Delay in pending matters also part of judicial decision, not open to challenge in writ petition: SC

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Synopsis

SC bench said if priority has not been given to the petitioner’s criminal appeal (albeit filed in 2016) by the High Court for early hearing, for whatever reason, the same is also part of the judicial process and cannot be made amenable to a challenge in a writ petition under Article 32 citing breach of Article 21 of the Constitution 

The Supreme Court has said that anyone aggrieved of denial of bail or delay in decision in criminal appeal filed by him before a High Court cannot invoke writ remedy as a judicial decision rendered by a judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him does not infringe a fundamental right.

A bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih said delay in decision of a pending cases is also part of the judicial decision and is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution for breach of right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The court also pointed out the Constitution does not confer power of superintendence on the Supreme Court over the High Courts as both are constitutional courts.

The court dismissed a writ petition filed by Ganpat alias Ganatpat as "thoroughly misconceived".

The petitioner filed the plea seeking a mandamus for direction for expeditious disposal of particular criminal appeal filed in 2016. He also sought an interim suspension of sentence and his enlargement on bail in the case.

"If priority has not been given to the petitioner’s criminal appeal (albeit filed in 2016) by the High Court for early hearing, for whatever reason, the same is also part of the judicial process and cannot be made amenable to a challenge in a writ petition under Article 32 citing breach of Article 21," the bench said. 

The bench noted that the High Court has previously, pending his criminal appeal, denied the petitioner bail twice and one such denial having been challenged, it has failed before this court. 

"The petitioner, if he wishes to be released on bail pending the criminal appeal, cannot invoke the writ remedy but has to take recourse to an application under Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure," the bench said.

"Accepting the prayer of the petitioner and issuing any direction, as prayed, would amount to inappropriate exercise of discretionary jurisdiction showing disrespect to another constitutional court; hence, no such direction, as prayed by the petitioner, can be issued," the bench said.

That apart, the bench said, assuming that an extraordinary case requires a nudge from this Court for early hearing of a long pending criminal appeal, it is only a request that ought to be made to the High Court to such effect in appropriate proceedings, care being taken to ensure that the proceeding before this Court is otherwise maintainable. 

Bearing in mind the Constitution Bench decision in 'Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar Vs. State of Maharashtra' (1967) which has laid down the law more than half a century back that a judicial decision rendered by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him does not infringe a Fundamental Right, the bench said, "We are of the clear view that the instant writ petition (presented by the petitioner aggrieved by non-consideration and non-disposal of his criminal appeal) is not maintainable."

The bench also pointed out there is no provision in Chapter-IV (titled The Union Judiciary) under Part-V (The Union) of the Constitution of India which, in terms similar to Article 227 of the Constitution (Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court) under Chapter-V thereof, confers power of superintendence on the Supreme Court over the High Courts. 

The bench also made a reference in this connection to the decision of this Court in 'Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd Vs State of Bihar (2004). 

"It has been highlighted there that in our constitutional scheme there is a clear division of jurisdiction between the two institutions and both the institutions need to have mutual respect for each other," the bench said.