidence to initiate a trial against them.

A bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan explained that what is important to note is that for committing the offence of culpable homicide, a positive act must be done by the doer with the intention that such an act would cause death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that by such an act, death may be caused.

"What, therefore, is significant is that the doer of the act must have the intention of causing death or the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or has the knowledge that by doing such an act he is likely to cause death. Therefore, to commit the offence of culpable homicide, intention or knowledge is of crucial importance," the bench said.

With regard to Section 304 Part II IPC, the court said that the said section would be attracted if anyone commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.

Therefore, the requirement of Section 304 Part II IPC is that the doer must have the knowledge that the act performed is likely to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death. Thus, the basic ingredient of Section 304 Part II IPC is the presence of knowledge and absence of intention. The doer must have the knowledge that the act performed by him would likely cause death, etc., but there should not be any intention to cause death, the bench said.

It was contended that two employees of appellant Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther, namely Salauddin Shaikh and Arun Sharma, were provided with an iron ladder and were working on the signboard approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level. They were struck by electricity and as a result, they got electrocuted and fell down. After being taken to the hospital, they were declared dead on arrival.

More than two months later, on December 04, 2013, the FIR was lodged at Vishrambag Police Station against the appellants for not taking proper care and caution and not providing any safety equipment like belts, helmets, rubber shoes, etc., to the two deceased employees. The appellants were charge-sheeted for committing an offence under Sections 304A, 182, 201 read with Section 34 IPC.

The judicial magistrate opined there were materials to attract Section 304 Part II IPC. The sessions court, on April 01, 2017, dismissed both discharge applications, holding there was sufficient material justifying the framing of charges against the accused Kanther and Nimesh Pravinchandra Shah for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC.

The high court, on November 2, 2017, dismissed the revision petition, holding there was strong suspicion against both the appellants for committing the offence for which they were charged. It could not be said that there were no grounds to proceed against the appellants, it said.

Before the apex court, the appellants' counsel contended no offence was made out in the case, as it was a case of a sudden accident. Neither any negligent nor rash act was committed by the appellants, nor can any specific overt act be attributed to them, he said.

He further submitted that the appellants had paid compensation to the legal heirs of the two deceased employees to the extent of Rs 5,91,180.00 (Arun Sharma) and Rs 5,20,584.00 (Salauddin Shaikh). The appellant also provided employment to the brother of Shaikh and took care of the educational expenses of Sharma's children.

On the contrary, the respondent's counsel claimed the appellants did not provide any safety equipment to the two deceased employees, who sustained electric shock, fell down, and suffered multiple injuries resulting in their death.

Having gone through the legal framework, the bench noted that, according to the prosecution and accepted by the trial court and the high court, the two accused persons had not taken proper care and caution by providing safety shoes, safety belts, etc., to the two employees, although they were asked to perform the job of working on the signboard as part of decorating the front side of the shop, which was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level.

"Even if we take the allegation against the appellants as correct, we are afraid no prima facie case can be said to have been made out against the appellants for committing an offence under Section 304 Part II IPC," the bench said.

The court noted there was no intention on the part of the two appellants to cause the death or cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause the death of the two deceased employees. It cannot also be said that the appellants had knowledge that by asking the two deceased employees to work on the signboard as part of the work of decoration of the frontage of the shop, they had the knowledge that such an act was likely to cause the death of the two deceased employees, the court said.

The bench pointed out that at the stage of consideration of discharge, the court is not required to undertake a threadbare analysis of the materials gathered by the prosecution.

"All that is required to be seen at this stage is that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In other words, the materials should be sufficient to enable the court to initiate a criminal trial against the accused. It may be so that at the end of the trial, the accused may still be acquitted," the bench said.

At the stage of discharge, the court is only required to consider whether there are sufficient materials that can justify the launch of a criminal trial against the accused. By its very nature, a discharge is at a higher pedestal than an acquittal. Acquittal is at the end of the trial process, maybe for a technicality, on the benefit of doubt, or because the prosecution could not prove the charge against the accused. But when an accused is discharged, it means that there are no materials to justify the launch of a criminal trial against the accused. Once he is discharged, he is no longer an accused, the court said.

The court also rejected reliance by the respondent's counsel on the case of Keshub Mahindra v. State of MP (1996) (Bhopal Gas Tragedy case), saying the facts of the present case were poles apart from that case.

The bench pointed out that the Keshub Mahindra case arose out of the infamous Bhopal Gas tragedy. A highly dangerous and toxic gas escaped from a tank in the Bhopal factory belonging to Union Carbide India Limited. As a result of such leakage, 3,828 human beings lost their lives; 18,922 suffered permanent injuries; 7,172 suffered temporary disablement; 1,313 suffered temporary disablement caused by permanent injuries; and permanent partial disablement was suffered by 2,680 persons. While 40 human beings suffered from permanent total disablement, a total of 2,544 animals died. Criminal proceedings were initiated against the company and officials belonging to the company.

"This court, upon perusal of the material on record, had then held that charges under Section 304 Part II, 324, 326, and 429 of IPC were not attracted at all. Framing of such charges against the concerned accused persons fell short of even a prima facie case. It was also observed that the mere act of running a plant as per permission granted by the authorities would not be a criminal act", the bench pointed out.

However, considering the gravity of the incident, this court exercised power under Article 142 of the Constitution to hold that a prima facie case was made out for the accused to face trial under Section 304 A of the IPC, the bench said.

Terming the present case as "purely accidental," the bench said no prima facie case could be said to have been made out against the appellants for committing an offence under Section 304A IPC, not to speak of Section 304 Part II IPC.

The court also said, in any case, the trial court only considered the culpability of the appellants with respect to Section 304 Part II IPC, as the committing magistrate had committed the case to the court of sessions, confining the allegations against the appellant to Section 304 Part II IPC and not Section 304A IPC.

It accordingly held that the trial court and the high court fell in error in rejecting the discharge applications of the appellants. Consequently, the court quashed and set aside the orders, allowing the appeal and discharging the appellants in the case.

Case Title: Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr Vs State of Maharashtra