Subsequent decision in which earlier ones were considered and distinguished are binding upon the High Court: Top Court
The Supreme Court last week clarified that its subsequent decision, in which the earlier decisions were considered and distinguished by it, would be binding upon the High Court and not the earlier decisions, which were distinguished.
"Not following the binding precedents of this Court by the High Court is contrary to Article 141 of the Constitution of India...", further remarked a bench of Justice MR Shah and Justice BV Nagarathna.
This observation was made by a division bench while allowing an appeal filed by Gregory Patrao and Others who were the original landowners in an acquisition proceeding.
Patrao had challenged the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Karnataka wherein it set aside the judgment and award passed by the Reference Court and remanded the matter to the Reference Court to decide the references afresh after affording an opportunity to all the parties including respondent No. 1 - M/s. Mangalore Refineries & Petrochemicals Ltd., Mangalore (MRPL).
Lands belonging Patrao and others were acquired under Section 28(4) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (“KIAD Act, 1966”) under three different notifications for the development of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (“KIADB”) for establishment of industrial areas.
The Land Acquisition Officer after affording an opportunity of hearing to the owners of the land passed an award. At the instance of the landowners, the references were made to the Reference Court which enhanced the amount of compensation.
Aggrieved by the enhanced amount of compensation, MRPL, who was allotted the land as a lessee by the KIADB, preferred appeals before the High Court wherein the impugned judgment was passed.
A short question that arose for the Top Court's consideration was whether MRPL, who is simply an allottee of the land by the KIAD Board, after the acquisition of the lands under Section 28 of the KIAD Act, 1966, can be said to be a “person interested” under the provisions of KIAD Act, 1966 and therefore, was a proper party in the reference proceedings initiated at the instance of the original landowners?
High Court had set aside the judgment and award passed by Reference Court mainly relying on two Supreme Court judgments viz. Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. vs. Francis Victor Countinho (Dead) By LRs', and UP Awas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Gyan Devi (Dead) by LRs to reject the contention that the MRPL, being an allottee from the KIADB and the beneficiary of the land acquisition proceedings is the KIADB and not the MRPL and the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer was deposited by the KIADB, MRPL cannot be said to be a 'person interested'.
It was found that the High Court ignored the reliance placed on the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan vs. State of Karnataka, wherein it was held that an allottee company cannot be said to be a beneficiary or a "person interested" entitled for hearing before determination of compensation.
Court further noted that UP Awas Evam Vikas Parishad case and Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. case relied upon by MRPL and even by the High Court dealt with acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Also, in the case of Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan, the acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the KIAD Act, 1966 were considered by the top court and it was held that both were distinct and the provisions under both the Acts were distinguishable.
Accordingly, the impugned judgment by the High Court setting aside the award passed by the Reference Court and remanding the matter to the Reference Court came to be quashed and set aside.
Case Title: Gregory Patrao and Ors. vs Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Limited & Ors.