Supreme Court Says ‘Approach the Executive First’ on Plea Seeking Regulation of Religious Instruction Institutions

The bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma permitted the petitioner to withdraw the plea with liberty to make a representation before the competent authority.

During the hearing, Justice Datta questioned the very premise of the petition. “We do not understand what is meant by registration,” the Bench observed at the outset.

Responding to the Court’s query, Senior Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan, appearing for the petitioner, clarified that the relief sought was for “recognition” rather than mere registration of such institutions.

However, the Bench pressed the petitioner on maintainability, noting that no prior representation had been made to any authority. “Before the court, you have to show that you have approached the authority with the same prayer, and that the authority has either declined to consider it or is sitting tight,” Justice Datta said. He added that the Court would consider the issue “in the next round” if the executive failed to act.

Sankaranarayanan pointed to conflicting judicial views on the issue, submitting that the Allahabad High Court and the Kerala High Court had taken diametrically opposite positions. According to him, the Allahabad High Court had held that institutions imparting religious instruction could continue without recognition, while the Kerala High Court had ruled that such institutions could not function without recognition and were liable to be shut down.

Justice Datta, however, was unconvinced that this warranted immediate intervention by the Supreme Court. “Let the executive first deal with it,” he said, observing that the prayer as framed raised federal concerns since all states were parties to the petition. Referring to West Bengal, Justice Datta remarked, “In Bengal, I don’t find any registration thing.”

The Senior counsel invoked Article 21A of the Constitution, which guarantees free and compulsory education to children between the ages of 6 and 14 years. Sankaranarayanan argued that the core concern was children being diverted from compulsory formal education into “parallel methodologies” of religious instruction. He clarified that the plea was not confined to madrasas alone but extended to any institution imparting religious instruction without ensuring compliance with constitutional and statutory mandates on elementary education.

“The problem is children who are not getting compulsory education and are being sent to a parallel system of religious instruction,” Sankaranarayanan submitted.

The Bench, however, maintained that the issue must first be examined at the executive level.

Concluding the hearing, the Court allowed the writ petition to be withdrawn and granted liberty to the petitioner to approach the appropriate authority with a detailed representation raising the concerns.

The public interest litigation (PIL) filed by Advocate Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay under Article 32 of the Constitution through AoR Ashwani Kumar Dubey seeks mandatory registration of all institutions imparting secular education or religious instruction to children up to the age of 14, invoking Articles 21A, 39(f), 45 and 51A(k).

The petitioner contends that children are the backbone of the nation’s growth and, owing to their tender age, are particularly vulnerable to indoctrination and manipulation. It is argued that the State bears a heightened constitutional responsibility to ensure their welfare, safety and access to quality education. According to the plea, unregistered educational and religious institutions pose serious risks not only to child welfare but also to national security, as unsupervised environments can facilitate radicalisation and brainwashing of young minds.

A core plank of the PIL challenges the prevailing constitutional interpretation governing educational and religious institutions. The petitioner submits that institutions imparting religious instruction squarely fall under Article 26, which deals with religious denominations and their right to manage institutions for religious and charitable purposes. Article 30, it is argued, is merely a reiteration of Article 19(1)(g) insofar as it grants minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions, and does not extend to propagation of religion through religious instruction.

The plea contends that Article 30 covers only secular or non-religious educational institutions, even when established by minorities. Any institution imparting religious instruction, whether minority or non-minority, must therefore be governed by Article 26. The current practice of extending Article 30 protection to what the petitioner terms “semi-religious” minority educational institutions is described as constitutionally impermissible and discriminatory, violating Article 14 by creating unequal treatment between minority and non-minority institutions imparting similar forms of instruction.